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Preface
The period between 1999 and 2003 proved to be quite an interesting 
period in modern Myanmar history, because it provided unusual 
insights into the political and other forces that propelled Myanmar 
on its pathway towards a transition to democracy. My assignment as 
Australian Ambassador from 2000 to mid-2003 enabled me to obtain 
some unique perspectives on current developments in Myanmar, 
which I was able to refine and extend over the next 10 years or so, after 
my ‘early’ retirement from the Australian foreign service and while a 
Visiting Fellow on Myanmar at The Australian National University 
(2003–2015).
Why was this period especially interesting or illuminating? Why is 
it still worth recording in some form some time later? One obvious 
answer is that some of the specific origins of Myanmar’s current 
transition trace their start and many of their enduring characteristics 
to this period, which made this an unusually good opportunity — 
in terms of openness, access to people and places, and availability of 
data — to document these early encounters with reform. The second 
answer is that for those participating directly in attempts to transform 
and improve Myanmar — Myanmar people and foreigners alike — 
this period was an experimental laboratory. Some initiatives tried at 
this time worked and were perpetuated; some did not work and were 
modified or dropped. 
My experience is not unique: some of my Australian colleagues shared 
similar experiences; some of my foreign colleagues also shared similar 
experiences. But much of this background is not well known, has not 
been widely or accurately reported, and is already being forgotten.
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I was fortunate in several ways, mostly not of my own making: 
Australian policy towards Myanmar at this time — under Foreign 
Minister Alexander Downer in the Coalition Government of John 
Howard — was somewhat innovative; and I met many Australians 
working in and with Myanmar, some of whom had been doing so 
intelligently and empathetically for many years. I was also able to 
travel widely inside Myanmar and met many Myanmar people deeply 
committed to making their country a much better place. Most of these 
people remain good friends to this day.
I dedicate this book to those Myanmar people.
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In 2000, Myanmar/Burma was one of the least known countries in 
Southeast Asia, despite its history as a long-time British colony, 
and its place as a scene of significant and sustained international 
military action  during World War II. Decades of self-imposed 
isolation by military-dominated governments, followed by over 
a decade of international sanctions, contributed not only to this lack 
of understanding and knowledge, but also to the prevalence of a 
variety of international stereotypes about the country and its people. 
It was seen as a ‘backwater’, as being of little economic or cultural 
significance, and its people were believed to be uncomfortable 
with foreigners. 
Myanmar/Burma was best known as a country of military dictatorship 
and political repression, and attempts by the international community 
to develop effective policies to change this situation were often 
presented in mainstream analyses as being either misguided or 
without focus. Internationally, relatively few academics thoroughly 
studied the nature of politics, the military, or the state in Myanmar/
Burma, and media reporting tended to be superficial and trivial.
This situation was not helped by the tendency for politics in 
Myanmar/Burma, and responses to political dilemmas, to be highly 
and unnecessarily polarised. The international community was always 
under enormous pressure to take sides in international debates over 
political issues in Myanmar; and, conversely, the government of 
Myanmar/Burma was expected to accept the majority international 
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line on human rights, forced labour, economic development options, 
democratic institutions, and socio-economic choices. The situation 
was not helped by the lack of sustained, enquiring, and objective 
international journalism, given that the only foreign journalist based 
in Myanmar was from China’s Xinhua News Agency. 
Any visitor to Myanmar/Burma at the time soon discovered how 
wrong most of these stereotypes were. In fact, Myanmar/Burma is a 
country of substantial natural resources, with a long and rich cultural 
and artistic heritage. I found Myanmar people to be genuinely friendly 
and hospitable towards foreigners, with a proud and independent way 
of thinking, who complained little, and had developed many creative 
and innovative ‘coping mechanisms’. Politically, Myanmar/Burma was 
a complex and complicated country facing physical, psychological, 
and financial obstacles in dealing with its many long-term problems, 
which the rest of the world seemed to prefer not to confront directly by 
providing assistance or relevant expertise. Many of the solutions that 
were offered by the international community — especially through 
the United Nations — were simplistic and tendered on a ‘take it or 
leave it’ basis.1 
Probably only three Burmese individuals were well known in the rest 
of the world: U Nu, the non-aligned prime minister in the period after 
independence (various times between 1948–62); General Ne Win, the 
ruthless dictator whose xenophobic policies had virtually destroyed 
the country (1958–60, 1962–88); and Aung San Suu Kyi, whose 
winning of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 and whose subjection to 
years of house arrest by a ruthless military had transformed her into an 
1  By 1999, relations between Myanmar and the World Bank had broken down over 
unauthorised disclosure of World Bank documentation about Myanmar; the US Congress 
had determined that no US Ambassador would be appointed to Myanmar/Burma; the West 
(as represented by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)) had 
severed practical cooperation with and training of the Burmese military, although the United 
States retained its defence attaché positions in Yangon; other international agencies (such as 
the International Labour Organization and the International Committee of the Red Cross) were 
experiencing difficulties establishing working relationships with Myanmar/Burma. But the 
UN Security Council — because of the veto powers of China and the Soviet Union/Russia — 
never imposed mandatory sanctions against Myanmar/Burma.
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1 . INTRODUCTION
‘icon’ of democracy. Yet some Burmese diplomats and economists were 
famous in their fields, and some Burmese philosophers and historians 
produced original approaches to region-wide issues.2
Myanmar/Burma clearly presented the international community 
with a serious challenge, which was very hard to ignore given the 
prominence accorded Aung San Suu Kyi after she won the Nobel 
Peace Prize. Whenever the situation in Myanmar/Burma took a turn 
for the worse, whatever the cause, it seemed to highlight the inability 
of international pressure to force the military regime to change its 
approach and adopt a more conciliatory approach. (In fact, of course, 
it would have needed a bit more patience than either the international 
media or the US Congress could muster, both being impatient and 
one-sided in their attitudes.) Moreover, scholars at that time tended 
to transform any discussion into a debate about sanctions versus 
‘engagement’, especially in the United States, where sanctions were 
always a favoured option of the US Congress or US administrations, 
even though the success of most sanctions regimes was highly 
questionable. Much of the academic argumentation about sanctions 
and engagement was also flawed — it was often highly ideological, 
sometimes plainly one-sided, and in general did not focus on benefits 
from engagement or damage from sanctions. The academic debate, 
like the policy ‘debate’, failed to take a strategic or multi-disciplined 
approach. Furthermore, everyone underestimated the determination 
of the Burmese military to hold onto power and to stay on their 
preferred course, which was later outlined in their 2004 ‘Seven-Point 
Road Map’.
While Australia was unmistakeably a supporter of sanctions, and 
therefore only partially and occasionally ‘friendly’ towards the regime 
through its policy of ‘limited engagement’, officials in the Myanmar/
Burma Government and the ordinary Burmese people were unfailingly 
polite and civil about this difference of viewpoint. There was clearly 
a strong legacy of goodwill and trust towards Australia, even many 
years after the Colombo Plan finished. (However, many Burmese — 
who became friends — were open in interchanges I had with them 
about their opposition to sanctions, which they saw as only harming 
poor people and the country, and having little or no impact on the 
2  Here one thinks of UN Secretary-General U Thant; development economist Professor Hla 
Myint; Aung San Suu Kyi herself on pacifism; and Dr Thant Myint-U on history.
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military leadership.) Their opinions influenced me into thinking the 
same way, though as ambassador I always had to support Australian 
policy. This is why I wrote about the ‘collateral damage’ being caused 
by sanctions in 2007, long after I ceased being ambassador. 
In hindsight, one can see that the period between 2000–03 was an 
experimental reform period. What was in play then were numerous 
ideas and changes that took their time to take root and to develop 
fully, but which included some measures that would eventually prove 
not only successful but also popular. Looking back, it is interesting to 
identify any indicators of how and why certain changes were effective, 
or at least non-threatening, and what reforms might be important for 
a successful political transition. 
One issue that had long provoked debate, and which would remain 
a topic for debate for many years, was what name should be used 
for Myanmar/Burma. Obviously, the way the incoming State Law and 
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) changed the name to Myanmar in 
1989 was a political action. While it might not have been their first 
action, it was clearly made in such a way as to indicate the defining 
nature of the change. On the other hand, it can hardly have been a 
surprising move, since the term ‘Myanmar’ had been in widespread 
official and day-to-day use for many years. The decision by the 
democracy movement to object to the change of name is equally a 
political action, and some of the reasons they cite for objecting to it 
do not seem very persuasive. Most people from Myanmar who take up 
the issue are arguing from a political perspective, whatever they say, 
so it is hard to pinpoint the objective case for or against ‘Myanmar’ 
or ‘Burma’. 
Interestingly, the debate over nomenclature was conducted mostly 
outside the country, not inside; it mattered more to the exiles and 
refugees from ‘Burma’ than to the residents of the country. The names 
became highly politicised after 1988, when the newly formed 
democracy movement used ‘Burma’ without exception: for example, 
the ‘Free Burma Campaign’, the National Coalition Government for the 
Union of Burma (NCGUB), and the ‘Burma Campaigns’ in the United 
States, the UK, and Australia.
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Since my letters of credence as ambassador referred to the country 
as ‘Myanmar’, for reasons of protocol I always maintained that the 
name ‘Myanmar’ was correct, and then found it was by far the most 
commonly used name inside the country. Indeed, the only residents 
of the country who always used ‘Burma’ at this time were National 
League for Democracy (NLD) members and the elderly, who had been 
accustomed to saying ‘Burma’ for most of their lives. In Australia, 
I did not always insist on ‘Myanmar’ if my interlocutor was clearly 
more comfortable with ‘Burma’, but I did deliberately use ‘Myanmar’ 
when being interviewed by Voice of America, just as they deliberately 
used ‘Burma’ when questioning me. 
Otherwise, I was relatively unconcerned about what the country 
should be called, and tended to avoid becoming embroiled in the 
ongoing debates about this, which I still regard as an issue of little 
consequence.3 In a practical sense, most Western diplomats — 
including my successors and I — would have followed the custom 
that prevailed in the environment in which they were speaking 
(or writing). Australian governments of both persuasions have more 
than once changed their position on nomenclature, and then sometimes 
reversed that position, which did not increase clarity, certainty, 
or understanding on the part of the Australian public.4 However, since 
so many people and organisations made an issue of the name used for 
the country, the Australian Embassy resorted to using two different 
letterheads, one using ‘Yangon’ and ‘Myanmar’, and another using 
‘Rangoon’ and ‘Burma’.
Australia did not follow the military regime, or the United Nations, 
when they switched to ‘Myanmar’ in 1989. In late 1995, then Foreign 
Minister Gareth Evans decided to move to use ‘Myanmar’, after 
Burma/Myanmar started being raised (as ‘Myanmar’) in Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meetings which Australia attended, 
but this policy did not last very long. When the conservative Coalition 
Government assumed power in March 1996, they supported the name 
3  Andrew Selth probably provided the most balanced and objective account of this in his 
27  November 2013 piece on the Lowy Interpreter blog: www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2013/ 
11/27/Australia-and-the-BurmaMyanmar-name.aspx?COLLCC=178848935&.
4  For an example of a media release Gareth Evans issued as foreign minister, see: foreignminister.
gov.au/releases/1995/m115.html.
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‘Burma’.5 (This did not stop the new minister Alexander Downer 
developing his own innovative approach to engaging with the military 
regime in Burma/Myanmar.) After 2007, as foreign minister and then 
prime minister, Kevin Rudd used ‘Burma’. Thus Australian financial 
sanctions were legislated in 2007 using ‘Burma’. (They were originally 
drafted under Alexander Downer and then taken up by Kevin Rudd.) 
However, when Bob Carr became foreign minister in the Gillard 
Labor Government and visited the country in mid-2012, he initiated 
a complete shift to ‘Myanmar’, which the Australia media and others 
eventually followed. Official Australian usage remained ‘Myanmar’ 
until late 2013, when Foreign Minister Julie Bishop quietly ordered a 
complete change, and all entries on the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) website were changed.6 (For a time, examples of both 
terms could be found on the DFAT website, with historical references 
to ‘Myanmar’ on the former Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID) website being among the last to be removed.) 
By this time, most of the world media were using ‘Myanmar’, and the 
country was in the public eye as the host of ASEAN and East Asian 
Summit meetings as ‘Myanmar’. (Australian  Government ministers 
attended most of these meetings.) 
The Australian media were among the last in the world to change 
to using ‘Myanmar’; even the New York Times and the Wall Street 
Journal had adjusted their terminology in 2012, after the by-elections 
for the Myanmar Parliament, in which the National League for 
Democracy participated, thereby acknowledging the correctness of 
the usage by the military regime and its successor, the Thein Sein 
Government. I  and other ‘experts’ on the country, who were often 
interviewed by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) and 
Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), had long urged the Australian 
media to adopt an apolitical approach and to follow the United Nations 
practice, but such arguments were to no avail. Both the ABC and the 
SBS seemed to be in the thrall of Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, and 
instinctively and stubbornly followed democracy movement wishes.
5  See Alexander Downer’s firm response to repression of NLD activities by the military 
regime as the new foreign minister: foreignminister.gov.au/releases/1996/fa102.html.
6  No public explanation of this change was issued, but, when asked, DFAT explained 
the policy along the lines of: ‘The [Australian] Government will use the term “Myanmar” 
in communications with and public statements about the Myanmar Government, but “Burma” 
in other contexts.’ Private communication from DFAT.
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When the new President of Myanmar, Thein Sein, visited Australia 
officially in early March 2013 and the Australian Government for 
protocol reasons had to use ‘Myanmar’, it was obviously awkward for 
the media to ignore this. When the ABC finally changed its practice 
in early 2013, they could not resist having a special radio item on the 
subject (for which they conspicuously did not interview me).7
Some of the arguments used in the name debate to make the case for 
‘Burma’ are blatantly wrong and misleading. For example, it is not 
correct that ‘Burma’ was chosen through a democratic process in 1947 
in contrast to the way the military regime changed the name in 1989; 
nor is it true that the name ‘Burma’ is more acceptable to the ethnic 
minorities in Myanmar; if anything, ‘Myanmar’ is more acceptable 
to ethnic groups because it carries no racial or ethnic overtones, in 
contrast to ‘Burma’, which plainly derives from the majority ethnic 
name ‘Bamar’.
Common international usage is not necessarily much of a guide to what 
is ‘best’ or ‘correct’ practice in using such terminology. Governments 
were always influenced by political factors, producing the undesirable 
result of Asia and the Third World using ‘Myanmar’ and the West 
using ‘Burma’. Foreign travel companies, not surprisingly, opted 
for the least risky option of sticking with ‘Burma’. Scholars started 
to choose, citing a variety of reasons — some adopted a historical 
approach, using ‘Myanmar’ from 1989. Many writers used ‘Burma’ 
without disclosing a political reason for doing so, occasionally 
without understanding the political significance of what they were 
doing. Fortunately, the internet can easily be programmed to accept 
both Burma and Myanmar equally and as equivalents.
Making the name of the country a high-profile policy issue and 
provoking debate that is not always well-informed is at least 
a distraction and at worst not helpful in terms of substantive 
relationship and activities. A former British Ambassador to Thailand, 
Derek Tonkin, who has become a ‘realist’ activist on Myanmar, has 
been quite scathing about the negative effects of recent reversion to 
the terminology ‘Burma’ by a few: 
7  See Liam Cochrane’s 22 March 2013 story on Radio Australia: www.radioaustralia.net.au/
international/radio/program/connect-asia/is-it-burma-or-myanmar/1105814.
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The policies of those Western countries which maintain this 
unedifying dichotomy reflect a veritable schizophrenia in dealing 
with what is very much a self-imposed dilemma. ‘Myanmar’ is all 
too often an operational necessity — not a mere diplomatic courtesy 
as the US State Department would have us believe — where all matters 
of diplomacy, trade and international relations are concerned, while 
‘Burma’ is still used in a domestic context, to pander to the activist 
lobby and to respond to the entreaties of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. 
The reality is that ‘Myanmar’ is essential on all matters that count, 
since governmental and commercial business would otherwise grind 
to a halt. But ‘Burma’ can be used when there is supposedly nothing at 
stake. What a quaint way to conduct inter-state relations!
The recent [2013] change in Australian policy, if confirmed, will 
neither advance reconciliation between Suu Kyi and the Generals, nor 
help Australian national interests. It is a classic example of the folly 
of politicians succumbing to short-term interest on a wave of emotion 
when a cool head, reliability as a prospective partner and support for 
the reform process in Myanmar should be primary considerations. 
How counterproductive can you get!8
8  See Derek Tonkin’s Network Myanmar website: www.networkmyanmar.org/.
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The Historical Contexts 
Conditions in Myanmar in 2000
Being assigned to Myanmar/Burma obviously meant being prepared to 
function as a diplomatic representative in a political, social, and economic 
context created by Burma’s own history and its own actions or ‘decisions’. 
One needed to be aware of the country’s British colonial past as well as 
more recent events, not the least of which was the 1988 pro-democracy 
uprising, and the infamous and repressive military regime that followed, 
whose continued existence still dominated almost every aspect of life in 
the country for its own citizens and those foreigners living and working 
there. I quickly discovered that although Burma was a relatively small 
country with very modest impact on the outside world, for a variety of 
reasons it generated a wealth of scholarly and media attention, perhaps 
even to a disproportionate extent. There was not only a good deal of 
historical and other writing about Burma, which was of great assistance 
in carrying out my assignment, but there was also more media attention 
than one would expect for a relatively isolated country. Media attention 
could be a mixed blessing, requiring a great deal of care and alertness at 
all times, since as ambassador it would not always be possible to avoid 
it altogether.1 
1  In the early 2000s, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) was not as restrictive 
as it was to later become in regard to media contacts, allowing our ambassadors a small amount of 
leeway for factual comment to journalists. I found that, because there was not a large number of 
‘Western’ embassies in Yangon, and because reliable sources of public information were scarce, I 
would often be sought out by journalists from other countries as well as from Australia. Indeed, 
Australia’s ambassador seemed to be relied on by quite a number of foreign journalists to provide 
helpful and balanced observations.
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One ongoing challenge, however, was the fact that much of the outside 
media and academic interest in Myanmar was to a greater or lesser 
extent influenced by political and/or ideological considerations. 
In other words, it was sometimes biased and not objective, responding 
to or reflecting a predetermined ‘agenda’. For example, reporting in 
some organisations funded by pro-democracy institutions (such as 
the US government–backed National Endowment for Democracy 
or the private Soros Open Society Foundation) in outlets such as 
The Irrawaddy or BurmaNet News is always enormously valuable and 
fills very real gaps, but in its coverage, content, and choice of topics, 
it is never politically neutral. Outsiders did not always immediately 
understand this.
Two aspects of Myanmar’s turbulent history probably stood out for 
their far-reaching consequences and impacts: one is the extent of 
its isolation, first self-imposed during decades of authoritarian rule, 
and  lately reinforced by various political and economic sanctions 
imposed by ‘Western’ — or, more correctly, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) — countries; the other was the 
continued existence of martial law in the form of a military regime 
that had assumed power as a supposed temporary measure to restore 
‘law and order’ in 1988, and then sabotaged the reconciliation process 
it had set up to transfer power to an elected government. While the 
‘disturbances’ of 1988 are often characterised as a ‘democratic 
uprising’ against the (authoritarian but elected) government of the 
day, this is only part of the story.2 Starting on 8 August, students and 
workers launched protests and demonstrations in Yangon that spread 
quickly to many other cities across the country. A general strike soon 
followed, and business conditions deteriorated. Between 8 August 
and 18 September 1988, there was a collapse of law and order, with 
indiscriminate mob violence targeted at the authorities, especially 
police, and public executions by civilians on the streets. The army’s 
crackdown led to an estimated 3,000 people being killed over the 
period of the uprising, in incidents that are still seared in the minds 
of participants and observers, from young students to townspeople. 
2  Several accounts exist of the events of 1988–90. One of the most accessible is Outrage by 
the well-known journalist Bertil Lintner, then working for the Far Eastern Economic Review. 
The most authoritative insider account is that by Dr Maung Maung, who as Attorney General 
was the only civilian in the Ne Win Government: U Maung Maung, The 1988 Uprising in Burma. 
New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1999.
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2 . THE HISTORICAL CONTExTS
The 1990 election campaign itself was relatively peaceful, and resulted 
in the newly formed National League for Democracy (NLD) winning 
a majority of seats, with a voter turn-out of 72 per cent. However, 
the elections occurred without the participation of Aung San Suu 
Kyi, who had emerged as a leader of the protest movement in August 
1988, but had been placed under house arrest by the military. When 
the military regime — the State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC) — proposed convening a National Convention to draft a new 
constitution rather than transferring power, there was understandably 
widespread disappointment, and a large number of activists left the 
country when warrants for their arrest were issued. Soon afterwards, 
in December 1990, a coalition government-in-exile was set up — 
the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) 
— led by Aung San Suu Kyi’s cousin, Dr Sein Win, who was one of 
the NLD MPs elected in 1990. The NCGUB was based in Washington 
DC, and it engaged in continuous lobbying on behalf of the democracy 
movement in Washington and New York. But it always had problems 
communicating effectively with the NLD inside the country, essentially 
because of relentless restrictions on political activity under the 
military regime. The NCGUB deferred to Suu Kyi, but was not always 
well informed about Suu Kyi’s thinking. Suu Kyi, for her part, sought 
to avoid opening gaps between herself and the NCGUB, but regarded 
herself and the NLD’s Central Executive Committee as the decision 
makers. The NCGUB was never a serious alternative government; 
its political profile was effectively lowered after the Committee for 
a Representative Parliament (CRP) was established in 1998 by those 
1990 MPs remaining inside the country. The NCGUB was formally 
abolished in 2011 after the new parliament, made up of MPs elected in 
2010, was convened.
When the SLORC announced in 1990 that it would not transfer power 
to the party that won the election, the international community 
reacted strongly to the human rights abuses of 1988 as well as this 
refusal to recognise election results, even though the world was 
preoccupied with the collapse of Eastern Europe and Gorbachev’s 
reforms in the Soviet Union. The initial reaction of the international 
community took the form of political sanctions organised by 
international assistance donors through the OECD: government-to-
government relations were restricted, economic assistance (but not 
humanitarian assistance) was stopped, most defence relations were 
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suspended, and many governments issued statements criticising 
the SLORC. Developments in Burma were also raised in the United 
Nations: at the first opportunity, a group of mainly Western countries 
prepared a resolution for the 1991 UN General Assembly; in 1992, 
the UN Secretary-General appointed a special rapporteur (Professor 
Yozo Yokota of Japan); and later the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights appointed a series of special rapporteurs on human 
rights. It was not possible politically to take the situation in Burma 
to the UN Security Council for the imposition of universal mandatory 
sanctions, because of the likelihood of a veto being exercised by China 
and the Soviet Union. The main thrust of the international response 
was to isolate and punish the Burmese military regime, with any form 
of engagement or consultation becoming a low priority. This stand-off 
would eventually provide the spark for a long-lasting debate about 
the merits of sanctions versus engagement.
These developments created a situation where the highly polarised 
domestic political situation in Myanmar was paralleled by a high 
degree of polarisation within the international community. Highly 
confrontational behaviour inside Myanmar was matched by hard-line 
ideological positions among Western members of the international 
community, the outcome of which was essentially a stalemate, with no 
substantive progress. Other key ‘stakeholders’ — such as China, India, 
or Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries — were 
virtually marginalised in the political and diplomatic negotiations 
that ensued, and neutral or ‘third party’ mediation was effectively 
ruled out. Inside Myanmar, other political parties and ethnic groups 
struggled to advance their particular interests under military rule, and 
by 2000 they too had failed to achieve any real impact. International 
opinion was seriously divided, with Myanmar’s Asian neighbours 
and Third World countries not prepared to endorse sanctions against 
Myanmar, preferring instead various forms of engagement with the 
military regime, which equally produced little evidence of progress. 
After more than a decade, it looked as if this prolonged stalemate 
in Myanmar could continue indefinitely.3 Given the circumstances, 
3  The best account of the protracted tensions between engagement and isolation in relation 
to Myanmar is Morten B. Pedersen’s Promoting Human Rights in Burma: A Critique of Western 
Sanctions Policies, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008.
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it is not surprising that many observers were disposed to give up on 
Myanmar. Nor was there any obvious potential solution available that 
had not already been tried. 
From around the mid-1990s, and especially after 1999, the military 
regime began to experiment quietly and gradually with its own ‘reform’ 
program. Initially, from 1995, the regime started to open its borders to 
humanitarian international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) 
such as Word Vision, Médecins Sans Frontières, and the Cooperative 
for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), who were permitted to 
carry out humanitarian activities in different parts of the country. In 
1997, Myanmar became a member of ASEAN and agreed to conform 
with ASEAN policies and procedures. In the same year, the regime 
self-nominated as a Least Developed Country (LDC) in the United 
Nations, and began accepting assistance from UN agencies. Between 
1995 and October 2000, Aung San Suu Kyi was under restricted 
movement around Yangon and, while she could not carry out normal 
political activities, she would give speeches to her supporters across 
the wall of her residence. She continued to be harassed, was denied 
access to the media, foreign visitors, and members of her party, the 
National League for Democracy, and was often under house arrest.4 
Nevertheless, in 1999 the regime had issued an order outlawing 
forced labour, although they did not implement this until after they 
signed a cooperation MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) with the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2002. In 1999 they agreed 
to an Australian proposal for human rights training preparatory to 
setting up an independent National Human Rights Commission (which 
they did not do until 2011). In the second half of the 1990s, relations 
with United Nations envoys and the World Bank were troubled, and 
the military regime was unresponsive to requests for visits.5 However, 
from 2000, they agreed to regular visits by UN special envoys and 
special rapporteurs on human rights, and from 2002 allowed the ILO 
to open an office in Yangon. From May 2002, Aung San Suu Kyi was 
released from house arrest and permitted to travel freely around the 
country for the first time since 1989, and she and her party were 
4  Aung Zaw, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of The Irrawaddy magazine has published on-line 
a reasonably accurate summary of Khin Nyunt’s role in his The Dictators: Part 8—Khin Nyunt 
Overplays his Hand, available at: www.irrawaddy.com/feature/the-dictators-part-8-khin-nyunt-
overplays-his-hand.html. 
5  See Anna Magnusson and Morten Pedersen, A Good Office?: Twenty Years of UN Mediation 
in Myanmar, New York: International Peace Institute, 2012.
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allowed to carry out limited political activities (and open party offices) 
around the country. All of this came to a brutal end in May 2003, 
when the regime instigated an attack on Aung San Suu Kyi while 
she was travelling around Myanmar, and she was again placed under 
house arrest. 
Why abandoning the quest for an internationally assisted solution in 
Myanmar was not really an option is not hard to see. First, serious 
human rights abuses represented ongoing problems that could not be 
ignored, especially when prominent political prisoners such as Aung 
San Suu Kyi were part of the equation. Second, the socio-economic 
conditions for the people of Myanmar were manifestly disastrous 
and could not be allowed to drag on because of the enormous 
human costs. Third, the destabilising regional and strategic forces 
could not continue to be downplayed or denied — whether it was 
the spill-over into regional neighbours of transnational crime effects 
(refugees, people trafficking, narcotics trafficking) or the unhealthy 
and distorting strategic and military competition between China and 
India over Myanmar. So whether the outcomes of any initiatives in 
relation to Myanmar would be worthwhile or sufficient to justify 
the further efforts, and whether they might need to be contested 
or warrant subsequent confirmation would probably remain to be 
seen. At the same time, given the amount of misunderstanding or 
ignorance of other parties that was objectively prevalent regarding 
the situation in Myanmar/Burma, missteps and miscalculations might 
have contributed to the lack of progress. So it might always be worth 
another try, a slightly different approach, or better coordinated 
arrangements. 
However, the level of mistrust and suspicion from the population 
towards the authorities (military and non-military) was massively 
deepened in later years by the ineptitude of the government’s handling 
of fuel price increases in 2007 and its response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008, 
which inevitably spilled over into attitudes between the two opposing 
political groups. Most of the military and civilian figures responsible in 
the government at the time of the 1988 uprising had long since moved 
aside, leaving successor generations to manage the consequences. 
Economic and social damage to the country was long-lasting and severe. 
Unsurprisingly, this extreme political confrontation and polarisation 
was very apparent even more than a decade later, when I took up my 
position as ambassador, and has still not been fully overcome.
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The state of Australia–Myanmar relations 
in 2000
Australian ambassadors represent the Australian Government in 
the countries to which they are appointed or accredited. They are 
formally in charge of all embassy staff, whether they are from DFAT or 
other departments, and whether they are posted to the country from 
Australia — ‘Australia-based staff’ — or whether they are recruited 
in the country — either nationals of the country, or third-country 
nationals: ‘locally engaged staff’. Managing the embassy, which 
involves both overseeing its administration as well as providing 
leadership for the whole embassy, is the single most important role 
and responsibility of an ambassador. In the Australian foreign service, 
for many decades the ambassador’s role and responsibilities have been 
spelled out formally in a letter of appointment (the ‘Head of Mission 
Directive’), which also represents the statement of expectations against 
which an ambassador’s performance is to be measured. But, of course, 
ambassadors are inevitably representatives of their country as well, not 
just the government. There are, however, no structured ways for this 
wider representative role to be monitored or assessed. An ambassador 
is meant to be an advocate for his own country, and an interpreter of 
the country to which he is assigned.
Operationally, ambassadors are regularly sent instructions to convey 
messages from the Australian Government to the government to 
which they are accredited. But they are also expected to use their 
own initiative to routinely convey generic messages or relevant policy 
statements to the government to which they are accredited, without 
specific instructions. To be an effective and objective interpreter of 
the country to which they are accredited, ambassadors are expected to 
develop a wide range of well-informed and influential contacts inside 
and outside the government to which they are accredited, and to send 
assessments and reports to Canberra from time to time to assist the 
process of formulating well-focused Australian policy towards the 
country to which they are accredited. Obviously, all of this requires 
frequent and effective communications — formal and informal — with 
relevant staff in the Australian Government. One of the underlying 
objectives in all of this is to avoid either government being ‘surprised’ 
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by developments; but another important — absolutely normal 
and well understood — objective is to influence the policies of the 
government to which ambassadors are accredited. Surrounding this 
role is, of course, the routine requirement to engage in appropriate 
public relations activities of all kinds, both in Australia (although only 
occasionally) and in the country to which an ambassador is accredited 
(pretty well all of the time). It goes without saying that ambassadors 
are expected to be impartial and of the highest personal integrity. 
Nowadays, ambassadors are required to attend special ‘head of mission’ 
training programs in Canberra before they take up their assignments.
In Australia, foreign policy is not the exclusive preserve of DFAT, 
but is the product of a collective political process, which assumes 
considerable public acceptance of the central direction and the main 
content of the policy.6 Ambassadors are expected to be conversant with 
all aspects of policy and mindful of opportunities or risks for Australia 
wherever they might arise. They might hope to influence the various 
elements of policy towards another country, region, or organisation, 
but are not expected to ‘play favourites’ by giving preference to one 
aspect of relations over others. 
While it was not the accepted view at the time, it is clear now that 
by the end of the twentieth century Australia’s relations with Burma/
Myanmar had more to look backward on than to look forward to. 
It could reasonably be seen as a situation where all concerned were 
under-achieving and accepting missed opportunities, as was inevitable 
in the circumstances. There is no one in particular to blame for this; 
it arose primarily out of conditions in Burma that were not promising 
in terms of normal international relations.
One important exception to this general lack of interest in Myanmar 
was the fact that Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, in the Liberal–
National Party Coalition Government of Prime Minister John Howard 
(1996–2007), showed considerable interest in Burma, and met his 
Myanmar counterparts (Ohn Gyaw and later Win Aung) reasonably 
regularly at ASEAN-Plus ministerial meetings between 1996 and 
2007. While not changing Australia’s political sanctions against 
6  The most authoritative account of how Australian foreign policy is practised is still Allan 
Gyngell and Michael Wesley Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003. 
17
2 . THE HISTORICAL CONTExTS
Myanmar, in 1999 Downer showed considerable political courage 
and an innovative approach by launching Australian engagement 
initiatives with Myanmar in the field of human rights, police-to-
police training, and — in 2002 — agricultural research collaboration. 
These were conducted by Monash University, the Australian Federal 
Police, and the Australian Centre for International Agricultural 
Research (ACIAR) respectively. These initiatives — each successful in 
its own way — added interest to my otherwise low-profile assignment. 
Downer himself made a short ministerial visit to Yangon in October 
2002 during my period as Australian Ambassador, but unusually did 
not wish to receive a debriefing from me as outgoing ambassador at 
the end of my assignment in June 2003.
Trade between Australia and Myanmar, officially ‘neither 
encouraged nor discouraged’ since 1988, was minuscule by 2000, 
Australian exports averaging a mere $17 million per year between 
1998 and 2003.7 Consistent with this, Austrade withdrew its trade 
commissioner from the Australian Embassy following the imposition 
of commercial sanctions from 1988, after which trade commissioners 
would occasionally visit from the Australian Embassy in Bangkok, 
but really could do little more than maintain a ‘watching brief’. 
Austrade never really reconsidered their position, and when their 
only long-serving Myanmar trade assistant died in 2002, they were 
(unsurprisingly) not especially concerned about having nobody to 
cover Myanmar. Larger Australian companies such as BHP had closed 
their Yangon offices, and one private Burmese trade consultant was 
able to represent the Australian Wheat Board, mining companies, and 
still take on other Australian clients. A small number of small-scale 
Australian companies were operating in fields such as environmental 
engineering, water treatment, and were making their mark in a tiny 
market. Mining support services for the large-scale copper mine then 
operated by Ivanhoe Minerals near Monywa in central Myanmar 
were coming from Western Australia on an entirely commercial basis. 
7  Australian Bureau of Statistics figures. This figure was probably inaccurate, however, 
as it apparently did not include Australian goods shipped through Singapore but destined for 
Myanmar, where, by the early 2000s, newly opened supermarkets sold items such as King Island 
cheeses and Australian wines. There was no way to determine the size of entrepôt trade through 
Singapore.
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The  other significant Australian investment was in the Myanmar 
Times newspaper (see Chapter 8). Such people made up what was only 
a small community of individual Australian business people, but they 
were perhaps a sign of what might happen in the future.8 The data on 
Australian trade with Myanmar is summarised in Table 1.








20002 $22m 56,331 tonnes
20012 $38m 116,535 tonnes
20022 $14m 73,140 tonnes
20032 $10m 60,850 tonnes
20042 $28m 69,600 tonnes
20052 $38m 157,150 tonnes
20062 $34m 139,500  tonnes
20072 $34m n/a




Sources: (1) The New ASEANS, East Asia Analytical Unit, DFAT, 1997; (2) Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, Column 5368 .0; (3) Australia’s Trade with East Asia 2011, DFAT, August, 
2012 . Available at: www .dfat .gov .au/publications/stats-pubs/Australia-trade-with-east-
asia-2011 .pdf .
Australian trade was not only small, but was also dependant on a 
single commodity: wheat. Myanmar was a regular buyer of Australian 
wheat.
8  Austrade would not reopen an office in Yangon until early 2013, after the Australian Labor 
Party (ALP) Government lifted all economic sanctions against Myanmar.
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Australia’s aid program: Present and past
By 2000, Australian aid was also running at a very low level, restricted 
as it was to humanitarian and relief assistance, and with no funding 
of scholarships for training in Australia. By 2003–04, Australia’s total 
aid flow would be only $7.8 million. This was not only a historical 
low level, but it did not by any measure reflect the needs of a least 
developed country with the lowest socio-economic data in ASEAN — 
lower even than Cambodia and Laos, countries with tiny populations 
compared to Myanmar’s 50 million. 
Australian aid to Myanmar by the year 2000 was not only minuscule, and 
deliberately styled ‘humanitarian assistance’, but it was also directed 
mainly through UN agencies, such as the World Food Programme and 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), to avoid any suggestion 
that it was being channelled through the illegitimate military 
regime. After the military crackdown against the 1988 uprising, all 
Australian aid — with the exception of humanitarian assistance — to 
Myanmar had been halted as part of a concerted approach by Burma’s 
traditional aid donors, namely the OECD countries, including Japan 
and later Korea. AusAID annual reports of this period ritualistically 
began their section on Burma by pronouncing that Australian aid to 
Burma was suspended after 1988. Even in 2001–02, when AusAID 
acknowledged that Burma was ‘on the brink of a humanitarian crisis’,9 
Australia’s bilateral ‘country program’ for assistance to Myanmar 
was a mere $1.6 million. Throughout my term as ambassador, there 
was no appetite in Canberra for any expansion of the aid program 
(apart from the ‘courageous’ initiatives of Alexander Downer) and 
even my representations (along the lines of similar representations 
by my predecessors) for a resumption of Australian Government 
scholarships for individuals from Myanmar went without response. 
Yet, astonishingly, Australia was the only aid donor that completely 
stopped official scholarships: the United States continued its Fulbright 
scholarships, and Japan, the  UK, and Germany continued their 
scholarship programs. 
The data on Australian aid is summarised in Table 2.
9  AusAID Annual Report for 2001–02.
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Table 2: Australian aid to Myanmar, 1999–2010
Year Amount  
(Bilateral/Regional)





1999–2000 A$0 .8/NA Not reported Not reported
2000–01 A$1 .4m/NA Not reported A$1 .4m1
2001–02 A$1 .6m/NA Not reported A$1 .6m2
2002–03 A$3 .0m/A$3 .2m Not reported A$6 .2m3
2003–04 A$2 .9m Less than 2% A$8 .7m4
2004–05 A$3 .1m Not reported A$11 .3m5
2005–06 A$3 .4m Less than 2% A$12 .2m6
2006–07 A$ 2 .6m 2% A$11 .3m
2007–08 A$7 .1m 2% A$17 .9m7
2008–09 A$6 .9m 4% A$44 .9m8
2009–10 A$20 .7m 3% A$29 .2m9
Sources: AusAID annual reports .
Notes: Since AusAID reports do not always disaggregate country program data and 
specific funding under cross-cutting programs, it can be hard to identify specific funding.
1 . Funding for education support for 1,000 Burmese on the Thai–Burma border may not 
be included .
2 . Funding for returning Rohingya refugees in Rakhine State may not be included . 
3 . Includes an amount for a bilateral child nutrition pilot program as well as funding for 
returning Rohingya refugees in Rakhine State .
4 . Includes an amount for the 2003–06 Asian Regional Project Against People Trafficking, 
as well as funding for avian influenza prevention programs.
5 . Includes funding for regional HIV/AIDS prevention program for intravenous drug users .
6 . Includes funding for regional foot and mouth disease eradication programs as well as 
additional support for food and shelter for 160,000 Burmese living in camps on the 
Thai–Burma border .
7 . Includes funding for humanitarian relief following Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 . 
Also includes funding for livelihood support in Rakhine and Shan states .
8 . Australia aid for Cyclone Nargis relief and recovery totalled A$55 million in 2008 .
9 . A new commitment to capacity building assistance in health, education, and agriculture 
announced by Foreign Minister Stephen Smith in February 2010 .
It is sometimes not realised that in the post-war years, and after 
independence in 1948, Myanmar was more dependent on Colombo 
Plan technical assistance from Australia than from other donors. 
Myanmar came after Indonesia, India, Malaya, and Pakistan in the 
number of awards received for study in Australia, and was ahead of Sri 
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Lanka and other Southeast Asian countries. Burma was the fifth (out 
of 16) largest recipient of Australian Colombo Plan funds in the first 
eight years of the program.10
So it was not really surprising that, even in 2000, many Burmese still 
remembered Australia for the Colombo Plan — under which relatives 
might have been trained in Australia — whose passage into history 
was widely mourned, although not understood. Many Burmese 
openly wished for the return of those days. Even ministers and senior 
officers in the government would ask if Australia would resume aid 
along the lines of the Colombo Plan. For them, this was the single most 
perplexing anomaly in Australia’s post-1988 policies. Scattered around 
the Myanmar civil service were senior technocrats who still traced 
their skills back to their education in Australia under the Colombo 
Plan. Thus the mining engineer who devised Myanmar’s off-shore gas 
policy had a master’s degree from Monash University, and a prominent 
Australian-trained doctor became Deputy Minister for Health in 2005 
(he was the only Deputy Minister standing for the government Union 
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) slate in the 2010 elections 
who was defeated). 
Evidence of Australia’s past extensive aid program surfaced from 
time to time even in the early 2000s, sometimes in unexpected 
situations. The north–south gravel road west of the Irrawaddy River, 
from Pathein to Monywa, which was built by the Snowy Mountains 
Engineering Corporation, was still referred to as ‘the Australian road’ 
or the ‘Western Highway’; it was used mainly for transport of goods 
to markets, and was still in relatively good condition in 2000, although 
it was still unsealed. U Than Aye, the Minister for Education in the 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) Government for many 
years, was formerly the manager of the Australian Dairy Corporation’s 
notorious Mandalay Dairy Project. When I visited water and sanitation 
projects on a UNICEF up-country trip in Sagaing Division in 2002, 
we  saw a solar-powered village water supply system donated by 
Australia around 1988 — which was ahead of its time in operational 
10  David Lowe and Daniel Oakman (eds), Australia and the Colombo Plan 1949–1957, Canberra: 
Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004; ‘The Colombo Plan’s 
First Six Years: Australia’s Part’, (Doc. No. 299, Paper by the Department of External Affairs), 
23 August 1957, p. 638.
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simplicity and the way it became enmeshed in village life — still 
working as a village’s principal source of safe water, and managed by 
local residents themselves.
By 2000, Australia was no longer seeking ‘big-ticket’ aid projects in 
Myanmar, and it was sometimes even difficult to ensure that Myanmar 
was included in Australia’s capacity building programs with ASEAN 
well after Myanmar’s admission into ASEAN in 1997. (Whenever 
Myanmar was included in such programs, it worked hard to ensure it 
was not a ‘drag’ on such regional programs because of its own backward 
arrangements.) Meanwhile, from the mid-1990s on, the Australian 
Embassy actively implemented a grass-roots assistance program for 
small-scale community projects, which were highly successful in their 
impacts, and were meticulously implemented by local groups across 
the country, including in areas where it was not always possible for 
diplomats to travel, such as Northern Chin State. The Direct Assistance 
Program (DAP) was the only program directly under the control of the 
embassy, rather than being run out of Canberra, and reports of some 
of its achievements made their way into AusAID annual reports. 
The  Japanese and British embassies had similar schemes that had 
similar excellent results. But all of these community-based programs 
fell far short of helping Myanmar develop its national infrastructure 





I had never been to Myanmar, and knew relatively little about the 
country when I took up my position in May 2000. But some one-off 
contacts in the early 1990s might have been a foretaste of things to 
come. A delegation of Australia-based Burmese activists called on then 
Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans in 1995, while I was working 
as his senior advisor. They left a very positive impression: they were 
intelligent, reasonable, and spoke excellent English. Unlike some who 
called on the minister, they did not seek to use their meeting with 
him for their own publicity, although the Australian Government 
could do very little for them at that time. I was to meet some of them 
again during consultations that Australian ambassadors normally have 
before, during, and after their overseas postings.
A further one-off contact arose in 1995–96 during my work with 
Senator Gareth Evans, who —  as an ‘activist’ foreign minister 
— tried to establish benchmarks for progress as guidelines for the 
international community’s responses to liberalising steps made by 
the Myanmar military regime.1 Almost no other members of the 
international community were interested in relaxing their sanctions 
1  Gareth Evans’s proposals were presented in confidential sessions of the 1995 ASEAN-Plus 
ministerial meeting, and mentioned only in general terms in his public statement to the meeting: 
‘We should make clear to that leadership that the region will respond in a measured and positive 
way to the benchmark steps it takes towards that reconciliation, but that those steps need to be 
taken.’ See: gevans.org/speeches/old/1995/020895_evans_address_aseanpmc.pdf.
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or ‘engaging’ more closely with the military regime at that stage, 
even though the policies — of trying to isolate the regime and backing 
a democracy movement that could only claim a single effective leader 
— were manifestly not working. On the other hand, the difficulties 
of advancing the concept of ‘benchmarks’, which seemed entirely 
logical, exposed me to some of the problems in encouraging Burma 
towards the goal of reconciliation. The ‘benchmarks’ were attacked 
from all sides, mostly for ideological or political reasons, as if the 
activist community wanted nothing less than complete capitulation 
by the military regime and its humiliation. The ‘benchmarks’ quickly 
disappeared from the international agenda; perhaps they were too 
complex, and politically unrealistic. At the very least, they were 
ahead of the times. But, much later, the indicators of genuine change 
or progress in Myanmar were much the same as those laid down by 
Gareth Evans; and the responses from the international community 
were also similar, although not really coordinated. So, with Myanmar/
Burma, ideas can be condemned, even if they are good ideas. 
In contrast to these brief glimpses, the overall tone of my official pre-
departure briefings was intended to lower any expectations that the 
posting to Burma had any chance of achieving results. With sanctions 
firmly in place, and scarcely questioned, most of the normal aspects 
of relations between two countries were not present or existed 
in a rudimentary state, or, worse, it was insisted that generally no 
ambitions were held for improving relations, or for Australia playing 
a distinctive role in politically influencing Myanmar. The main official 
pre-posting briefings I received in Canberra in April/May 2000 had 
a common central theme: Burma had been downgraded as a priority 
for Australian policy, and trade, investment, tourism, and education 
were not considered to be areas where relations could be developed or 
enhanced because of Australia’s sanctions against the military regime, 
which had existed since 1988. The ambassador’s role was apparently 
to maintain a presence only. The most senior DFAT officer with line 
responsibilities for Burma in the department was explicit: there should 
be no effort put into ‘political reporting’, the normal mainstay for 
policy officers. Curiously, this was reinforced by a recent Australian 
Government decision to downgrade Burma as a lower priority of 
intelligence interest for the main Australian intelligence community. 
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All of this proved to be quite unrealistic, of course, and demands from 
Canberra (or elsewhere) for information or assessments were received 
quite frequently, regardless of this ‘downgraded’ ranking of the Yangon 
post. (This system of ranking posts by their ‘importance’ seemed to 
disappear at a later stage.) Even at the time, the ‘downgrading’ of 
Burma seemed to contradict some quite specific Australian interests: 
Australian police and immigration officers were as interested as ever 
in Burma as a potential source of criminal or immigration violations. 
Moreover, later — perhaps in 2002 — analysts from Australia’s Office 
of National Assessments (ONA) made brief visits to Yangon to follow 
up various questions in which they remained interested, as was their 
normal practice around the world. There was no indication from them 
that Burma/Myanmar was a much lower priority than before.
One useful meeting before my departure was with the highly competent 
and personable Myanmar Ambassador U Aye, who, as is sometimes 
the practice, kindly invited me to lunch. U Aye was one of Myanmar’s 
best diplomats, going on later to be Ambassador to South Africa. 
Although I was not aware at the time, he had considerable experience 
working with Myanmar’s military intelligence. He would later retire 
in Australia — as had some Burmese diplomats before him, and where 
his daughter had received her university education — and led a quiet 
life of seclusion. In Myanmar, his brother, U Myint, was a prominent 
economist who had worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
later the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
(ESCAP), and would later become an economic advisor to Aung San 
Suu Kyi and — in 2011 — to the reformist president, Thein Sein. Like 
previous Australian ambassadors, I got to know U Myint very well, 
and I met him quite often later whenever I returned to Myanmar.
In preparing to take up the position of ambassador, it was essential to 
consult members of the Burmese community in Australia, and members 
of the pro-democracy movement based in Australia. Not all members of 
the Burmese community in Australia were associated with the activist 
movement, which was represented mainly by the Burma Campaign 
Australia. Some, such as the Anglo-Burmans, who had migrated in 
the 1950s, and others who had come before (and sometimes after) the 
1988 disturbances, did not wish to be involved in political activity. 
Certain ethnic groups did not like to mingle with others. So in my 
‘consultations’ I usually needed to arrange several meetings with the 
Burmese community, rather than a single meeting. 
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The influence of the activist movement in Australia in support of 
the restoration of democracy in Myanmar was not as great as that in 
counterpart countries, such as the US and the UK. I met a number of 
their leaders during my briefings, and remained in occasional contact 
with Dr Myint Cho, one of the 1990 MPs resident in Australia, and 
undoubtedly their most effective public ‘voice’ in Australia.2 There was 
a representative of, but never a formal office of, the government-in-exile 
in Australia, although some senior members of the National Coalition 
Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB) were full- or part-time 
residents in Australia.3 There was never an official representative of 
the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Australia, although some 
NLD supporters rather late in the piece declared themselves a ‘liberated 
zone’ — it is not clear whether they had any authority for this. It is 
hard to pinpoint the reasons for this lack of more visible support, but 
the difference in impact is — in hindsight — noticeable. Sympathy in 
response to the repression of Burmese democracy was certainly strong 
and consistent over time in Australia, and relatively large numbers of 
Burmese were accepted as refugees — across the main ethnic groups — 
and later as asylum seekers. But this did not translate into the sort of 
significant government policies one might have expected, despite many 
years of active lobbying for their cause. Why was this?
Australian Labor Party (ALP) support for the Burmese democracy 
movement was quite overt: the Australia Burma Council formerly 
had its office in the Sussex Street headquarters of the New South 
Wales (NSW) ALP.4 But in the various parliaments around Australia, 
parliamentary groups supporting Burmese democracy went across 
party lines, and the minor parties — the Democrats and subsequently 
the Greens — have been particularly strong supporters. For example, 
at the federal level, Australian political parties resisted economic 
sanctions against the Burmese military regime until its response to the 
‘Saffron Revolution’ in 2007, when financial sanctions were adopted 
and quickly won strong bipartisan support. But they did not last 
long. Australia was one of the first countries to suspend its economic 
2  Members of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma Cabinet residing in 
Australia include Foreign Affairs Spokesman Teddy Buri, and Information Spokesman Daniel 
Aung. Dr Myint Cho was affiliated with the Australia–Burma Council.
3  Amanda Zappia was Australian representative of the NCGUB until February 2000, when 
she stepped down for personal reasons. She was never replaced as representative of the NCGUB, 
although other members of the Australia Burma Council acted as spokesmen.
4  The Burma Campaign Australia, successor to the Australia Burma Council, is located in the 
NSW Trade Hall building.
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sanctions after political reforms progressed in Myanmar after 2011. 
Support for Burma’s pro-democracy movement reached all Australian 
political parties and most parliaments, but core support was possibly 
split between the Australian Labor Party and the Greens. Some key 
members of the ALP were highly influential on Burma, but the ALP 
was not really the strong ‘fraternal’ party of the NLD that it might have 
been. Later, it was noticeable to me that Aung San Suu Kyi herself did 
not visit Australia until the end of 2013, three years after her release 
from house arrest.
The Burmese community in Australia was generally as committed as 
it could have been to democracy, and participated in every manner 
of community-based protest activity — such as mass rallies in capital 
cities and outside the Myanmar Embassy in Canberra — but some 
former MPs were under warrants for ‘absconding’ after the 1990 
elections and adopted a low-key public profile. Support for democracy 
was, to a certain extent, fragmented across the Australian states, and 
some leading figures (such as those associated with the government-
in-exile resident in Australia) spent a considerable amount of their 
time in Thailand. In other parts of the Australian community, however, 
support for democracy in Myanmar was not as directly connected to 
the NLD as elsewhere, although when Suu Kyi did visit Australia in late 
2013, the crowds that came out and attended functions in her honour 
in Sydney, Canberra, and Melbourne were large and enthusiastic. 
Many members of the Burmese community were strongly apolitical, 
and preferred not involve themselves in political activism, especially 
if they were in the habit of visiting their families in Myanmar. 
Interestingly, the Myanmar Embassy in Canberra seemed to maintain 
contact with quite a wide range of Burmese residents of Australia, 
including some who no longer had Burmese citizenship. 
The Australian trade union movement was always one of the strongest 
areas of support for the democracy cause in Myanmar, and the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU)-affiliated organisation 
Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad 
(APHEDA) was one of the more effective Australian support groups.5 
While many Australian church groups were also very sympathetic, 
5  According to APHEDA’s website: ‘Union Aid Abroad-APHEDA’s international program has 
developed from a rights based approach. Our work aims to build self-reliance through support 
to educational and training projects for workers and their organisations. See: apheda.org.au.
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their direct involvement seemed to be channelled through counterpart 
church groups and needy communities in Burma rather than through the 
NLD. Larger Australian humanitarian international non-governmental 
organisations (INGOs) focused very effectively on the humanitarian 
aspects of their work, both in fundraising in Australia and program 
delivery in Burma, rather than on seeking greater political support in 
Australia or Myanmar. Australian tourists — who might have provided 
some impetus for more assertive government policies — tended to stay 
away from Myanmar, preferring other Southeast Asian destinations 
until recent years. 
The overall picture of Australian interest in the plight of the Burmese 
people is not clear-cut and is somewhat mixed. The thinking of the 
Australian media — particularly the national media such as the ABC 
and SBS — was considerably influenced by the pro-democracy cause, 
as was international media anywhere, which certainly contributed to 
greater awareness and sympathy among Australians generally. But the 
Australian media did not give prominence to any single representative 
of the activist community in Australia, which did not have a high-
profile leader. However, Australian academics made some notable and 
distinctive contributions to the overall democracy cause, including 
some working directly with the NLD. Australians have probably 
been as sympathetic on the Rohingya problem as the international 
community anywhere. Australia has long been one of the main sources 
of humanitarian assistance for the Rohingya through international 
agencies such as the World Food Programme and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Another problem may 
have been that Australian support efforts were focused on the affected 
displaced Burmese on the border with Thailand — in refugee camps 
and the armed resistance — where progress arising from political 
changes inside Myanmar was slowest to materialise. 
Reflecting this persistent downplaying of Australia’s interests in Burma/
Myanmar, the staffing levels of the Australian Embassy in Yangon were 
very modest. In particular, representatives of Australian Government 
departments in the Australian Embassy had been drastically reduced 
since 1988, and were confined to DFAT and the Australian Federal 
Police (and the latter only arrived in 1999, the year before I assumed 
my duties in the embassy). There was no representative from the 
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), which in 
2013 reached eight Australia-based people. The defence attaché had 
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long been withdrawn; the Australian Defence Attaché to Thailand was 
accredited to Myanmar from Bangkok and usually visited Yangon twice 
a year. The Austrade office consisted of one local staff officer, with a 
commercial counsellor from Austrade occasionally visiting from the 
Australian Embassy in Bangkok (although these visits became less and 
less frequent). Australian immigration staff from the Bangkok Embassy 
visited regularly for operational reasons, and in 2003 the Department 
of Immigration (unilaterally) offered the Myanmar Government 
training in detecting passport fraud, a problem that Australia took 
seriously and hoped to encourage regional authorities to pursue more 
systematically. The Myanmar Ministry of Immigration and Population 
— whose minister was, of course, a general — eventually accepted 
the offer, which was for them rather unusual and, at first blush, 
slightly surprising.
DFAT annual reports from between 1998 and 2002 illustrate how thin 
the official relationship was during this period, repeatedly referring 
euphemistically to ‘carefully balanced’ policy or ‘carefully judged’ 
approach. Despite the 1997 dispatch of Special Envoy John Dauth 
(the senior departmental officer responsible for Southeast Asia at the 
time) to make direct personal representations about Myanmar’s need 
to pursue reforms, little hope was really held that such changes might 
occur. Thus, when Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
launched a human rights training initiative in 1999, it was always 
stated that the Australian Government did not expect the program 
would necessarily bring immediate or detectable improvements. 
Outside government-to-government relations, nothing else merited 
mention in DFAT’s annual reports during this period. In a real sense, 
with or without direct Australian Government support, many projects 
and instances of Australia–Myanmar cooperation flourished. Sanctions 
did not stop all forms of (or desire for) collaboration. But it can hardly 
be said that relations were reaching their full potential. 
The condition of the Chancery of the Australian Embassy on 
Strand Road in downtown Yangon was arguably another sign of 
the low priority  Burma was being accorded by DFAT at this time. 
Just over $1 million had just been spent on a refurbishment of the 
fairly unpromising embassy building, which had formerly been 
an outbuilding of the famous Strand Hotel next door. While the 
building had some charm, it was not designed to be an embassy. 
An Australian contractor had been on site as foreman for the last part 
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of the refurbishing project, but it seems to have been done ‘on the 
cheap’, and many problems remained after its supposed completion 
in 2000, especially in relation to ‘rising damp’ — exacerbated because 
no tropical-grade dehumidifying equipment had been installed in the 
air conditioning system. (The residual moisture in the ambassador’s 
office was so high that a stalactite-like fungus began to grow out of a 
gap in the ceiling as soon as it was repainted.) Embassy staff patiently 
reported these problems to Canberra as they appeared, but we received 
little response, even when we pointed out the health implications for 
embassy staff. When we sent a report by cable listing the outstanding 
problems, we were admonished for showing lack of judgement. Yet 
less than five years later, DFAT was proposing to build a completely 
new chancery in Yangon on the grounds that the old (refurbished) 
one was ‘no longer’ suitable and ‘no longer’ complied with Australian 
health and safety standards.6 
It is not necessarily unusual to discover a gap between the expectations 
of Canberra’s bureaucracy — which normally compromised any 
ambassador’s instructions — and the expectations that exist in the 
Australian community or in the country to which one is assigned. 
It would not normally be a good sign if this gap were too large. I knew of 
many instances in which an Australian ambassador had fought against 
limited or confining official guidelines issued from Canberra, but also 
knew that such situations could be professionally and personally 
detrimental. I was not really surprised when local expectations seemed 
quite a mismatch with my very unambitious official briefings, but on 
the whole managed to live with this, while always trying to ensure 
I informed Canberra clearly what any expectations were, whether or 
not they were welcome.
Coordination of policy with like-minded counterpart countries was 
an important part of the Australian Embassy role in Myanmar, but 
Australia’s profile was not consistently in the front line. Australia 
had been a member of UN Special Envoy Alvaro de Soto’s ill-fared 
‘Friends  of Burma’ group in 1998, but this group had become 
6  In its submission to the Parliamentary Public Works Committee at the end of 2006, DFAT 
stated: ‘Although extensively refurbished over the years, the chancery no longer satisfies security 
set-back, access, building services or efficient work space needs, or current Australian building 
code and occupational health and safety requirements. A purpose-built chancery will meet 
these requirements and provide an efficient and safe working environment.’ Senate Hansard, 
6 November 2006.
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moribund by 2000. Australia was not invited to the Chilston Park 
meetings organised by the UK Government during 2001–02. However, 
Australia did participate in less-focused meetings of an informal 
Walker Hill (Seoul) group, and it proved most informative for me to 
attend one of these meetings alongside my predecessor as ambassador, 
Lyndall MacLean, in Seoul in early 2000. When UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki Moon revived the ‘Friends of Myanmar’ group after 
2007, Australia was again a participant. Whenever UN envoys visited 
Myanmar, Australia routinely attended the briefings provided at the 
end of their visits.
Australia’s formal status in relation to such groups did not seem to 
matter much in Yangon, where we were still taken seriously by the 
Myanmar Government and by representatives of the international 
community with whom there was regular interaction. Australia was 
expected to participate in such arrangements involving regional 
countries; indeed, non-participation by Australia might even have 
been seen by some as a sign that Australia was not playing its part. 
In part, Australian participation in multilateral consultations arose 
directly from Australia’s role as a regular donor to the relevant 
international agencies — United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), UNICEF, UNHCR, World Health Organization (WHO), 
etc. Between 2000–03, Australia only played a leading role in one 
multilateral program, namely the so-called ‘Mini-Dublin Group’ of the 
UN Office of Drugs and Crime (then United Nations International Drug 
Control Programme (UNDCP)). By convention, Australia and Japan 
took it in turns to chair the monthly meetings of this group, although 
much of the initiative for setting the agenda remained with UNDCP. 
The main Australian initiative on the ground during this period was 
to invite the Myanmar Police Force to provide an advance briefing for 
the group on the Myanmar Government’s proposed money laundering 
legislation. At this time, it was still rare for the home government, 
Myanmar, to participate in such multilateral consultations in Yangon.
It was not apparent to me that whatever role Australia played was 
the product of a deliberate or specific strategy by Canberra. We 
rarely received specific briefing from Canberra for these meetings, 
and did not often receive routine background information that might 
have been relevant. Despite the value of any information sharing 
and policy consultation that occurred, it is hard even now to point 
to these groups as a source of major initiatives or breakthroughs, 
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although they certainly performed less ambitious roles quite well, and 
occasionally got the ear of the military regime. One constant problem 
with these consultative groups was that the military regime was never 
represented, so the meetings inevitably created an ‘us and them’ 
atmosphere, and the military regime never felt unduly pressured to 
take them seriously; or, to put it differently, the military regime could 
hardly have been said to have anything to fear from these groups. It 
goes without saying that Myanmar opposition groups were not party 
to any of these discussions, although some Western countries (such 
as the US and the UK) may have consulted Aung San Suu Kyi and her 
party separately. 
Australian ambassadors normally have an opportunity to refresh their 
working strategies with Canberra by returning to Australia for mid-
term ‘leave and consultations’. Mine were due to occur around the end 
of 2001, but as a federal election was scheduled for November 2001, all 
leave and consultations by our ambassadors overseas were deferred, 
and my mid-term consultations eventually occurred in February 2002. 
This was very useful, as it enabled two-way conversations about the 
expectations of our Yangon Embassy, although from memory it was 
more valuable for me for the additional opportunities to interact with 
Australian and Burmese ‘constituencies’ in Australia than for any 
new or substantial adjustment to my official briefings. I remember 
discussing the 60th anniversary of the Burma–Thailand Railway with 
the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Returned and Services 
League, who both very reasonably indicated they would be responsive 
to the level of public interest in the anniversary to determine what 
official involvement would be appropriate. (The then Director of the 
Australian War Memorial, Gary Beck, encouraged me to see if it would 




Working Under Military 
Authoritarian Rule
Official day-to-day dealings between Yangon embassies and the 
military regime in Myanmar involved a good measure of pragmatism 
on both sides. In effect, this represented routine dealings with the 
government that was in effective control. Nobody ever suggested this 
implied any degree of consent or condoning of Myanmar’s military 
regime. The job of all diplomats everywhere is to build up networks 
of well-informed, independent, accessible, and reliable contacts inside 
and outside the host government, among political parties, opposition 
groups, and NGOs, so that they can report objectively, accurately, and 
in a timely way to their home governments on all manner of topics. 
Myanmar was no different, but the fact that it operated as a police 
state, with a highly visible and basically hostile intelligence service, 
presented some obvious problems. In the early 2000s, when the local 
people’s movements and activities were closely monitored by their 
own government, it could be very difficult to gather information, 
although it is now much easier to do this in Myanmar. After I left 
Myanmar in 2003, I was able, even then, to remain in touch with some 
of my most valuable contacts through the internet, and through my 
occasional visits to Myanmar.
Australia maintained a very small embassy in Yangon: in 2000–03, 
we only had six Australia-based staff from DFAT and one officer from 
the Australian Federal Police (AFP), who had been assigned to Yangon 
EyEWITNESS TO EARLy REFORM IN MyANMAR
34
in 1999.1 Working as an Australian diplomat in Myanmar at this time was 
interesting, sometimes challenging, and occasionally one encountered 
the unexpected. Any government maintaining an embassy in Yangon 
at this time accepted that this would in itself bring them into direct 
contact with the military regime. So there was no point in having 
scruples about dealing directly with a ‘pariah regime’. Some Western 
governments chose not to maintain an embassy for this reason, while 
others, such as European Union (EU) members and Australia, chose 
not to develop military-to-military cooperation with the regime, and, 
to underline this, decided not to station a defence attaché in their 
embassy. Even this did not mean ceasing all contact with the military 
as such, because, as in Australia’s case, defence attachés accredited 
from Bangkok could still visit Myanmar for occasions such as Armed 
Forces Day (held annually on 27 March), when the military regime 
organised a formal program for the visiting attachés. It was not clear 
that this very limited contact brought worthwhile results, other than 
allowing a few Australian military officers to become a little familiar 
with the Burmese Army. Of course, all Australian Embassy staff were 
constantly watchful for any attempt by the military regime to take 
advantage of their enormous police powers; this included being on 
the alert for signs that Australian or Myanmar Embassy staff were 
subject to any form of pressure or were in any way vulnerable. While 
this meant staff had to cope with more stress than would normally be 
the case, both at work and outside the office, these were understood 
as the conditions we had to live under. We assumed that all foreign 
diplomatic staff were under surveillance. 
The martial law regime (SLORC/SPDC) established as a result of the 1988 
coup had at least a public or ‘in principle’ commitment to handing over 
power to a ‘multi-party democracy’ after holding national elections. 
Arguably, the military regime would have ended much sooner if the 
NLD had not walked out of the National Convention in 1995, thereby 
leaving the whole constitutional process in a state of suspense until 
2005. (The army could have resumed the National Convention process 
much sooner if they wanted to, and as they eventually did, but they 
must have hoped for NLD to return to the process earlier, albeit in 
1  By contrast, in 2013, there was a big AusAID section, plus the AFP office, and a trade 
commissioner (appointed earlier in the year); by the start of 2014, a defence attaché also arrived, 
bringing the Australian official representation back to something like it was in 1988, 25 years 
earlier.
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a subordinate role. The army never were any good at negotiations.) 
Inside the country, however, many still blame the NLD for making a 
strategic mistake when they walked out in 1995 — and again when 
they refused to participate in the elections held under that constitution 
in 2010.
Burma had been a centrally planned state since the 1960s. While the 
country was definitely under quite effective military rule in 2000, it 
still possessed a substantial bureaucracy, including a large number 
of experienced technocrats in areas in which the state traditionally 
played  a leading role, such as education, health, and agricultural 
support. Although this meant a very large number of civilians were 
working as civil servants, they were always under strong military 
control, through having generals openly working (in  uniform) as 
deputy ministers and in other leading positions, as well as a sprinkling 
of military officers throughout the ministries (often working in plain 
clothes). The civilian bureaucracy had some patches of technical 
competence,2 but not any flair or innovativeness — and certainly 
not any ability to take on ‘risk’.3 Lack of effective authority had long 
been a major weakness in the bureaucracy, dating back to Ne Win 
times. Moreover, Burmese officials were not permitted to criticise the 
military regime, and were certainly not allowed to express support for 
the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi. 
However, the army did not necessarily regard itself as the natural 
ruling party, even though it had long been groomed for a ‘nation-
building’ role going well beyond preserving national unity and 
national security. In regional areas, for example, the local military 
commander also served as the regional governor, with de facto 
responsibility for all administration, with both soldiers and civilians 
(for example, from the General Affairs Department of the Ministry of 
Home Affairs) under his authority. In the early 2000s, army colleges 
offered the first MBAs in Myanmar, and civil administration still 
features in their curricula. Yet, most of the population regarded the 
army as incapable of running the country competently. (The official 
response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 provided compelling evidence for 
2  Visiting Australian technical people would occasionally comment positively to me on the 
technical knowledge of officials in health, agriculture, and civil engineering.
3  The best description of the Burmese state at this time is David Steinberg’s Burma: The State 
of Myanmar, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001.
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the people’s assessment.) On the other hand, the Burmese generals 
dismissed politicians — including the NLD — as incapable of running 
the country. Senior military members of the regime, as well as the 
regime’s own propaganda, constantly reminded people that the regime 
was committed to relinquishing power, even though many of its 
actions to suppress dissent by force (in 1996 and 2007, as well as 1988) 
might have suggested otherwise. 
Although in many respects the Burmese army is not necessarily 
regarded highly by the people, and while to some extent it has 
developed its own separate socio-economic institutions (hospitals, 
universities), on the whole the army is an institution that is integrated 
into society: there have long been retired army people working across 
the bureaucracy, and this might become even more common as the 
army downsizes if and when insurgency ends; and many families 
would have one son who volunteered for the army (though this can 
lead to a breakdown in family relationships). There is no strong ‘us 
and them’ division between the army and the people. Although 
the army is — consistently — a source of human rights abuses and 
mistreatment of people, and is already widely blamed for many of the 
country’s problems, it is also acknowledged as one of the few strong 
national institutions that has historically made great contributions 
to the formation of the state. There is no doubt, however, that by 
around 2000 the army was universally regarded as not competent to 
be the government, and was seriously mismanaging the country by 
its socio-economic policies. In many quarters, the army was despised, 
profoundly distrusted, and looked down on. All levels of Burmese 
society openly made jokes at the expense of the army, and directed at 
Than Shwe personally, which demonstrated that the army no longer 
enjoyed widespread popular support as a national institution.
On the other hand, while the Burmese Army naturally used any limited 
contacts it had with Australian entities to present itself in the best 
light, and to win some sympathy from their Australian counterparts, 
to my knowledge they made no attempt to exploit normal commercial 
contacts in unacceptable ways. Occasionally, Australian companies 
sent representatives to Myanmar to explore possible commercial 
opportunities. Sometimes these ‘opportunities’ involved dealing with 
the military regime or its state-owned enterprises, but the Australian 
Embassy could not be involved in assisting such efforts, and during 
my time in Myanmar the embassy was not involved. Knowing this, 
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around this time only a small number of Australian companies ever 
visited Myanmar in search of commercial opportunities. At the 
same time, it was assumed that the Burmese Army could be seeking 
to import dual-use (civilian/military) equipment from Australia. 
Khin Nyunt’s Office of Strategic Studies: 
Agent of or façade for change?
The main ‘face’ of the SPDC/SLORC was Secretary One, Lieutenant-
General Khin Nyunt, who was, in effect, Chief Cabinet Secretary and 
the regime’s spokesman, and who could deal with all issues for all 
audiences. Formally, Khin Nyunt was head of the military intelligence 
organisation in the Burmese Army. He had advanced quite quickly 
through the ranks, but rightly or wrongly was always regarded as 
lacking front-line operational experience and support. He was seen 
as highly intelligent and articulate, and the international media 
portrayed him as being ‘moderate’ and reform minded. He was also 
seen as the driving force behind the regime’s limited attempts at 
opening up the country.4 Under Khin Nyunt, Myanmar’s military 
intelligence (generally known as ‘MI’) had a reputation for efficiency, 
ruthlessness, and (relative) openness. It had its staff placed in all arms 
of government, and had gathered a group of well educated, confident, 
and articulate officers with some experience of foreign countries, 
who accepted their intermediary role in bringing peace to Myanmar, 
both internally and externally. It was Khint Nyunt’s staff that had 
negotiated and consummated ceasefire agreements with 17 ethnic 
groups between 1989 and 2000. They also controlled counter-narcotics 
policies though the government’s Central Committee on Drug Abuse 
Control (CCDAC), and all aspects of internal security.
By 2000, it was widely accepted that Khin Nyunt had created his own 
‘change agency’ inside the military intelligence organisation that he 
headed. Although called the ‘Office of Strategic Studies’ (OSS), 5 it was 
not an ‘office’ in the sense of being a separate or independent body; 
4  Some of his thinking was evident in his interviews with journalists at the time, such as one 
by China Express: www.burmafund.org/Research_Library/interview_with_khin_nyunt.htm.
5  An excellent description of how the Office of Strategic Studies functioned can be found 
in Andrew Selth’s seminal work Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory, Norwalk, 
Connecticut: EastBridge, 2002. 
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it was staffed entirely by military intelligence officers who worked 
on both domestic and international policies under their leader Major-
General Kyaw Win, Khin Nyunt’s close associate.6 It had specific 
responsibilities for international relations, anti-narcotics policy, and 
ethnic affairs, where its authority exceeded that of the line government 
agencies. Importantly, it also had chief responsibility as the liaison 
channel for the dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi, through Major-
General Kyaw Win and other senior OSS officers. OSS staff tended to 
be well educated, had good policy skills, and spoke good English, 
and they were noticeably comfortable, indeed confident, in dealing 
with foreigners. Their military status was quite overt, and they were 
open about their lines of command. Among embassies, they came to be 
regarded as the best people to get problems ‘fixed’. They were almost 
alone among anyone in the SPDC regime in having contact with Aung 
San Suu Kyi and being prepared to discuss her. 
Khin Nyunt was de facto prime minister long before he was given 
the formal title in 2003. He was extremely competent, decisive, and 
demonstrably familiar with a wide range of policy issues. He spoke 
reasonably good English and understood it quite well, although 
(sensibly) when conducting formal business, he would use an 
interpreter. In person, Khin Nyunt was impressive and reasonable, 
although he could be tough and even ruthless, and was a formidable 
negotiator. He took his responsibilities seriously and seemed to 
enjoy his power and his role thoroughly. People recognised that 
he wielded enormous authority and that he could be counted on 
to deal with complex problems and any political issues that arose. 
It was accepted that he was prepared to take risks, and to consider 
new and unprecedented approaches. His leadership encouraged 
the international community to see him as showing a way forward. 
Burmese people were always conscious of his capacity to exercise the 
authority of a dictatorship. At this time, Khin Nyunt seemed to be 
domestically and internationally regarded as the military leader who 
might be able to lead the country towards national reconciliation, and 
who might be able to persuade the more conservative regime head, 
Senior General Than Shwe, to go along with some changes. While 
this might have been an optimistic scenario, it seemed to enjoy some 
6  Major-General Kyaw Win was an extremely intelligent and affable military commander, and 
also quite an accomplished amateur painter. He was called on from time to time to ‘negotiate’ 
with Aung San Suu Kyi.
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credibility even among members of the military, although senior 
ministers and generals often mentioned regretfully their inability to 
convince the top leaders of the virtues of new policies. 
The Office of Strategic Studies was in many ways the international 
face of the military regime and, compared to some other parts of the 
Myanmar Government, was relatively accessible. At one level, OSS 
managed the regime’s public relations; at another level they controlled 
dealings with the outside world, including foreign visa and Myanmar 
passport issue.7 On arrival in Yangon, it was normal to pay an initial 
courtesy call on OSS, as well as on other ministries. Like all military 
organisations, they were relatively formal and protocol-conscious, 
but they were reasonably friendly and gave the impression of being 
helpful. All embassies in Yangon adopted a pragmatic approach to 
dealing with the OSS and military intelligence.8 The bureaucracy 
and OSS were relatively open about the roles that each played, but 
this sometimes meant leaders of the mainstream army were not 
involved in many of the day-to-day affairs of state. Civilian parts of 
the Myanmar Government bureaucracy did not necessarily enjoy 
being overshadowed by military intelligence, but some bureaucrats 
seemed to work very closely — if not always comfortably — with 
military intelligence staff. Khin Nyunt and his deputy, Major-General 
Kyaw Win, were generally impressive and competent, and their senior 
colleagues, Brigadier-General Thein Swe and Brigadier-General Kyaw 
Thein (on narcotics and ethnic issues), were also cooperative and 
efficient. Ultimately, OSS staff tended to be somewhat cocky and 
perhaps over-confident in their role, and this may be why they were a 
particular target for the purge that happened in 2004–05.
The OSS could be extremely helpful, especially in handling slightly 
unusual situations, as its staff were less hidebound than the 
bureaucracy, had the authority to overrule the bureaucracy, and knew 
that they would not be challenged if they obtained Khin Nyunt’s 
blessing for any proposed action. They were often an avenue of last 
resort for foreign embassies. On one occasion, the Australian Embassy 
in its consular role needed to contact an Australian backpacker who 
7  In 2000, the regime’s official spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Hla Min, wrote a propaganda 
publication for the regime entitled ‘Political Situation of Myanmar and its Role in the Region’, 
which is now in its 26th edition.
8  Of course, Western embassies also considered Burma’s military intelligence to be a ‘hostile’ 
intelligence service, and the necessary security protections were used.
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was travelling ‘up country’ and we asked military intelligence if they 
could help us locate the young man to tell him that his father was 
seriously ill in Australia. Military intelligence obliged and, eventually, 
some time later (too late, as it happened) provided us with detailed list 
of where the young man had travelled and the hotels he had stayed 
in. The only problem was that the information reached the Australian 
Embassy long after the young man had returned to Australia. 
This  anecdote reveals several sides of Burma’s military intelligence: 
their wide reach that could be quite effectively targeted; their extreme 
technological backwardness; and their readiness to provide assistance 
in some circumstances.
Dealings with the Army
Protocol demanded that the Australian Ambassador present credentials 
to the Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Than Shwe, who was head 
of the military regime (the State Peace and Development Council), and 
to make introductory and farewell calls on the de facto prime minister, 
General Khin Nyunt. It was also not unusual to see General Khin 
Nyunt at national day receptions of leading Asian countries. 
Embassies had little or no contact with Commander-in-Chief, Senior 
General Than Shwe, other than in the case of high-level visits, such 
as the October 2002 visit of Australian Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer to Myanmar, which included a courtesy call on Than Shwe 
in his capacity as head of state. Than Shwe would occasionally be 
seen from a distance at formal state occasions. There was even less 
contact with former head of state, Ne Win, who was living under de 
facto house arrest in a remote location on the edge of Inya Lake in 
Yangon. Members of the public and foreigners were not permitted 
to meet Ne Win, although members of his family (his children) were 
occasionally in contact with some senior Burmese. Although Ne Win 
was reputed to be pulling the strings behind the military regime, 
there was no evidence whatsoever of this by 2000: no verified reports 
of interaction between Ne Win and the military leadership; no 
reports of any kind of interventions by Ne Win in policies, politics, 
or national security matters; no rumours or anecdotal reports of Ne 
Win’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the state of the nation. In 
hindsight, it seemed that promoting stories of Ne Win retaining real 
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power suited conspiracy theorists, and those who sought to discredit 
the Than Shwe/Khin Nyunt leadership of the army. In fact, whether 
he did or did not retain political influence made no difference at all. 
When Ne Win finally died in December 2002, the military regime even 
denied him an official funeral, more or less confirming that he had 
long lost any standing.9 There were no observable consequences from 
his death. 
As an embassy without a military attaché on its staff in-country, the 
Australian Embassy, like many other embassies, had almost no direct 
dealings at all with uniformed officers in the one organisation that 
ran Myanmar, the Burmese Army, or Tatmadaw. The only immediate 
consequence of this was that, as ambassador of a country that did 
not have a defence attaché on its embassy staff, and did not maintain 
active defence relations, I did not receive an invitation to attend the 
Burmese Army’s annual Armed Forces Day celebrations. (This is not to 
say that this event was without its impact on anyone living in Yangon: 
with a large parade of soldiers, and some equipment, near the centre of 
the city, and rehearsals for weeks before and — even by 2003 — live 
television coverage on the day, one could not be unaware of the event.) 
As in some other countries where access to the government was not 
easy, quite a bit of business would be transacted with Myanmar 
Government leaders attending national day receptions. I recall one 
diplomatic reception, before the 40th anniversary of the Burma–
Thailand Railway in 2002, at which I tackled General Khin Nyunt over 
the very poor state of the road between Yangon and Mawlamyaing, by 
which elderly Australian former POWs would have to travel in order 
to attend the commemorative event at Thanbyuzayat (just south of 
Mawlamyaing) in May 2003. I was concerned that some of our veteran 
visitors might suffer health problems because of the state of the 
road. It was probably not normal, and certainly not encouraged, for 
ambassadors to raise such negative and possibly embarrassing issues 
with army leaders. Foreign Minister U Win Aung (now deceased) 
pulled at my arm to drag me away from General Khin Nyunt, who 
listened but did not make any very specific commitment to me. But 
some repair work was subsequently done on the road before the 
railway anniversary event. It was perhaps planned to occur anyway.
9  The Reuters report of his death, compiled with input from the Reuters stringer in Yangon, 
can be seen at: www.dawn.com/news/70684/ne-win-dies-at-91.
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At this time, there were perhaps only four ministers in the cabinet 
who were not from the army,10 so meetings with any other ministers 
were with army generals. The sports minister who attended the 2000 
Olympic Games in Sydney with the Myanmar athletes was Brigadier-
General Aye Win. His attendance required a waiver of the travel bans 
applied by Australia against the military regime. The travel bans had 
a significant effect in deterring high-level official travel to Australia, 
which was not always for the public good. We had only one clear 
example where the bans were applied when it might have been 
beneficial if the visit had proceeded. This was a proposed visit by the 
Mayor of Mandalay, who was attracted by some traffic light technology 
being manufactured and exported by an Australian company in 
Melbourne, and was planning to visit with an eye to consummating 
the purchase. When it was realised he was a brigadier-general, his 
proposed visit was aborted, and his visa application was denied, and 
as far as I know the sale did not proceed. So the commercial returns 
were lost by the Australian firm, and Mandalay would have obtained 
its traffic lights from another source. Slightly lower-level military 
officers of the rank of colonel or lieutenant colonel were permitted 
(by special arrangement) to attend an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting 
in Sydney in 2002.
Of course, embassies also dealt routinely with those military officers 
who held ministerial rank in the cabinet/government — whose rank 
ranged from major-general to colonel. These ministers wore their 
uniform proudly when working inside Myanmar, but would attend 
international meetings in other countries in civilian clothes. One also 
encountered uniformed officers in their regional commander roles, 
when travelling ‘up country’. In my case, I had occasion to call on the 
Deputy Regional Commander in Rakhine State for a briefing on the 
security situation there. I also called on the Regional Commander 
in Mon State to seek his cooperation in a broad sense for Australian 
participation in the 2003 anniversary of the Burma–Thailand Railway. 
However, embassies did not normally have dealings with the military 
10  U Soe Tha, the Minister for National Planning and Economic Development (elected in 
2010 as a Union Solidarity and Development Party MP and Committee Chair in the People’s 
Assembly); U Than Aung, the Minister for Education (now deceased); David Abel, the Minister 
for Trade (a former military officer, now retired); and Dr Kyaw Myint, Health Minister after 2001 
(now retired).
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corporations — Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings or Myanmar 
Economic Corporation — or any of the other military arms of the 
Ministry of Defence, the three services (army, navy, and air force). 
The major military event on the annual calendar was Armed Services 
Day, 27 March, which was usually an occasion for a massive march 
by army troops, but not necessarily for displays of military hardware, 
as in some other countries. Streets in Yangon were closed off for this 
event, and for the rehearsals that took place in the weeks leading up 
to 27 March. The Australian Defence Attaché (from Bangkok) usually 
attended this event, but no other Australian embassy staff were 
invited to attend. So the Australian Ambassador and other staff had 
almost no opportunity or occasion to get to know regular members 
of the military. (By contrast, the US Chargé d’Affaires in Yangon 
often played golf with senior military officers, thanks partly to the 
connections the US Government maintained with the Tatmadaw 
through the three US military attachés stationed in their embassy in 
Myanmar, notwithstanding US sanctions.) The absence of regular, 
direct, and effective channels of communication with the military was 
undoubtedly something of a handicap, but it did not really produce 
problems for the Australian Embassy at this time. Defence attaché 
visits from Bangkok were a useful supplement for our limited defence 
intelligence needs, but their necessarily infrequent and occasional 
character meant they did not seem to lead to significant deeper 
understanding of the military regime.11 This may have changed a few 
years later when a successor defence attaché in Bangkok found his 
visit more productive.
The one regular contact the Australian Embassy had with the army 
was to request them to provide a bugler for the annual Anzac Day 
service, which was held at the Yangon Commonwealth War Cemetery 
on 25 April.12 They regularly did this, and indeed seemed be to be 
pleased to oblige. Since Burma was still a colony and not independent in 
World War II, remembrance of World War II military history was not as 
11  Politically, at this time, with almost no sign of flexibility on the part of the military about 
transferring political power, it would not have been realistic for Australia to seek to engage more 
directly with members of the military. 
12  Only seven Australian soldiers are buried in the Yangon Cemetery, compared to some 
23 at the largest Commonwealth War Cemetery at Taukkyant, north of Yangon, and 1,350 
prisoner of war graves at the Commonwealth War Cemetery for the Burma–Thailand Railway at 
Thanbyuzayat (see Chapter 10).
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prominent in Myanmar as one might have expected, given the country 
was directly ruled by the military from 1988–2011, and the small but 
valuable role the Burmese army played in victory over the Japanese 
in World War II. So Anzac Day and Remembrance Day (11 November) 
ceremonies were mainly attended by the foreign community, and 
any role the Burmese army played in these commemorations would 
not have been noticed by other Burmese. The Myanmar Government 
played no official part in these ceremonies at all.
In the early 2000s, the role of the Burmese army in controlling the 
country was not normally much in evidence. Large military barracks 
were a common sight around the country, but military troops were 
rarely seen in an operational role. Troops were deployed to border 
areas for military operations, but it was not common to see military 
troops stationed on the streets in Yangon or other major cities. This was 
somewhat surprising given that a military regime was running the 
country. If there were security alerts (for example, against a possible 
coup d’état) troops would sometimes be mobilised discreetly around 
town, usually overnight, and not in obvious view. Army leaders seemed 
intent on keeping their visible presence to a minimum, other than in 
their roles as ministers in the government when they customarily wore 
their military uniforms, and when they were often photographed. Even 
so, it was impossible for any foreigner living or working in Myanmar 
to be oblivious of the army.13 At the same time, the fundamental role 
that the Burmese army has always played in Myanmar means that its 
unstated presence in the background is a factor that Burmese people 
live with, often uncomfortably. Moreover, this presence reaching right 
across the country could sometimes affect daily affairs, especially the 
affairs of Myanmar families, quite directly. Most embassies in Yangon 
paid close attention to the views and thinking of the military, to the 
extent that it was possible to ascertain what these were. 
The modest commercial or non-governmental presence of Australian 
organisations and individuals in Myanmar did not bring them into 
much direct contact with the military. So, after 2000, the Australian 
Embassy had little cause to deal with the Burmese army on its own. 
This also meant we had little or no opportunity to influence the 
13  Mary Callahan explains the often contradictory role of the army in state-building in Making 
Enemies: War and State Building in Burma, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004.
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Burmese army, but this was not a role we were seeking, then or now.14 
After Australia’s other sanctions against Myanmar were lifted between 
2010 and 2012, the restrictions on direct cooperation with the military 
were retained. This reflects an enduring political constraint, whereby 
the pro-democracy advocates on Burma in Australia, as elsewhere, still 
criticise any direct Australian Government military dealings with the 
Burmese Army, and are reluctant to accept that such dealings could 
be justified, given the Burmese Army’s continuing record of human 
rights abuses. 
Ultimately, the Burmese Army is a highly secretive organisation, not 
given to making public statements to advertise or defend its policies. 
It was suspicious of outsiders, and distrusted foreigners as well 
as civilian Burmese.15 At the same time, it was an extremely proud 
organisation, certain of its central place in holding the Myanmar 
state together, and assured about the absolute importance of its role 
in supporting national security. Aung San Suu Kyi was inclined to 
say that she accepted that the army would play a key role in nation-
building, and was confident that they could more than hold their 
own against Thailand. However, after 1994, as the army spent less 
time fighting insurgency following the conclusion of various ceasefire 
agreements, its military prowess began to erode, and during the short 
border disagreement with Thailand in 2002 it lost out in cross-border 
skirmishes with Thai troops for the first time. 
Working in a Police State
Anyone living in Myanmar in those days, even as a diplomat, was 
very conscious that Burma was a fairly effective police state, but 
its police state system also had some obvious weaknesses. It still 
relied mainly on paper documents; the IT age had not arrived fully 
14  However, Dr John Blaxland from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at ANU, and 
Defence Attaché to Myanmar (and Thailand) from 2008–10, has argued that Australia could play 
a key role in influencing the Tatmadaw positively in regard to reform and ongoing state-building 
activities. See: John Blaxland, ‘Myanmar: Time for Australian Defence Cooperation’, Security 
Challenges, Vol. 7 No. 4, Summer 2011, pp. 63–76. Available at: www.regionalsecurity.org.au/
Resources/Files/vol7no4Blaxland.pdf.
15  An Australian scholar specialising in the Burmese military, Dr Andrew Selth (who was 
formerly a diplomatic member of the Australian Embassy staff) still has professional contact with 
the military.
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in Myanmar, so the regime’s information was often incomplete, its 
communications arrangements were primitive, and its responses 
were not always timely. Nevertheless, one could not really escape 
the feeling of being regularly monitored, if not actually followed, 
and it was uncomfortable knowing that Burmese staff at the embassy 
or the ambassador’s residence were probably reporting to military 
intelligence on one’s activities. This meant one was always careful and 
automatically cautious in whatever one did. 
One or the more irksome manifestations of the military regime 
was the tight control that was exercised, quite effectively, over in-
country travel by the staff of foreign embassies and international 
agencies. For  diplomats, it was necessary to obtain permission for 
any travel (private or official) more than 50 miles outside Yangon 
(other than for tourist trips to Pagan and Mandalay). One irritating 
aspect of this was that permission would always be granted at the 
last minute. In  reciprocity, the Australian Government (like its 
Western counterparts) imposed parallel restrictions on Myanmar 
diplomats in Canberra. These travel restrictions mostly had a strong 
‘nuisance value’; I have never seen any study, official or otherwise, 
that demonstrated that these travel restrictions ever produced any 
other useful results. They were accepted as one of the array of security 
counter-measures (perhaps even ‘counter-espionage’ measures) against 
such governments. There was no formal effort made by either side to 
change or moderate this policy in this period.
The Australian Embassy operated under instructions from Canberra to 
comply with such restrictions. Personally, whenever possible, I avoided 
seeking permission to travel to areas where tourists were permitted 
to travel freely, and where diplomats should have been absolutely 
free to travel. But if I had reasons — official or otherwise — to travel 
to more unusual places, I normally ‘notified’ the Foreign Ministry; 
I specifically did not seek ‘permission’, although the ministry often 
responded formally by saying my travel had been ‘approved’. I only 
rarely omitted to notify my intention to travel outside Yangon, and 
sometimes this did not seem to be noticed by the Myanmar authorities. 
It was sometimes possible to go to unusual parts of the country that 
were not generally ‘open’. For example, permission was given for me 
to make an official visit to Northern Chin State in December 2002 so 
that we could inspect an embassy community aid project — a village 
water supply and mini-hydro scheme — that had been funded under 
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the embassy’s Direct Assistance Program. In early 2003, I joined an 
ASEAN ambassadors’ tour of the famous ruby-mining area of Mogok, 
which was normally ‘off-limits’ for foreigners, presumably because of 
the risk of smuggling rubies, and perhaps because of the appalling 
working conditions of the miners.16 There were few if any instances 
where an embassy or an ambassador was singled out by the Myanmar 
authorities for more favourable treatment under these arrangements. 
We never inquired about how the Chinese or (then) Soviet embassies 
were restricted. 
In my case, travel permission was only denied twice. The first instance 
was when we sought to go further along the track of the World War 
II Burma–Thailand Railway — from Thanbyuzayat (the site of the 
Commonwealth War Cemetery) to Three Pagodas Pass — than had 
previously been allowed. Permission was denied on the grounds of 
security, which was slightly plausible, in that the New Mon State 
Army controlled territory there. (I am not aware of any foreigner being 
permitted to travel to Three Pagodas Pass from Thanbyuzayat until 
Professor Joan Beaumont from ANU in February 2013.) The leading 
ethnic group in the area, the New Mon State Party (NMSP), would 
normally have been prepared to allow travel within their territory, 
but their relations with the government were not good at this time. 
I encountered them only at road checkpoints where their territorial 
control began, although the NMSP sent an unofficial representative 
to the 60th anniversary ceremony we held at the Thanbyuzayat 
Commonwealth War Cemetery in 2003. On another occasion, my 
wife and I wanted to visit Laiza, the lacquerware production site in 
Shan state, privately, but we were told that on security grounds we 
could not go there. (There was some insurgent activity in the area, so 
this could have been a genuine reason.) I did not hear of any other 
foreigners visiting Laiza at this time.
Generally, during this period the authorities relaxed their restrictions 
on foreigners’ travel quite considerably, and organisations such as 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were permitted 
to establish branch offices in a number of regional centres (some of 
which were later closed). During my three years in Yangon, I was able 
to travel widely around the country, mixing business and pleasure 
16  All such officially approved tours were very tightly controlled during this period, 
with itineraries and meetings under strict Myanmar official restrictions.
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(tourism), from the north in Kachin State, where Australian aid funds 
were going to the INGO World Concern, to the far south in Myeik, 
where the West Australian firm Atlantic Pearls had a joint venture 
with the Ministry of Mines. I was able to visit environmental sites 
(such as the Moyingyi Wetlands, listed under Ramsar),17 cultural sites 
such as Pagan (later accepted for World Heritage listing by UNESCO), 
Sri Ksetra, the ancient archaeological Pyu site in Central Myanmar, 
and Mrauk-U in Rakhine State, as well as beach resorts (such as 
Ngwesaung, where development was overwhelmingly by private 
entrepreneurs). Only once, when trekking from Kalaw in Shan State 
to Inle Lake, was I directly affected by being followed by the security 
authorities, who tried to find me at the wrong hotel in Nyaung Shwe, 
at the northern end of Inle Lake, and loudly abused our tour guide 
— not in my presence — for misleading them (when it was plainly 
their mistake). When travelling by car along the track of the World 
War II Burma–Thailand Railway in Mon State, we eventually reached 
a security checkpoint beyond which we were not permitted to travel. 
Unlike my predecessor, I was allowed to visit Northern Chin State 
(Tiddim) to inspect an Australian aid project for a village water supply. 
I was only rarely conscious of being monitored or trailed by Myanmar 
security/intelligence vehicles, which were mostly unobtrusive, but 
our private driver sometimes openly reported our movements on these 
trips to MI staff. Several trips were organised by UN agencies such as 
UNICEF or UNHCR, for which Australia was a significant donor, both 
for Myanmar programs as well as more broadly.
Under existing standard procedures, as ambassador, I was required 
to obtain written permission from both Canberra and the Myanmar 
Government for any travel I undertook inside Myanmar, whether 
the travel was official or private. Securing approval from DFAT to 
undertake travel was not normally a problem, as long as the Embassy 
Number Two, the First Secretary, remained in Yangon. Obtaining 
permission from the Myanmar authorities in time to make the 
necessary logistical arrangements was not always easy, and once or 
twice when travelling to Mandalay or Pagan for tourism, I did not 
bother to seek their approval (on the grounds that foreign tourists did 
17  Ramsar is the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance. Myanmar only ratified 
the convention in 2005, and Moyingyi is Myanmar’s only listed wetlands site. When I visited, 
preparations for its listing under Ramsar were already well advanced. See: www.ramsar.org/
wetland/myanmar.
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not need to obtain permission to travel to such sites). There were no 
consequences from this. I was given permission for all other trips, and 
travelled without any official ‘escort’ or security presence; other than a 
trip in early 2003 to Chin State, which was not open for tourists at that 
stage. On that trip to Northern Chin State (Haka, Tiddim, and Falang), 
I was obliged to accept two armed soldiers for security protection 
(although it was not certain that their weapons had bullets). There 
was no problem in following our planned itinerary and we were able 
to carry out our program as proposed. Needless to say, there was never 
any hint of a security problem. On none of my travels did I experience 
any ‘incidents’ or interference of any kind. Other than the trip to Chin 
State, I never sought permission from the Myanmar authorities to 
meet specific Myanmar individuals, many of whom worked for non-
government bodies, while on these trips. If there were any concerns 
on the part of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra on the 
grounds of security or anything else, they were never made known 
to me.
Whatever the extent to which our movements were monitored by 
the internal security authorities, I was never conscious of Myanmar 
non-government people in the regions being reluctant to meet me or 
fearful of the consequences of talking to me. At the same time, I did 
not seek to introduce political overtones into regional trips. Like other 
Western colleagues, I met former political prisoner and NLD-elected 
MP U Ohn Maung whenever we stayed at his Inle Princess Resort 
on Inle Lake in Shan State. There seemed to be no consequences 
from these meetings for U Ohn Maung, who spoke frankly about his 
experiences and his openly (but predictably) anti-government views. 
Most of the Myanmar people I met were cautious in their remarks, 
the notable exception being the rickshaw driver in Mawlamyaing who 
was quite happy to expound his fierce determination to run for the 
elections, while standing next to me in the middle of the road. When 
travelling inside Myanmar, I did not normally seek to meet regional 
Myanmar Government representatives, who were also regional military 
commanders. I usually had no business to raise with them, and to meet 
them could have implied inappropriate recognition of their political 
legitimacy. There were only two exceptions to this: when I called on 
the (Military) Governor of Mon State in early 2003 to alert him to the 
visit by Australian former prisoners of war to Thanbyuzayat, south of 
Mawlamyaing, for the 60th anniversary of the Burma–Thailand 
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Railway in May 2003; and when I called on the Deputy Regional 
Commander/Deputy Governor in Sittwe to explain Australia’s interest 
in the plight of the Muslim Rohingya, as the largest foreign donor to 
the World Food Programme, and to urge the Myanmar Government to 
treat these people more reasonably. Not surprisingly, I was given the 
standard response by the Deputy Governor, who was some years later 
‘promoted’ to be a deputy minister in the central government.
Pragmatic interaction with the government 
in effective control
The Australian Embassy had no specific detailed instructions on how 
to handle day-to-day dealings with the military regime. This would 
normally be left to the common sense judgement of embassy officers, 
and the absence of detailed guidelines was not really problematic. 
A pragmatic approach generally made sense. But the arms-length 
relationship that Australian governments preferred, for domestic 
political reasons, to maintain with the military regime could lead 
to awkward moments. Ambassadors normally call on ministers of 
the receiving government after they present their credentials to the 
head of state. I decided to seek appointments with the ministers 
with whose portfolios Australia had most contact, or some semblance 
of a working relationship. But the only civilian ministers were the 
Minister for Trade (David Abel, a retired brigadier-general and a 
Christian who was responsible for ASEAN Free Trade Area issues); the 
Minister for National Development and National Planning (U Soe Tha, 
whose responsibilities included coordination of aid, and Australia 
wasn’t giving economic aid to Myanmar at this time); the Minister 
for Education (U Than Aung), although Australia at that time had 
stopped offering scholarships to students from Myanmar as part of 
its sanctions against the military regime; and the Attorney-General (U 
Tha Tun, who supported human rights development, but died in office 
in 2002). Even the Minister for Health was a general — Major-General 
Ket Sein, against whom human rights abuse allegations had been made 
by human rights activists. (Later, and perhaps more normally, a senior 
medical doctor was appointed Minister of Health.) 
51
4 . WORKING UNDER MILITARy AUTHORITARIAN RULE
The main ministry that acted as the interface between the diplomatic 
corps and the military regime was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Myanmar has a career foreign service whose personnel were competent 
and courteous, if not always fully in control of the ministry’s policies. 
Some senior members of the Myanmar foreign service had even been 
trained in Australia before 1988; the last one being Ambassador 
Kyaw Tint Shwe, who would become Myanmar Ambassador to the 
United Nations around 2003. Senior Myanmar diplomats were quite 
impressive, in particular Deputy Foreign Minister U Khin Maung Win 
(who was de facto head of the ministry). A few military officers had been 
transferred to the ministry over the years, to toughen it and to ensure 
the army knew what ministry staff were thinking. Some, but almost 
certainly not all, of these officers were known to foreign diplomats. 
Several became long-term members of the Myanmar foreign service. 
They did not necessarily perform well, but one exception to this was 
the long-time Chief of Protocol, Thura Aung Htet, who would recount 
with feeling his difficult years in the army in the jungle fighting the 
Burmese Communist Party. On closer acquaintance, by the early 2000s, 
Myanmar diplomats could be quite frank in private conversations. 
Sometimes they even went further than might have been expected in 
official discussion, for example, requesting (publicly available) reports 
of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings on a regular 
basis, even though there was no prospect of Myanmar being invited 
to join APEC at that time. After the US bombing of Iraq in 2003, 
one middle-ranking bureaucrat who was in frequent contact with 
diplomats privately called for similar US action against Myanmar, but 
such extreme behaviour was rare, and he did not remain long in his 
job after this. 
Given the synergies between the Australian and Myanmar economies, 
and after consulting Australian NGOs informally, I decided in the first 
instance to call on the ministers for mines, agriculture, and livestock 
and fisheries, all of which were sectors of potential direct interest 
to Australia. Each of these ministers was a general, but each was 
accustomed to meeting foreign ‘dignitaries’ in their ‘civilian’ capacity. 
The meetings I had with these ministers were vaguely useful, and 
I recall the Minister of Livestock and Fisheries (Brigadier-General 
Maung Maung Thein, who was the longest serving minister in the 
early 2000s) proudly telling me there were no state-owned enterprises 
under his ministry. The Minister for Agriculture, Major-General Nyunt 
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Tin, was enthusiastic in supporting agricultural research cooperation 
with the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research 
when this was proposed in 2002, and we signed the government-to-
government MOU for the project together.18 The Minister for Mines, 
Brigadier-General Ohn Myint, had oversight of the pearl industry, 
where there was an Australian joint venture.19 I realised there was a 
limit to the utility of these calls on other ministers after a particularly 
unimpressive meeting with the Minister of Industry Number One, 
(where, by contrast, there were no less than six separate state-owned 
enterprises). The minister, a retired army officer who was one of the 
regime’s hard-line ideologues, U Aung Thaung, simply rattled off 
government propaganda and was not in the least interested in engaging 
with a ‘Western’ diplomat.20 
Seeking out civil society: Few alternatives 
to the military regime
There were few practical alternatives to dealing with the military 
regime in Myanmar in the early 2000s. One of the frequent 
observations about Myanmar at that time was that, structurally, 
civil society weakness was one of the major obstacles to reform and 
democratic change. This is hardly surprising, given that around 
two million Burmese, who represented much of the intellectual and 
financial capital of Myanmar, had left the country after 1988 to live 
overseas. The non-government sector was indeed unusually weak 
between 2000–03, having been actively suppressed during Ne Win’s 
one-party rule after 1964. Ne Win had even forced organisations 
such as the local subsidiary of Rotary International to disband itself, 
although, by 2003, suggestions for the revival of Rotary in Myanmar 
18  Major-General Nyunt Tin had been appointed as Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation in 
1997, and was dismissed (‘permitted to retire’) in 2005, supposedly for corruption.
19  This was Myanmar Atlantic Pearl, which was based in Western Australia and operated 
a pearl farm near Myeik in the far south of Myanmar. See their website: www.myanmarpearl.
com/update.htm.
20  According to the editor of The Irrawaddy magazine, Aung Thaung was known for his 
anti-Western views and for his survivor instincts. He later served on the executive of the 
government’s Union Solidarity and Development Association. See Aung Zaw, ‘Aung Thaung: 
Burma’s Untouchable Minister’, The Irrawaddy, Vol. 15, No. 6, June 2007. He stood for election 
for the USDP in 2010 and was elected, but was not given a ministerial position by President 
Thein Sein in his new cabinet in March 2011.
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began to be heard, but did not gain any headway until more than a 
decade later. Interestingly, church organisations, including the Young 
Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), continued to function, and 
several volunteers from Australian counterpart groups were present 
during this period. The Myanmar Red Cross (MRC) was a government 
organisation, but the Australian Red Cross considered it a counterpart, 
and occasionally sent its experts to work at the MRC in Yangon or with 
ICRC which at that time had numerous offices around the country. The 
Australian Embassy had good contacts with both the MRC and the 
ICRC. 
After around 1999, it had become possible for local non-governmental 
organisations to be approved as potential partners for international 
‘counterparts’. One of the first organisations to be established was an 
environmental group, the Forest Resource Environment Development 
and Conservation Association (FREDA), which had been established 
as early as 1996.21 Some environmentalists later established another 
wildlife conservation organisation called the Biodiversity and Nature 
Conservation Association (BANCA). According to the Ministry of 
Home Affairs, by 2002 more than 20 local NGOs had been approved,22 
but they were closely watched by the authorities and allowed little 
freedom of action. Unfortunately, these NGOs were rather fragile 
and, at that time, did not have a high level of capacity, so there were 
limited scope for connections between Australia and these groups. 
(On my return to Australia in 2003, I sought to put BANCA in touch 
with Birds Australia in the hope that counterpart collaboration could 
develop.) Historically, there were also a few government-connected 
humanitarian organisations, such as the Myanmar Anti-Narcotics 
Association (MANA). Some Australian grass-roots assistance was 
delivered with the cooperation of local organisations such as the 
Myanmar YMCA, which was remarkably ‘independent’, and headed 
nationally at the time by the respected (Karen Christian) scholar Tun 
Aung Chain. Such organisations often seemed to have developed 
pragmatic working relationships with the authorities, who did not 
interfere unduly with small-scale, local humanitarian initiatives.23 
21  FREDA maintains an impressive website. See: fredamyanmar.com/freda.html.
22  Official communication from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Australian Embassy.
23  On the other hand, the military regime remained quite suspicious of international agencies 
and pursued a much more interventionist role in relations to their activities, insisting that 
programs be coordinated and monitored by the Ministry of National Development and Economic 
Planning, a policy that was resisted to the extent possible by NGOs and UN agencies.
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Embassies that had similar programs (the UK and Japan) had similar 
experiences, so this was not a unique phenomenon for Australian 
programs. 
Around this time, a few academics and retired bureaucrats with 
professional qualifications had organised ‘academies of science’ as 
a means of keeping in touch with other professionals and fostering 
future independent professional development. These groups depended 
to a great extent on retired government officials, but were seriously 
short of funding. In 2002, the Australian Embassy arranged for a 
donation of surplus forestry science books from ANU Forestry School 
(where quite a number of Myanmar foresters had been trained under 
the Colombo Plan) to be donated to the Academy of Agriculture and 
Forestry Sciences. These organisations would later proliferate as new 
vehicles for international cooperation and provide some long-awaited 
opportunities for strengthening civil society. Also common were some 
professional associations, a few of which were active, useful, and 
non-political. The best known was probably the Myanmar Historical 
Commission, whose regular conference was a major opportunity for 
interaction between scholars, including, from time to time, some from 
Australia. There was a further substantial growth in the NGO sector 
after Cyclone Nargis in 2008, partly as a result of the ongoing need for 
relief activities for local communities. 
Another large and important national Myanmar non-governmental 
organisation was the Buddhist clergy, or sangha, numbering more than 
400,000. They were not officially isolated from the outside world, and 
occasionally travelled overseas. Burma hosted the World Buddhist 
Summit in December 2004, the year after I left Myanmar, and from 
around this time began to receive foreigners who wished to undertake 
meditation courses (a special kind of religious tourism). In the absence 
of many ‘neutral’ political observers, I sometimes sought to consult 
leading independent Buddhists about current affairs. A sayadaw 
I visited on more than one occasion was U Jotika (Zawtika),24 who was 
comfortable discussing the current political situation. I met another 
sayadaw who had actually been a political prisoner himself, and who 
24  U Zawtika (also spelled U Jotika) speaks fluent English, having lived for a short period 
in the United States. He was living in a small monastery on the outskirts of Bago, about 50 
kilometres north of Yangon. Like many prominent sayadaws in Myanmar, he has a large popular 
following for his sermons that he distributes on CDs or tapes. His biodata can be found at www.
thisismyanmar.com/nibbana/jotikauk.htm.
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was much more nervous about talking (through an interpreter) about 
such matters. Burmese people quite routinely discuss their daily 
issues with their sayadaws, as we might in a Western society. Some 
Myanmar sayadaws are actively and openly involved in supporting 
their communities over politically sensitive local issues, but many 
who were affiliated with the government-controlled sangha would not 
challenge or criticise the military regime.
One sector that was largely ‘missing’ in Myanmar was the media, both 
domestic Myanmar media and international media. A trademark of 
the military regime was its highly effective censorship of the media. 
Amongst other things, this meant no foreign correspondent was based 
in Myanmar, apart from the Xinhua representative, and tight controls 
were exercised over journalistic reporting. But even by 2000, this was 
starting to change. Foreign media representatives were permitted to 
enter the country as working journalists from time to time, satellite 
broadcasting was beginning to have an audience and an impact, and 
more and more Burmese were tuning into Burmese-language broadcasts 
by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Voice of America (VOA), 
and later (2007) Radio Australia. Although political uses of the media 
were still in their infancy inside Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi was very 
effectively using video ‘messages’ and speeches smuggled out of the 
country to get her message across directly to international audiences. 
But even SPDC censorship was being exercised more sensitively in 
some ways. For example, several international news agencies had 
long employed highly capable and well-informed local journalists as 
their ‘stringers’. Some of the best media reporting at this interesting 
transition time was by the stringers for Reuters (Aung Hla Tun) 
and Associated Press (Aye Aye Win). These two highly professional 
journalists showed excellent ‘instincts’ when it came to knowing what 
developments were important and would be carried by international 
media. But their reporting was all the more impressive because they 
succeeded in pushing the boundaries of what reporting the regime 
would tolerate. Their reports were more accurate, and more timely, 
and sometimes would have definitely benefited from information 
provided by military intelligence. Of course, the Myanmar Times was 
operating in a similar way, but it remained constrained by its weekly 
format and by (initially) appearing only in English. 
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On one occasion around 2002, I discussed press censorship with the 
editor-in-chief of one of the main daily Muslim newspapers, who 
described the form of self-censorship under which he was permitted 
to operate at that time: his newspaper content was entirely confined 
to religious matters and not political or social issues. But it seems like 
the form of ‘post-publication censorship’ adopted after 2012. At that 




Myanmar in 2000: Ready 
Or Not For Change?
In 2000, the Australian Government’s assessment of the prospects for 
movement in Burma seemed about as gloomy as could be imagined.1 
What the assessment did not mention was that the process of political 
negotiations in Myanmar remained at a complete stalemate, and that 
the prospects for a resolution of this situation seemed as remote as 
ever. What it did not need to state was that a repressive, undemocratic 
military regime was still engaging in widespread human rights abuses 
and that the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD), Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi, was still under house arrest, with her freedom of 
movement extremely restricted. Faced at that time with a ‘temporary’ 
military regime which had already been in power for more than a 
decade, and apparently confronting stern outward resistance from the 
Burmese army military leadership to any overt liberalising openings, 
it was hard to discern where the inspiration for substantial change 
1  The entire entry on Burma in the DFAT Annual Report for 1999–2000 read: ‘We continued a 
carefully judged approach to Burma, enabling Mr Downer’s Human Rights Institution initiative 
to proceed to the point where the first human rights training workshops could be held in July, 
with another one to follow in October 2000. The workshops expose middle-ranking Burmese civil 
servants to international human rights concepts, instruments and standards. At the same time 
as implementing this innovative approach, we took care to keep Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the 
Burmese opposition fully informed. The department complemented the human rights initiative 
through direct representations to the Burmese Government about arrests and harassment of 
members of opposition groups, and other human rights violations. We supported human rights 
resolutions on Burma at the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights 
and a resolution on the use of forced labour in Burma at the International Labour Conference.’
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could emerge. Yet it was mainly a problem of not knowing enough 
about the opponents. As the International Crisis Group would 
comment in its very first report on Myanmar in 2000: ‘The challenge 
for the international community is to find ways — having regard to 
the regime’s apparent strengths and vulnerabilities — to intensify the 
pressure upon it to accommodate peaceful democratic transition.’2
Moreover, as I discovered during my initial exposure to Burmese 
matters after my appointment was decided upon in early 2000, 
there were some very slight grounds for hoping that the distasteful 
military regime in Yangon might be receptive to allowing some 
change. For example, when Australian Human Rights Commissioner 
Chris Sidoti visited Myanmar in August 1999, he was surprised by 
the apparent openness he encountered about exploring the scope 
for human rights cooperation on the part of regime representatives.3 
At the very least, even a slight hope for positive movement seemed 
to encourage some international ‘players’ to contemplate modest 
initiatives to encourage more movement. Alexander Downer himself 
was frank about what might or might not be expected from this 
initiative, when he admitted: 
Now, this one swallow is a long way from making a summer, but 
the fact that the Burmese Government can see the point of such a 
(independent human rights) body, albeit not having made up their 
minds about it, is a good step forward. And it highlights the positive 
role that Australia can play in advancing discussion of human rights 
issues throughout our region.4 
Australia was not alone, however. When I attended a United Nations-
sponsored meeting at Walker Hill in Seoul in March 2000 to consider 
ways forward for Burma, diplomats, experts, and scholars from more 
than 20 countries were split over whether the best option would 
involve engagement or further sanctions. At least at this meeting there 
was debate and discussion on possible ways to move forward.5 In the 
2  International Crisis Group, ‘Burma/Myanmar: How Strong Is the Military Regime?’, 
Asia Report No. 11, Bangkok and Brussels, 21 December 2000. 
3  Sidoti’s lengthy and detailed press release can be viewed at www.humanrights.gov.au/
news/media-releases/chris-sidoit-visit-myanmar-burma.
4  See Alexander Downer’s speech to the NSW Branch of the Australian Institute of 
International  Affairs, ‘Australia — Effective Action on Human Rights’, 5 August 1999. 
See foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1999/990805_aiia.html. 
5  See Roger Mitton’s report, ‘Inside “Secret” Meetings: The Chilston Conferences to Engage 
Yangon’, Asia Week Online, March 2000.
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previous year (1999), the Burma Update Conference at The Australian 
National University in Canberra had concluded that ‘given the strength 
of the regime, the relative weakness of the domestic opposition, and 
the severity of the humanitarian situation, it may be necessary to 
try to work with the military in order to prepare the ground for the 
political and economic reform’.6
A separate, if related, trend appearing after the mid-1990s was the 
growing consensus that, notwithstanding the military regime’s 
superficial cohesiveness, there were ‘cracks in the edifice’ and ‘an 
accommodation with the military regime’ probably held the key to 
making progress towards a political solution of the stand-off between 
the military regime, its political opponents, and Myanmar society at 
large.7 In hindsight, the year 1997 seems to have been a watershed: 
this was the year the military regime underwent an ‘identity change’ 
from State Law and Restoration Council (SLORC) to State Peace and 
Development Council (SPDC), changing its structure, its personnel and 
its priorities; it was also the year that Myanmar decided (voluntarily) to 
coordinate its overall policies more or less to the templates of ASEAN. 
Whatever shortcomings ASEAN might possess, ASEAN membership 
was quite a good way to encourage a previously xenophobic and 
isolationist country to turn its thinking around and to embrace what 
were for it novel and unprecedented changes. 
An important trend throughout Burma’s modern history was its strong 
predilection to seek its own solutions and to make its own choices. 
One method I used to find out what Myanmar officials might accept 
was to pose the question: what would be needed for Myanmar to 
become a ‘normal’ country after undergoing a process of change which 
it seemed to be intent on devising for itself, while being conscious 
of ‘lessons’ it could learn from other countries? It was encouraging 
that Myanmar officials did not seem to see their future founded in 
isolationism or in remaining separate or cut off from the rest of the 
6  See ‘Introduction’ to ANU 1999 Burma Update papers: Morten B. Pedersen, Emily Rudland 
and R. J. May (eds), Burma Myanmar: Strong Regime Weak State, Adelaide: Crawford House 
Publishing, 2000.
7  See the chapters in Burma Myanmar: Strong Regime Weak State by Mary Callahan (‘Cracks 
in the Edifice’) and Andrew Selth (‘The Future of the Burmese Armed Forces’): Morten B. 
Pedersen, Emily Rudland and R. J. May (eds), Burma Myanmar: Strong Regime Weak State, 
Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000.
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world. Indeed, it was in many ways surprising, but also realistic and 
reassuring, to find that they might turn to countries such as Australia 
for assistance and help. 
In view of the impenetrability of the Myanmar military and the 
fragility of the political opposition under police state conditions, 
it was not surprising that observers looking at Myanmar asked 
questions about the real potential of non-governmental organisations 
to act as the harbingers of change in such a tightly controlled state. 
A few encouraging signs could be found. First, the military regime’s 
gradual acceptance of humanitarian INGOs such as Médecins Sans 
Frontières, World Vision, and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief 
Everywhere (CARE) after 1990. Each of these had a formal MOU with 
the Myanmar Government. The most significant development in the 
area of civil society, involving a clear ‘back-down’ on the part of the 
regime, was its 1999 agreement to allow the ICRC for the first time ever 
to visit political prisoners from its office in Yangon, in accordance with 
standard ICRC procedures. A key role in achieving this outcome for 
the ICRC was played by the Swiss humanitarian ‘field diplomat’, Leon 
de Riedtmatten, who over the next decade was to act as an important 
mediator in Yangon between the regime and various international 
agencies, including the ICRC, the United Nations Special Envoys, the 
International Labour Organization, and the Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue.8 
The unrecognised potential for civil society to play a larger role was 
registered by the eminent US scholar David Steinberg at the 1999 
Burma Update at The Australian National University in Canberra. 
While admitting his own pessimism, Steinberg concluded: 
There is no reason why, over time, pluralism and democratic 
governance may not develop in Burma. The issue for the Burmese is 
over how long a time; and for foreigners, what role they might play to 
assist the process.9 
8  De Riedmatten always shuns publicity, and the only description of his role is at th.linkedin.
com/pub/leon-riedmatten/48/14b/67a. The regime formally rejected a role for ‘mediators’, but the 
enormous contribution of de Riedtmatten from 1999 should not be overlooked.
9  See Steinberg’s chapter, ‘The State, Power and Civil Society in Burma/Myanmar’, in Morten 
B. Pedersen, Emily Rudland and R. J. May (eds), Burma Myanmar: Strong Regime Weak State, 
Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000.
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Analysing the same issue in its second report on Myanmar in 2001, 
the International Crisis Group (ICG) concluded: 
While civil society organisations will therefore be important in creating 
the backing for any solution, and in consolidating the democratisation 
process once it begins, they are not likely to be crucial players in 
achieving a momentum for change.10 
The other changes that began around this time were the emergence 
of  business ‘cronies’ of the military as substantial ‘independent’ 
corporate operations. Almost all of Myanmar’s modern-day ‘crony 
capitalists’ began their corporate development in the early 1990s, 
deliberately encouraged by the army leadership after 1990. Although 
demonised by the pro-democracy movement for enjoying unfair 
benefits from their close associations with the army leadership, crony 
capitalism was not a new phenomenon in Myanmar.11 From  small 
beginnings, their reach extended quickly from resources and 
construction into banking, tourism (hotels, airlines), and other 
sectors. Eventually, once consolidated as business conglomerates with 
a wide range of interests after around 2000, many of them would make 
substantial contributions to infrastructure improvements across the 
country. The value of their contributions to lifting standards of living 
and upgrading national physical infrastructure has not been properly 
acknowledged because of their poor reputations (although, generally, 
their activities lacked transparency and accountability, and may not 
have always complied with the provisions of the law). Even at the 
grass roots, where people in Myanmar were often desperately poor 
and disadvantaged, they welcomed tourists, their farmers responded 
quickly to the needs of international markets if they could, and they 
were interested in the gains from adopting technological change when 
they could see the advantages of doing so. 
The continued opening up of Myanmar after 1988, in direct 
opposition to the extreme isolationist policies under Ne Win, was a 
significant change that had wide implications for the possibility of 
10  International Crisis Group, ‘Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society’, Asia Report No. 27, 
Bangkok and Brussels, December 2001.
11  In his 2001 doctoral dissertation, the Myanmar-born political scientist Kyaw Yin Hlaing 
noted that ‘crony capitalism has always thrived [in Burma] and continues to serve as the bedrock 
of state-business relations throughout the post-colonial period’. Abstract cited at SOAS Bulletin 
of Burma Research, Vol. 2, No. 1 Spring 2004. Available at www.soas.ac.uk/sbbr/editions/
file64304.pdf.
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political and economic reform as well as potential receptiveness on 
matters such as human rights, freedom of expression, and freedom 
of assembly. While this change started with SLORC in 1988, it was 
hastened by the military regime’s ‘Visit Myanmar’ program in 1996, 
and was deliberately, but quietly and gradually, extended after 2000. 
Its political impact was well understood by members of the NLD, one 
of whom was of the opinion that opening areas of Myanmar for tourism 
usually resulted in reduced human rights abuses such as forced labour. 
It was also well understood by religious groups in Western countries 
such as the United States and Australia, who responded by sending 
the equivalents of missionaries to provide humanitarian support 
and educational opportunities for Myanmar people as much as to 
proselytise. Such groups seemed adept at organising continuous and 
effective access, even to remote parts of the country such as Chin State 
and Shan State, and were careful to avoid risky political involvement 
or gratuitous criticism of the military regime.12
In the police state that Myanmar was in the early 2000s, these 
activities were not only authorised by the Myanmar authorities, they 
were quietly facilitated and even encouraged. In 2002, I was invited 
as Australian Ambassador to attend a large graduation ceremony in 
the Strand Hall, beside the Australian Embassy and alongside the 
famous Strand Hotel in downtown Yangon, for which the Yangon 
police provided traffic control. During an officially-approved visit to 
Kalay in Sagaing State in 2002, I called on the (Burmese) Bishop of 
Sagaing at his official residence in a large agricultural training centre 
in the middle of the town. Around this time, I also heard of American 
trainers carrying out personal management training programs as 
capacity-building humanitarian activities in the southern part of 
Myanmar. Such activities were clearly not unusual; they were not 
held in secret or surreptitiously, but they were conducted discreetly, 
without publicity, and went without mention in international media. 
On this basis, they were evidently regarded as not posing political, 
cultural, or security problems for the authorities or the ordinary 
Myanmar people they assisted. Indeed, they must have been officially 
12  As an example, the American Baptist Church-sponsored Myanmar Institute of Theology in 
the suburb of Insein in Yangon underwent rapid expansion of its activities from 2000, according 
to Wikipedia. Its history went back more than 100 years, but, according to its own account, 
it was permitted to grow substantially and even prosper in the early 2000s. See en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Myanmar_Institute_of_Theology.
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regarded as usefully filling gaps when access to quality international 
education or training was in short supply because of sanctions and 
Myanmar’s ‘pariah’ status. 
In various ways, therefore, by the late 1990s general conditions in 
Myanmar were better suited to allowing long-awaited political and 
economic changes to occur. Modest changes at the grass roots level 
could already be observed at this time, but without any regular and 
free reporting by local and international media at that time, it was 
not easy to get information about positive or negative developments, 
and with all the tools of a police state in full array, it was equally 
hard to identify what changes were significant and which Myanmar 
individuals could be expected to deliver ‘results’. The prospects were 
not bright, and the direction, pace, and duration of changes could not 
be guaranteed or predicted — and, indeed, some would temporarily 
go into reverse after 2004. Later, after the abolition of the military 
regime with the change of government, the post-2011 reforms began 
at a very rapid speed, a development that took many observers by 
surprise, even though many of the challenges had been recognised, if 
not addressed, years before.
Another development in the early 2000s was the growth of private 
international schools around Yangon. It was well known that the 
Myanmar Government school system was failing and incapable 
of providing better opportunities that would offer worthwhile 
employment prospects and greater personal fulfilment. Increasingly, 
small private schools were being set up, ostensibly to provide English 
language training or computer skills development, or, in some cases, 
as preparatory schools to prepare young Burmese for entrance 
to universities in the US or UK. Some young Australians came to 
work as ‘teachers’ in these schools; it was not clear what kind of 
visas they received or what qualifications they had, but they were 
not mere short-term visitors. They stayed out of the public eye and 
apparently managed to avoid causing problems for the ubiquitous 
Myanmar authorities. The legitimacy of some of these slightly dubious 
‘international schools’ would later be questioned when education 
reform finally began in Myanmar, but at the time there was no doubt 
that all of them were tolerated by the authorities, who at this time saw 
no prospect of Myanmar Government funding for such educational 
activities. (Myanmar per capita spending on education at this time 
was appallingly low.) 
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As ambassador, I was once invited to speak about Australia at one 
of these American-run ‘preparatory schools’ in Yangon around this 
time, a routine invitation which I accepted and which raised no 
issues for anyone. At this time, there were no Australian Government 
scholarships available for students from Myanmar, so there was little 
prospect of Burmese students at such schools going on to study in 
Australia. However, some enthusiastic, smaller Australian universities 
were already trying to promote their programs for Burmese private 
students who might be able to pass entry exams and fund their own 
studies in Australia, such overseas travel no longer being prohibited 
for Myanmar citizens. I personally received visits or enquiries from 
the University of Southern Queensland and Curtin University, both 
of which seemed enthusiastic about their prospects in Myanmar, but 
other Australian universities were interested as well. After all, at this 
stage no Australian Government sanctions against Myanmar would 
prohibit their campaigns to attract students from Myanmar; only the 
lack of scholarships or alternative funding would deter Myanmar 
students from going to Australia.13
On the media side, it would be several years before relaxation of 
Myanmar Government controls over the media occurred, but a 
surprising number of foreign journalists managed to visit Myanmar 
during the early 2000s, mostly travelling on tourist visas, obtained 
quite easily from the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok. While in 
Myanmar, such visiting journalists still had to be careful if they 
were interviewing Burmese nationals, and they often could not travel 
outside Yangon, but they seemed to be able to go about obtaining 
material for their reporting without too much trouble, as long as they 
avoided obvious ‘political’ topics. Television or film reporting was, 
however, unusual. I received several requests for interviews from 
visiting international print journalists — not many of whom were 
Australians — which I gave at the Australian Embassy in the normal 
way. Of course, any ‘political’ comments I made in these interviews 
were suitably careful, but apart from preferring to be identified 
only as ‘a Western diplomat’, I was never aware of any negative 
consequences from any of these kinds of interviews. I assumed some 
13  Only later was it revealed that some generals had sent their children to study as private 
overseas students at Australian universities. I saw this as a positive rather than negative 
phenomenon, as it implied they were being exposed to Australian values and ideas rather than 
having closed minds.
65
5 . MyANMAR IN 2000
other ambassadors in Yangon were doing exactly the same thing — we 
were not trying to hide any facts about Myanmar from the outside 
world.
Obviously, the most direct impacts of Myanmar’s ‘police state’ were on 
its own citizens, not on foreign diplomats, and my anecdotal account 
is not implying any necessary correlation between what happened 
to me as a diplomat with the often grim experiences of Myanmar 
citizens — which they sometimes spoke about. Some retired officials 
in the early 2000s told how they had been arrested under the Ne Win 
regime; many claimed this period before 1988 was worse, in terms of 
ruthless treatment of citizens and arbitrary actions on the part of the 
authorities, than anything that happened under the SPDC. Of course, 
in those days few international human rights organisations had access 
to Myanmar.
One of the main practical problems of dealing with an authoritarian 
military regime was its inability to be flexible or to negotiate with 
others. One illustration of this was provide by the relatively affable 
Minister for Home Affairs, Colonel Tin Hlaing, who in so many ways 
enjoyed and shone in his role as a de facto politician. In dealing with 
early instances of extremist Buddhist reactions to Muslims, Tin Hlaing 
quite often pointed out that, on some of these issues, the authorities 
had to deal with ‘extremists’ on both sides, a comment which certainly 
holds for the debate about Rohingya policies in Myanmar under the 
Thein Sein Government after 2011. 
In 2015, 12 years later after I left Yangon, it is hard to recall just 
how isolated Myanmar was between 2000–03. Official embassy 
communications were excellent, following the 1999 worldwide 
upgrade of the Australian diplomatic communications network, which 
fortunately included the embassy in Yangon.14 But other forms of 
communications with and in Myanmar in 2000 were not so advanced. 
Landline telephones were subject to interception and frequent 
breakdowns; mobile phone technology was only just beginning 
in Myanmar, and relatively few people had access in 2000–03. The 
internet only began in Myanmar in 2000 (in a highly controlled form), 
14  Some details of the program to upgrade Australia’s diplomatic communications network 
were contained in the DFAT Annual Report for 1998–99. See dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/
corporate/annual-reports/annual-report-1998-1999/html/programs/subprog41.htm.
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and access was slowly expanding as my assignment concluded in 
2003. However, within a couple of years it was possible for me to stay 
in contact with most Myanmar friends by email. As another example 
of rapid change, just a few years later I would receive phone calls from 
friends in Myanmar without this being unusual, for either them or 
for me.15 According to the International Telecommunications Union, 
Myanmar still has one of the lowest per capita rates of access to the 
internet and mobile telephones, although expansion in both has 
jumped dramatically since Myanmar’s reforms started after 2010.16
As an indication of Myanmar’s isolation in 2000, perhaps only four 
international airlines flew direct to Yangon, although the number 
increased quite quickly after around 2005. The Myanmar postal 
system was notoriously unreliable and remains so to this day, although 
registered mail (a requirement of Universal Postal Union membership) 
usually gets through. Myanmar’s middle classes were keen to adopt new 
information and communications technology (ITC) both professionally 
and in other ways, but most people in Myanmar initially tended to 
be quite cautious in how they used these technologies. Moreover, the 
potential connection between modern telecommunications technology 
and political liberalisation was predictably of considerable concern on 
the part of the Myanmar military regime, who often used technical 
breaches of ITC laws for internal security purposes.17 All  forms 
of communication technology — facsimiles, internet-connected 
computers, mobile phones — could be targeted by the authorities for 
potential political abuses.
Under the military regime, satellite television access was notionally 
more tightly controlled at the personal level than other forms of ITC, but 
this did not seem to stop satellite dishes appearing around the country 
after 2000. In 2000–03 international free-to-air satellite broadcasting 
was already spreading rapidly, and was uncensored, so some footage of 
the 9/11 incident in New York was instantly available, FA Cup football 
15  Myanmar’s standing in international data on the diffusion on new telecommunications 
technology was always poor, but my own experience has been that generally those who wanted 
access could get it.
16  See ITU statistics on telecommunications diffusion at www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/
Pages/stat/default.aspx.
17  One of the first steps taken by the National League for Democracy after 2011 was to establish 
its own website, which made a visible difference to its profile, even if the website was not fully 
developed. Later it was closed down and replaced.
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matches were routinely screened at local pubs and ‘tea houses’, and 
major international events were seen in one form or another. Within 
a few years, satellite dishes could be seen in cities and even in small 
and remote towns all over the country, showing the keen desire of the 
ordinary people to enjoy access to at least some of what the rest of the 
world could see. By 2005, Democratic Voice of Burma started television 
broadcasts directly to Myanmar, and these broadcasts influenced the 
unfolding of the ‘Saffron Revolution’ in 2007. 
In a relatively minor way, in 2000–03 Australia was inevitably involved 
in some of these advances in new ITC in Myanmar. The Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation’s Radio Australia had long collected 
evidence of its loyal short-wave radio listenership in Myanmar; 
and when Australia Television International (ATVI) was launched 
in 2002,18 it also found an audience in Myanmar, even though its 
signal did not target Myanmar and was not strong there. Australian 
missions in Southeast Asia, including the Australian Embassy in 
Yangon, were asked at this time to assist ATVI in getting started with 
local audiences.19 Myanmar’s isolation was somewhat mitigated by 
the subsequent arrival of ATVI at some of Yangon’s hotels in early 
2003. Although Myanmar was at the western edge of the satellite 
footprint, it could be received there and, following an exploratory 
visit to Yangon by ATVI representatives, after it was installed in a few 
hotels in Yangon in early 2003, it was instantly popular, reflecting the 
general appetite for such things in Myanmar. (Myanmar was not even 
an official target country and there would not have been many paid-up 
subscribers.) 
18  See Alexander Downer’s speech on the occasion of the launch, entitled ‘Australia, the Asia–
Pacific, and Television: Broadcasting to the Region’, 13 February 2002, at www.foreignminister.
gov.au/speeches/2002/020213_fa_austv_launch.html.
19  As the DFAT Annual Report for 2002–03 blandly said: ‘The department and posts worked 
closely with ABCAP (ABC Asia Pacific) TV to secure entry into regional markets.’ In 2002, the 
ABC launched ABC Asia Pacific or ABCAP — the replacement for the defunct Australia Television 






At the time of my appointment as Ambassador to Burma/Myanmar, 
there was an ongoing debate over ‘engagement versus disengagement’, 
which would run through the early 2000s. Earlier initiatives seeking to 
engage with the Myanmar military regime, such as the ‘benchmarks’ 
proposals of Alexander Downer’s predecessor as foreign minister, 
Gareth Evans, had failed conspicuously to win support from either the 
international community or the military regime. These ‘benchmarks’, 
floated as early as 1992, suffered from being more dirigiste, more 
prescriptive, more rigorous, and more redolent of international 
pressure than other ‘openings’.1 Not much of this debate about 
engagement versus disengagement surfaced in public in Australia, 
but it was very much to the forefront in government-to-government 
diplomatic contacts at the time: it would routinely arise in Australia’s 
participation in expanded ASEAN meetings, and with Australia’s 
‘like-minded’ regional partners, such as Japan.2 
1  Gareth Evans reflected publicly on this failure for the first time when opening The Australian 
National University‘s Myanmar Update on 5 June 2015. See his remarks at www.gevans.org/
speeches/speech573.html. Even his efforts to visit Myanmar as foreign minister up until 1996, or as 
President of the International Crisis Group from 2000–09, were rebuffed by the military regime at 
the time. He was not to visit Myanmar in this kind of role until 2014.
2  Alexander Downer mentioned the broader context of his initiative with Burma in an 
address to the NSW Branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs on 5 August 1999, 
referring to ‘the benefit of concentrating on outcomes rather than rhetoric in bilateral human 
rights diplomacy’. See foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1999/990805_aiia.html.
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One motivation for closer engagement with the military regime at 
this time was the possibility that it might be susceptible to being 
persuaded to introduce political change. This was not necessarily an 
unrealistic expectation: for a variety of reasons, the post-1988 military 
regime had chosen to drop Ne Win’s policy of isolation and to open up 
Myanmar (to foreign investment, tourism, etc.); while the regime was 
secretive and suspicious, and while it often denied many international 
observers access, it was also allowing much more exposure and scrutiny 
of the country through UN agencies and its participation in ASEAN 
than previous Burmese governments. Moreover, Myanmar remained a 
member of most UN agencies and international financial institutions, 
although its participation was not necessarily very active.
Obviously, the countries with potentially the greatest influence, 
or leverage, were the major powers who could, hypothetically or 
otherwise, offer the most aid, or business and investment. Australia 
was  not in this league. By the end of the twentieth century, 
US policymakers had come up with new foreign policy instruments 
which the United States could apply unilaterally, either under 
presidential authority or certification, or congressional processes — 
for example, legislation with built-in accountability mechanisms. 
Often these involved the categorisation of countries as compliers or 
non-compliers with international conventions or with unilateral US 
requirements where US  policymakers did not regard international 
conventions as sufficient. Frequently, this would involve the 
US Government compiling a ‘black list’ of countries deemed to be at 
fault, who would not qualify to receive any beneficial treatment from 
the US Government. The only way to qualify for US assistance, for 
a country on such a list, would be for the president to ‘de-certify’ 
the country in question, usually on the request or recommendation of 
the US Congress. Narcotics, human rights, and weapons proliferation 
were the most common subjects of these lists. ‘Burma’ was very often 
on these lists. Australia had no capacity to apply such policies, even 
though sometimes they matched Australian policy objectives. At times, 
US officials tried to use these procedures to shift the behaviour of non-
complying countries such as Myanmar, but at other times it served 
US interests to be able to ‘name and shame’ certain countries by 
publicising their non-conformity.
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Sometimes US policy was painted into a corner by the ideological 
imperatives close to the heart of many members of the US Congress, 
to which US administrations needed to be extremely sensitive. 
Among  these reporting mechanisms were the annual reports on 
religious freedoms, which presented a highly critical image of 
Myanmar. To  people on the ground in Myanmar, this criticism 
seemed remote from what one saw around the streets of multicultural 
Yangon, with its numerous cathedrals, mosques, and Buddhist 
temples and shrines; a panoply of religious events with designated 
official holidays for every major religion; mass Christian events in the 
form of festivals or theological college degree awards ceremonies; the 
substantial Catholic/Protestant enclaves which one saw when visiting 
the middle of cities such Yangon (in Insein), or Kalay (in Sagaing State); 
and in the form of charitable activities or organisations such as the 
YMCA. Few authoritarian states have a Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
but Myanmar/Burma has always had such a ministry, reflecting the 
importance Buddhism plays in society. It was not inappropriate that, 
under the military regime, the Minister for Religious Affairs was 
usually a general (since the military were quite comfortable being 
both Buddhists and soldiers). 
Essentially, the usual methods for influencing other countries were 
either through some form of active engagement with the government, 
or through the imposition of costs and punishment against the 
government via sanctions. In other words, ‘carrots and sticks’. 
Australian policy towards Myanmar after 1988 followed a little of both 
approaches. Australia clearly aligned itself with criticism of Burma’s 
anti-democratic regime and widespread human rights abuses, but, 
privately, Australia sought to differentiate itself from the countries 
pursuing hard-line unilateral sanctions by not ruling out certain kinds 
of direct engagement with the military regime. Australia was among 
a small group of Western countries that still provided humanitarian 
assistance, mainly through UN agencies and NGOs.
US sanctions against Myanmar were, unsurprisingly, a major source of 
irritation as far as the Myanmar Government was concerned. Myanmar 
officials — and the Myanmar official media — missed no opportunity 
to criticise US sanctions as being unfair, discriminatory, involving 
double standards, and punitive in their impact on the ordinary 
Myanmar people and the Myanmar economy — which Myanmar 
officials did not attempt to deny. In 2003, the official Burmese media 
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even publicised a petition from the Myanmar business community 
to the US Government protesting against the loss of jobs as a result 
of US bans on garment imports from Myanmar. Unsurprisingly, the 
Myanmar Government steadfastly denied that US sanctions had any 
political impact, either in terms of attracting wider international 
support or in the sense of influencing the State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC) to change policies. In a later chapter, I examine the 
evidence that certain US sanctions had quite a powerful and direct 
economic impact. 
One focus of the ‘engagement versus disengagement’ debate that 
affected ordinary people — in Myanmar and elsewhere — was tourism. 
Even in 2000, the Lonely Planet guide to Myanmar (Burma) (already 
in its seventh edition)3 still felt the need to begin with an introduction 
in which it sought to defend its promotion of tourism to Myanmar by 
answering the question: ‘Should you visit Myanmar?’ Its publishers, 
Australians Tony and Maureen Wheeler, lived in Melbourne and 
visited Myanmar from time to time — including while I was there 
— to keep in touch with developments, and to ensure the integrity 
of the Lonely Planet’s research on Myanmar. Their introduction sets 
out the different nuances between Aung San Suu Kyi/National League 
for Democracy (NLD) and government-in-exile (NCGUB) views about 
tourism: the expatriate views tended to be harder, arguing that ‘much’ 
of any tourism revenue ‘went into the pockets of the … generals’.4 
The  Wheelers obviously favoured tourists visiting Myanmar, 
but were openly unsympathetic to the military regime and were, 
unsurprisingly, very dismissive of the military regime’s 1997 ‘Visit 
Myanmar’ campaign. 
Pressure for sanctions against Burma was mobilised through ‘Burma 
Campaigns’, broadly supported by the NLD, which resulted in the 
European Union adopting a ‘Common Position’ on Burma in 1996, 
discouraging trade and investment, and calling for a tourism boycott. 
However, many EU member governments did no more than urge 
companies to apply boycotts, without imposing any enforcement — 
3  The first Lonely Planet guide to Burma appeared in 1979. It was not unusual when travelling 
around Myanmar even much later to meet tourism sector workers claiming proudly to have 
assisted the Wheelers undertake their research. 
4  Some of the arguments for and against the boycott are outlined in Andrew Buncombe, 
‘Boycott Burma: To go or not to go?’, Independent, 2 June 2008. Available at www.independent.
co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/boycott-burma-to-go-or-not-to-go-837207.html.
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although the absence of legal sanctions against tourism was not always 
made clear to the public. European tourism was indeed discouraged, 
but it continued at a low level. Responding to different pressures, 
Australian governments openly proclaimed their unwillingness to 
contemplate restrictions on trade, investment, and tourism, but did 
not promote any of these activities officially; they were never tempted 
to associate themselves with economic sanctions until 2007, when the 
‘Saffron Revolution’ occurred amidst international publicity.
During this period, Australia was seen by all concerned as belonging 
to the engagement camp, even though it had not eased its political 
sanctions and did not deviate from its basic association with Western 
policies against the military regime. So it would be more accurate to 
characterise Australian policies at this time as directed towards ‘limited 
engagement’. Myanmar was a country of limited direct significance for 
Australia, and Australian policies were reasonably altruistic, motivated 
by what was best for the people, the country, and the region. This was 
not always the case, but with Burma/Myanmar the ‘historical baggage’ 
for Australia was smaller than usual. Australia was widely regarded 
internationally as being well intentioned in relation to Myanmar. 
If Australia’s approach was at times a little more independent, this 
seemed to be expected by the international community and was 
respected by most of the people of Myanmar. The only Myanmar 
organisation that openly sought different Australian policies was the 
NLD, which favoured sanctions and wanted all Western countries to 
follow a single-minded approach. (The NLD also at times criticised 
Japan for diverging from the mainstream Western approach.)
When he was Australian Foreign Minister (1987–96), Gareth Evans 
perhaps straddled this engagement versus sanctions approach, 
articulating what he called his ‘benchmarks’ for actions by Myanmar 
a proposal he launched officially via the ASEAN-Plus meetings 
around 1995. In  his opening address at the 2015 Myanmar Update 
Conference at The Australian National University in June 2015, he 
reflected ruefully on the lack of support he had received domestically 
and internationally for his proposals.5 Perhaps these ideas were ahead 
of the times. But they were also probably far more prescriptive than a 
‘sovereignty sensitive’ regime could tolerate.
5  See gevans.org/speeches/speech573.html.
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While Western governments maintained their official sanctions on 
political contacts with the SPDC into the first decade of the twenty-
first century, and while restrictions on multilateral, including UN, 
‘engagement’ remained, some other countries — including Myanmar’s 
Asian neighbours — gradually relaxed their attitude towards the SPDC 
in the late 1990s. Moreover, following the SPDC’s more cooperative 
attitude and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from de facto house 
arrest in May 2002, a few other ‘Western’ governments experimented 
by reinstating ministerial visits. Most significant were the visits in 
August 2002 by the Japanese and Australian foreign ministers after 
gaps of 19 years in both cases. Regrettably, the more moderate SPDC 
policies did not last beyond May 2003, when regime-sponsored thugs 
attacked Aung San Suu Kyi and regime policy hardened again, to be 
met with new Western sanctions.
It is difficult to say whether the division in Western policies towards 
Myanmar in this period generated problems, or whether it served 
useful political and/or economic purposes, either in creating leverage 
with Myanmar or differentiating Australian policy from that of other 
countries. It certainly had a slightly polarising effect, in that Australia 
and Japan (and to a certain extent Korea) were openly recognised 
as pursuing policies distinct from the US and the UK. The SPDC 
definitely realised this, but did not try to take unreasonable advantage 
of it. Ordinary educated Myanmar citizens were quite aware of these 
distinctions between different Western countries, and did not seem 
to find them confusing or complicating. Interestingly, but perhaps 
unsurprisingly, international agencies (including UN agencies) 
seemed to quite strongly welcome the more accommodating policies 
of Australia and Japan, in preference to the hard-line attitudes of the 
US and the UK that, in the end, had the very real effect of denying 
substantial funding to international agencies. Thus UN Secretary-
General’s Special Envoy Razali Ismail was delighted to attend one of 
the Australia Government’s human rights workshops, which coincided 
with one of his visits, and UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights 
Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro was later prepared to praise the workshops 
in one of his reports. (Both the US and UK governments officially 
complained about these workshops when they started.) Agencies such 
as UNHCR and UNICEF were explicit in expressing privately their 
appreciation for Australian support for their activities in Myanmar. 
When the ILO was seeking a special envoy to rescue their cooperation 
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program on forced labour, it was no accident that they found the ideal 
candidate in former Australian Governor-General Sir Ninian Stephen, 
who was to visit Myanmar in 2001 and 2005.6 So Australia’s rhetoric 
was sometimes matched with action, and Australia’s reputation for 
independence in its policy thinking sometimes paid dividends.
The constant absence of high-level US policy involvement with 
Myanmar was a key reason for the failure of US policy. Political 
contact between the United States and Myanmar had been kept at 
a very low level ever since 1988, even when Aung San Suu Kyi was 
released from house arrest in May 2002. Visits in either direction by 
members of the cabinets of either country remained prohibited under 
US sanctions. Visits to Rangoon by members of the US Congress were 
few and far between, and even the number of congressional staffers 
who visited was extremely small. The possibility of a visit by the 
then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
James Kelly, was discussed during 2002–03, but never materialised 
before Aung San Suu Kyi was again placed under detention. Visits by 
the relevant Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs occurred from time to time, but were predominantly 
of a fact-finding and familiarisation nature, rather than offering the 
possibility of a substantial political dialogue, let alone any prospect 
of a change in US policy. In the absence of any inter-governmental 
programs between the United States and Myanmar, the only other US 
officials who visited were those working on counter-narcotics policy 
and, later and only intermittently, on the recovery of World War II 
remains. There would be few (non-communist) countries in the world 
where the United States so systematically avoided high-level political 
exchanges. 
A further complication was the fact that since 1991 the head of the 
US Embassy was designated chargé d’affaires rather than ambassador, 
as part of the US Congress’s political sanctions against Myanmar. 
In practical terms, this did not normally make a great deal of difference 
in Yangon. The US Chargé d’Affaires was usually active in cultivating 
influential members of the Myanmar community, enjoyed frequent 
6  See International Labour Office, ‘Developments Concerning the Question of the Observance 
by the Government of Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention: Report of High Level Team’, 
Geneva, November 2001. Available at www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb282/
pdf/gb-4-ax.pdf.
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access to Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD and other opposition groups, 
and in a highly pragmatic way developed discreet but effective ties in 
conjunction with the Myanmar military through the military attachés 
stationed in the US Embassy. 
But the absence of an ‘ambassador’ inevitably constrained working 
relations and inhibited the development of meaningful substantive 
rapport between Washington and Yangon. For example, the US 
Embassy had more limited contacts within the Myanmar bureaucracy 
than would normally have been the case for the United States, 
even though the bureaucracy is essentially technocratic. Instead, 
the embassy concentrated its outreach to opposition organisations 
and individuals whose political influence in the tightly controlled 
environment of Myanmar was not necessarily very significant.7 Staff 
of the US  Embassy were reportedly monitored more closely by the 
Myanmar security authorities than the staff of most other embassies, 
and could not normally travel as freely (although US Embassy officers 
were able to visit the site of the 30 May 2003 Depayin attack on 
the NLD convoy, despite the lack of any official travel permit).8 It is 
probably the case that the absence of ambassador-level representation 
had greater negative impact in Washington, where a chargé d’affaires, 
appointed by the State Department rather than the White House, 
simply would not have the same influence in Congress or the White 
House when it came to getting the ear of high-level policymakers in 
Washington. 
Even though Congress blocked the appointment of an ambassador after 
1990 — and continued to do so until 2012 — and refused approval 
for any government-to-government assistance programs, the US 
Defense Department normally maintained three defence attachés in 
the US Embassy, while the Central Intelligence Agency maintained a 
7  Unsurprisingly perhaps, one did not hear, even anecdotally, about participants in these 
programs appearing in more prominent roles. A much later US study revealed some movement of 
these ‘alumni’ into influential positions in the Myanmar Government, but not in the numbers or 
at the level that might have been expected. See Mark S. Riley and Ravi A. Balaram, ‘The United 
States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program with Burma/Myanmar: 
A  Review of the 1980–1988 Programming and Prospects for the Future’, Asian Affairs: 
An American Review, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 109–132.
8  The State Department occasionally made public mention of this harassment, but in a 
relatively mild way. An example is the State Department’s October 2003 ‘Report on Activities to 
Support Democracy Activities in Burma as Required by the Burmese Democracy and Freedom 
Act of 2003’.
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presence and discreet, but limited, working relations with Myanmar 
counterparts. US contacts with the Tatmadaw (Burmese armed forces) 
at times were quite good, mainly through ‘golf course diplomacy’, 
but of course this could not be followed up with the usual military 
cooperation and training programs. The last members of the Tatmadaw 
to receive training in the United States were those who had been sent 
there in the last years of the Ne Win regime, before 1990. Few of these 
last members of Burmese military to receive training in the United 
States were in positions of influence by 2000.9 As a result, the network 
of American alumni in the Burmese army dwindled, as it did in other 
circles in Myanmar. The same thing happened with most other Western 
aid donor countries’ networks. It could probably be said that the 
United States does not necessarily recoil from working with a military 
government in another country, as do many other Western countries. 
By 2000, the central focus of US policies towards ‘Burma’ was the 
various economic sanctions imposed unilaterally under US legislation, 
some of them at the instigation of the US Congress against the wishes 
of the administration of the day. After the 1988 uprising, the United 
States was the leading proponent of economic sanctions, beginning 
with the ban on new investment from 1997, but Western allies of the 
United States adopted similar sanctions, especially after the ‘Saffron 
Revolution’ of 2007. However, the United States also imposed a 
range of political and security measures administratively, and these 
were generally followed by other OECD member countries, including 
Australia. US diplomats were clearly glad that a group of like-minded 
countries had taken a strong stance against the 1988 military takeover 
in Burma, but they did not insist that all Western countries follow 
them in adopting economic sanctions. Indeed, they seemed to think 
that to have some diversity in policies provided additional flexibility in 
dealing with the military regime. They were always interested in how 
Australia’s ‘limited engagement’ approach was faring. Aung San Suu 
Kyi tended to be sceptical about limited engagement and sometimes 
expressed her regret that Australian policies were not more like those 
of the US.
9  In 2013, when their review of the program with Myanmar was published, Riley and Balaram 
found only four persons serving at ministerial level or above.
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Of course, the United States sometimes pursued its own form of 
engagement with Myanmar’s military regime. One area where this 
was in evidence was the counter-narcotics programs. Some US Drug 
Enforcement Agency officers were assigned to the US Embassy and 
worked quite closely with the relevant areas of the Myanmar Police 
Force, as well as providing technical and other assistance through 
the then United Nations Drug Cooperation Program (UNDCP). 
The  Australian Federal Police pursued a very similar approach, 
and cooperated closely with the Myanmar Police Force in Yangon. 
US pressure on Myanmar to be more vigorous in suppressing opium 
production was strong, and included a failed attempt in 2003 to 
arrange for leading Myanmar Central Committee for Drug Abuse 
Control representatives to give briefings for the relevant Congressional 
committees in the hope that this would allow Myanmar to be certified 
as a cooperating country. The briefings happened, but the certification 
did not, leaving Myanmar Police leadership very embarrassed and 
quite mistrustful of US promises. That was the last time prior to 2009 
that the US Government pursued any kind of engagement.
After 2003, US policy towards Myanmar moved away from engagement, 
hardening just as the military regime’s policies hardened. Additional 
US economic sanctions were imposed after the detention of Aung San 
Suu Kyi following the Depayin incident, and again after the regime 
crushed the unarmed and peaceful ‘Saffron Revolution’. US rhetoric 
and public posture towards Myanmar also hardened. Myanmar was 
not included in George W. Bush’s 2002 ‘Axis of Evil’ inauguration 
speech, but it was among the ‘Outposts of Tyranny’ described by 
incoming Secretary of State Condaleeza Rice in 2005. Both President 
Bush and his wife associated much more actively with Burmese 
democracy activists. Lobbying from US think tanks such as the 
National Bureau of Research, the Asia Society, and the US Institute of 
Peace that called for more flexible policies was ignored, until Hillary 
Clinton — on assuming the position of Secretary of State in the Obama 
Administration in 2009 — announced that ‘all US policies towards 
Myanmar had failed’, and called for a new policy strategy.
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For its part, the Myanmar Government was relatively pragmatic in its 
dealings with US representatives. It granted high-level access to the US 
Chargé d’Affaires,10 and only rarely excluded the US Chargé d’Affaires 
from activities for ambassadors. Its own ambassador in Washington 
was always a very senior diplomat who was trusted to carry out an 
active campaign of defensive lobbying on behalf of the SPDC, and who 
managed remarkably well in the intensive and demanding political 
environment of Washington. The US Chargé d’Affaires, Priscilla Clapp, 
was granted immediate access to Secretary One of the SPDC, General 
Khin Nyunt, after the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New 
York on 11 September 2001, and the Myanmar Vice Foreign Minister, 
U Khin Maung Win, signed the condolence book opened by the US 
Embassy after the incident. The SPDC was extremely cooperative in 
meeting US requests for extra security thereafter. Even a mid-level 
US official, such as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs Matthew Daley, was granted meetings with Khin 
Nyunt in May 2002.
The verdict on the merits and demerits of US sanctions is by no means 
clear. While, judging from their voting record, few politicians in the 
US Congress seemed to have had reservations about US sanctions, 
more rigorous analysis tends to cast serious doubt on the overall 
impact of economic sanctions in particular. A number of academics 
have condemned US sanctions for being ineffective, counter-
productive, and impairing US policy options more than they impaired 
the SPDC’s freedom of manoeuvre.11 Generally, they have called for 
a more sophisticated policy approach, incorporating some form of 
engagement. 
Political relations between the EU — especially the UK — and 
Myanmar had been deliberately limited after the EU adopted its 
‘Common Position’ on Myanmar in 1996. When EU sanctions were 
extended to an arms embargo and assets freeze in April 2000, the 
10  But the Myanmar Ambassador in Washington was always subject to the travel restrictions 
that Western countries imposed in reciprocity for the restrictions imposed on all diplomats in 
Myanmar. 
11  See, for example: David Steinberg, ‘The United States and Its Allies: The Problem of Burma/
Myanmar Policy’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2007, pp. 219–237; Ian 
Holliday, ‘Rethinking the United States’s Myanmar Policy’, Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 4, July/
August 2005, pp. 603–621; and Mike and Gail Billington, ‘US, Not Myanmar is Isolating Itself’, 
Economist Intelligence Report, 30 July 2004.
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way was also opened for an EU ‘Troika’ (made up of representatives 
of the Foreign Ministry of the Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union, the European Commissioner for External Relations, 
and the Common Foreign and Security Policy Secretariat) to engage 
in political ‘dialogue’. The Troika initiative with Burma never really 
worked during 2000–03: their visits were often postponed and, when 
they did come, they often did not meet the highest level Myanmar 
representatives, and they had no decision-making mandate. Perhaps 
because they were senior officials rather than political representatives, 
and because EU policy seemed fairly fixed and it was not clear that 
the Troika could devise a different policy, the Troika did not seem 
to be taken seriously by the Myanmar Government. EU engagement 
was not to start in earnest until the EU began offering substantial aid 
after 2006. Subsequently, the Troika idea was quietly sidelined by EU 
policymakers.
In this period, Japan sometimes seemed to be in two minds about 
‘sanctions versus engagement’. Japan’s structural adjustment initiative 
from 2000–01 was ambitious in endeavouring to use a process of 
engagement, in the form of a highly structured dialogue, to be the 
catalyst for policy change across several sectors of the economy. 
The dialogue was between Japanese officials and private economists, 
and relevant senior Myanmar Government representatives led by the 
minister attached to the Prime Minister’s Office, Brigadier-General David 
Abel. The choice of Abel as the leader of the Myanmar representatives 
was no accident: he had the most experience in international affairs of 
any SPDC minister, was well informed about economic policy, and was 
known to favour reform. Others among the Myanmar representatives 
— equally carefully chosen — were key policymakers in the main 
economic agencies and the central bank. In launching the initiative, 
the Japanese Government had the full support of the Japanese business 
community, and enlisted the cooperation of the relevant Japanese 
semi-government aid agencies, as well as certain Japanese academics. 
These Japanese academics were quite familiar with Myanmar through 
their participation in earlier Japanese Government-funded projects 
providing ‘intellectual’ support and ‘policy input’. Thus some of the 
Japanese academics were also well known to the Myanmar participants, 
which would have been important in contributing to the goal of trust 
building between the two sides. While the program apparently did 
not attract public criticism in Japan — being given minimal publicity 
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by the Japanese Government — it probably would not have enjoyed 
the wholehearted support of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, 
which was split between those politicians who supported providing 
assistance to the SPDC and those who did not.
The initiative was carried forward through a series of workshops 
focused on policies for reforming the Myanmar economy, which covered 
four fields: fiscal and monetary policy; trade and industrial policy; 
information technology; and agriculture and rural development.12 
These workshops were held, without publicity, alternately in Tokyo 
and Yangon, again emphasising the ‘equivalence’ of the two sides. 
Japanese participants in the project tended to be enthusiastic about 
the opportunity it provided to discuss various policy options in a 
closed environment. The project provided an opportunity to openly 
canvas policy choices that it would not have otherwise been possible 
to raise, let alone debate. Lively discussions occurred, especially about 
strengthening market forces on agriculture and exports, and financial 
and monetary policy. At a time when the Myanmar Government was 
giving new emphasis to agribusiness and agricultural exports, some 
of the subjects of the workshop seemed extremely relevant. Myanmar 
participants certainly hoped that this initiative might encourage the 
SPDC leadership to accept the need for policy changes in areas such 
as the exchange rate and agriculture. Expectations that the project 
might lead to substantial Japanese assistance were never completely 
dismissed.13
Eventually, joint reports containing ‘agreed’ policy recommendations 
were prepared in each area. Considerable discussion took place 
before these conclusions were finalised, with quite sensitive issues 
being openly broached. Draft conclusions for the report on sensitive 
areas were cleared with the highest levels of the SPDC before being 
incorporated into the reports. This often meant a watering down 
of the recommendations. It was hoped by all concerned that the 
recommendations, once finally agreed for the reports, would go to the 
Myanmar Government and be adopted. Japan’s expectations in this 
regard were to be disappointed. The joint reports remain confidential 
12  The only Japanese Government statement about the initiative on the public record is a 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, dated 21 November 2001, entitled ‘Yangon Workshop 
on Japan–Myanmar Cooperation for Structural Adjustment in the Myanmar Economy’. Referring 
to the third of four workshops, the press release contains only the barest of information. 
13  Author’s private conversations with Myanmar and Japanese participants, Yangon 2002.
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and their content has never been publicly revealed, although third 
country experts who were shown copies in confidence confirm that 
they contained substantive and well-focused policy solutions.14
The program achieved some significant progress in enabling 
unprecedented frank discussions on sensitive policy issues, and the 
consideration of results and impacts from implementing the policy 
reforms. However, the program failed in its ultimate goal of obtaining 
SPDC commitment to introduce economic reforms. Despite the 
offer of quite specific incentives (the promise of a sizeable Japanese 
Government loan to cushion the impact of structural changes following 
a rationalisation of the exchange rates), this was too strong a medicine 
for the conservative and essentially non-reforming military regime. 
The Japanese Government’s final report was somewhat delayed in being 
presented for decision and, by the time it was considered, the military 
leadership was no longer receptive to the idea of changing economic 
policy. Brigadier-General David Abel was eventually dropped from 
his ministerial position in late 2003, the last minister with any true 
understanding of economic policy.15
14  Information received from third-country academic, September 2005.
15  The only informed article published on this program is ‘Myanmar de Mieta Chiteki Enjo no 
Igi to Kadai’ (‘The Significance of and Issues Experienced in Intellectual Assistance in Myanmar’) 
by Ryu Fukui, Deputy Head, International Cooperation Department, Japan Development Bank, 
which appeared in the ‘Towareru Nihon no Kokusai Kyoryoku’ (‘Debating Japan’s International 
Cooperation’) column in Kokusai Kaihatsu Janaru [International Development Journal], July 2003, 
p. 13. Fukui was one of the Japanese experts who participated in the project. Little else is written 
on the project because of the confidentiality agreement entered into by the Japanese Government 
in order to launch the program. 
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Engagement was seen — somewhat controversially at the time — 
as a means by which Australia might influence a receptive Myanmar 
Government, albeit it a military regime internationally held in ill 
repute. What was most significant was that Australian assistance 
initiatives were to be carried out on a government-to-government 
basis. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer had first set out 
his policy of ‘engagement’ with Burma on human rights in an article 
in the International Herald Tribune on 23 August 1999.1 In a  very 
persuasive way, he said: 
Australia believes that now is the time to engage the regime in a serious 
dialogue on the protection and promotion of human rights in Burma. 
Such a dialogue is one way of improving the lot of ordinary Burmese. 
It is also a means of drawing the regime into a discussion on issues that 
have caused great concern outside Burma. To do nothing is to fail to 
confront the problem.
Alexander Downer had come up with the idea of enlisting the support 
of Australia’s then Human Rights Commissioner Chris Sidoti to develop 
a program of human rights capacity building, to prepare the way for 
the eventual establishment of a national human rights institution 
1  Alexander Downer, ‘A Start to Help Set Burmese on the Road to Human Rights’, International 
Herald Tribune, 23 August 1999.
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complying with international norms, something that was at that time 
unthinkable for an international community strongly committed to 
sanctions against the pariah military regime. 
Foreign Minister Downer responded to Myanmar’s membership of 
ASEAN and met his counterpart, SLORC Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw, 
on 26 July 1997 at the first ASEAN Regional Forum attended by 
Myanmar. Downer continued to meet Ohn Gyaw — and his successor U 
Win Aung — at these meetings from time to time. In order to explore the 
parameters of possible cooperation between Australia and Myanmar in 
the area of human rights, Chris Sidoti visited Myanmar in August 1999. 
According to the media release issued in Sidoti’s name: ‘The principal 
purpose of the visit was to discuss with officials of the Government 
of Myanmar the nature, roles and functions of independent national 
human rights institutions established in accordance with the relevant 
international standards, the “Paris Principles”.’2 According to Sidoti, 
in his preliminary discussion with Home Affairs Minister Tin Hlaing, 
and subsequently with SPDC Secretary One Lieutenant-General Khin 
Nyunt, the Myanmar leadership indicated that it understood exactly 
the significance of this initiative and its ground-breaking nature, 
both for the military regime and for the international community. 
They went into the program fully conscious of the undertakings they 
were entering into, and of the desirability of bringing around Aung 
San Suu Kyi.3 Eventually, it was agreed that this might be achieved 
by conducting a series of workshops for Myanmar Government 
bureaucrats and law enforcement officials. This decision was strongly 
criticised by the Australian Labor Party, supporters of the Burmese 
democracy movement in Australia, and (in private) by some foreign 
governments — but not by United Nations representatives, who 
strongly backed the initiative and took opportunities to demonstrate 
their support through public statements and by observing some of the 
workshops.4
2  Sidoti summarised the outcomes of his visit in a media release, in which he noted ‘that an 
exchange of views on human rights has begun where none existed before; that we have been able 
to identify some areas in which cooperation may be possible; and that there is evidently a strong 
commitment to taking the process further.’ The media release issued on 5 August 1999 can be 
accessed at www.humanrights.gov.au/.
3  Personal interview with Chris Sidoti, 18 November 2014.
4  On 28 June 2000, the then ALP Shadow Foreign Minister Laurie Brereton called for the 
program to be cancelled. See www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/200007/msg00015.html.
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Alexander Downer had occasion to vigorously defend his initiative 
in August 2000, saying: 
Our approach to Burma arose from the repeated failure of other 
approaches to improve the political and human rights situation there. 
The Human Rights training program has not only helped educate 
Burmese officials in basic human rights, but we have also contributed 
to Burma agreeing to establish an independent Human Rights 
Commission based on the Paris Principles, and using Indonesia’s 
KOMNAS HAM as a model. These are the only positive developments 
in human rights in Burma over the past decade.5 
By 2001, Alexander Downer went as far as saying he detected ‘signs of 
movement’ in the democratic process: ‘We take the view that some sort 
of engagement with them is better than none. We have been trying to 
explore ways we can engage without engaging too warmly.’6 Myanmar 
Government representatives were sounded out on whether they were 
interested in modest engagement initiatives directly targeting areas for 
reform. When they responded positively, as they generally did, this 
certainly opened the way for significant communication space with 
different arms of the Myanmar Government. Sidoti confirms that the 
SPDC fulfilled all the undertakings they made to him as Alexander 
Downer’s representative. 
Trust building through the Ministry 
of Home Affairs
The Australian Government’s cooperation on human rights training 
with the Ministry of Home Affairs was certainly an example of 
trying to build trust through a responsive government agency and 
its leading individuals. The then Minister for Home Affairs, retired 
Colonel Tin Hlaing, was a close associate of Lieutenant-General Khin 
Nyunt, was one of the longer serving military ministers, and as the 
minister responsible for internal security and therefore (notionally at 
least) in charge of police and prisons, was at that time in a position of 
great trust. Tin Hlaing had been designated Chairman of the Myanmar 
Human Rights Committee, a government-run body that was openly 
5  See foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2000/fa096_2000.html. 
6  ‘Australian FM detects signs of movement from Myanmar’, AFP, 24 July 2001.
EyEWITNESS TO EARLy REFORM IN MyANMAR
86
envisaged as eventually being the precursor of an independent human 
rights commission under the Paris Principles for such bodies endorsed 
by the UN Human Rights Commission and the UN General Assembly.7 
So successful was this relatively modest exercise that the Australian 
Government had planned to launch a second, more intensive phase 
of the program in June 2003, but this was suspended because of the 
attack upon Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD on 30 May 2003.
Interestingly, one of the more responsive organisations within the 
Ministry of Home Affairs was the Myanmar Police Force (MPF), whose 
International Division was quite well informed about international 
law enforcement issues ranging from human rights protection to 
counter-narcotics programs and people trafficking. Australia was not 
the only country engaging in direct cooperation with the MPF — the 
United Nations, the United States, and Japan also had specific law 
enforcement assistance programs — but Australia went further in 
treating Myanmar as a ‘normal’ jurisdiction that needed to conform 
with international norms. This went as far as inviting senior MPF 
officers, including the Director-General (or Chief of Police, Army 
Brigadier-General Soe Win), to visit Australia. There is no doubt at 
all that this was deeply appreciated by the MPF, who repeatedly 
displayed a highly cooperative and responsive attitude to proposals 
from the AFP. Australia’s wholehearted cooperation with the MPF 
undoubtedly contributed to the MPF’s ongoing commitment to 
improving Myanmar’s conformity with international law enforcement 
norms across the board, but especially in reducing people trafficking, 
narcotics trafficking, and institutional discrimination against HIV/
AIDS sufferers. 
7  See the section on ‘Burma and Cambodia’ in the DFAT Annual Report for 2000–01 which 
stated: ‘Work on Mr Downer’s Human Rights Institution initiative proceeded smoothly, with the 
first human rights training workshops held in July and October 2000. The workshops exposed 
middle-ranking Burmese civil servants to international human rights concepts, instruments 
and standards. An assessment by the workshop convenors concluded that the workshops had 
achieved their objectives, which included raising awareness of international human rights 
standards and obligations among Burmese officials and providing an opportunity for the 
Burmese participants to discuss human rights issues in an open manner.’
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Acknowledging human rights abuses
At the government-to-government level, the Australian Government 
was extended considerable latitude in carrying out its controversial 
human rights training program with the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
Australian requests to carry out activities under the program were 
invariably approved, and the authorities studiously avoided interfering 
in the conduct of the training workshops, even though they were fully 
aware of the scope of the discussions and the extent to which Myanmar’s 
human rights record was directly and indirectly challenged.8 From the 
outset, Australia’s human rights training program was a magnet for 
criticism of Australia, which had hoped that its limited engagement 
with the military regime could bring real results. This criticism came 
from Burmese activists and their supporters in Australia, who were 
never silent when it came to expressing their views and finding an 
opportunity to attack the military regime. Soon after the start of the 
program, Australian human rights lawyers (who were providing the 
training through the Castan Centre at Monash University) became 
targets for critical media commentary. Craig Skehan’s September 2000 
article in The Age, entitled ‘Australian Rights Lawyers Under Fire on 
Burma’, was fairly typical. Skehan wrote:
Critics say the seminars are being used to pretend there is a willingness 
to reform while at the same time intensifying repression of dissent, 
including a crackdown this week on democracy leader Aung San 
Suu Kyi.9
Leader of the program, Professor David Kinley, was quoted as saying:
The Burmese may be acting cynically, but I think there is at least a 
possibility of change … And I don’t think these seminars in themselves 
are going to make the regime more palatable.
8  See a case study of the program by David Kinley and the author, ‘Engaging a Pariah: Human 
Rights Training in Burma/Myanmar’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2007. pp. 368–402.
9  Craig Skehan, ‘Australian Rights Lawyers Under Fire on Burma’, The Age, 6 September 2000.
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Australia’s human rights initiative was raised directly by Alexander 
Downer when he visited Myanmar in 2002. The US Embassy’s report 
on a briefing I gave to like-minded ambassadors appeared in Wikileaks 
documents in 2012.10
From the beginning of 2000, the Australian Federal Police were able to 
develop satisfactory cooperation with the Ministry for Home Affairs 
and the Myanmar Police Force on anti-narcotics activity, and later 
on other areas of transnational crime, including people trafficking. 
Initially, capacity building training was focused on narcotics emanating 
from Burma.11 Training was gradually extended to money laundering 
and people trafficking (the AFP’s Southeast Asia regional program was 
for several years based in Yangon). One outcome regularly recognised 
in AFP public reporting was the decline in heroin production in 
Burma (the source of the bulk of Australia’s illegal trafficking), 
which was in the view of the AFP attributable to the cooperation 
and trust developed with their counterparts. Australian (as well as 
US) anti-narcotics programs were implemented with what appeared 
to be full commitment and cooperation on the part of the Myanmar 
law enforcement authorities, despite the inherent sensitivity of some 
areas where SPDC authorities were sometimes under severe criticism 
(from  the Burma lobby overseas, from conservative elements in the 
United States, and from certain circles in Thailand). 
Law enforcement cooperation was extended to money laundering, and 
here the pattern of behaviour on the Myanmar side was similar, with 
Myanmar eventually being removed from the Financial Action Task 
Force black list of non-cooperating countries.12 Australia was among 
10  See cable 02rangoon1293, ‘Downer Pushes Reform During Visit To Rangoon’, October 2002. 
Available at wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/02RANGOON1293_a.html.
11  The AFP Annual Report for 2000–01 stated: ‘The liaison officer in Yangon has forged an 
effective working relationship with the Burma Police and has provided vital intelligence and 
assistance to recent AFP offshore operations. Following the seizure of 357 kg of heroin in Fiji 
in October 2000, Burma authorities reacted to information provided by the AFP that led to the 
apprehension of the alleged organisers of the Fiji shipment. Through joint cooperation efforts the 
liaison officer and Burma police identified a second heroin shipment to Vanuatu, resulting in an 
additional offshore joint operation by the AFP with Vanuatu Police. The liaison officer in Yangon 
is also contributing to enhancing the law enforcement relations in the region, particularly 
between Burma and Thailand.’
12  This author’s case study of the effectiveness of cooperation combined with compliance 
enforcement is in ‘The Use of Normative Processes to Achieve Behaviour Change in Myanmar’, 
in Nick Cheesman, Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (eds), Ruling Myanmar From Cyclone 
Nargis to National Elections, Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2010.
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several Western donors urging the SPDC to introduce anti-money 
laundering laws. From Myanmar’s point of view, there was no reason 
to hesitate. As it happened, the head of the Asia-Pacific regional group 
on money laundering at the time was an Australian, who visited 
Yangon to encourage the regime to take this step. 
In another significant development, in July 2002 the Australian 
Government was successful in securing Myanmar Government 
agreement to carry out an assistance program to achieve harm 
reduction amongst intravenous drug users with HIV/AIDS. Such 
programs were controversial in many countries, even in Australia, and 
the Myanmar authorities approach to its own drug abusers was never 
especially tolerant or enlightened. But it was Ministry of Home Affairs 
officials, mainly key police officers in the Myanmar Police Force, who 
saw the value of such a program and were prepared to contemplate 
the ‘harm reduction’ program, which trialled needle exchanges for 
intravenous drug-users with HIV/AIDS. The program was launched at 
a press conference in Rangoon in July 2002.13
Subsequently, a major milestone in Australia’s relations with Myanmar 
between 2000 and 2003 was Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s 
visit to Myanmar in October 2002, the first such visit in 19 years. 
The Japanese Foreign Minister, Yoriko Kawaguchi, was just ahead of 
him, visiting in August 2002. Not for the first time did Australian 
and Japanese policy approaches to Myanmar seem rather similar. 
Naturally, Downer was determined to meet both the head of state, 
Senior General Than Shwe, as well as Aung San Suu Kyi, who had 
been released from house arrest in May 2002. This was tantamount to 
officially recognising Aung San Suu Kyi as Leader of the Opposition, 
something the military regime did not explicitly do, although their 
behaviour towards her connoted as much. There was never much 
doubt that the regime would tolerate a meeting between Downer and 
Suu Kyi, as they had already allowed Foreign Minister Kawaguchi to 
meet her. From the regime’s perspective, to receive a visit by a foreign 
minister from a government which had hitherto imposed sanctions on 
most government-to-government dealings was itself a point in their 
favour in terms of public perceptions. 
13  Australian Embassy Rangoon Press Release, 5 July 2002.
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Alexander Downer’s personal expectations of the visit were quite 
modest and seemed realistic. Downer had explained the thinking 
behind his visit to Mark Baker of The Age as follows:
Mr Downer said he believed Australia could influence the regime as it 
had maintained diplomatic contact in recent years and had provided 
limited humanitarian aid, including a controversial program of human 
rights courses for civil servants.
‘Australia is of interest because we have taken a different, a unique 
approach in dealing with Myanmar (Burma),’ he said. ‘So we have 
contacts with them in a way that people like the British and the 
Americans at the other extreme don’t have. We are perceived to be 
a so-called Western country, albeit a regional country … and I think 
that gives us a bit more leverage than would otherwise be the case.’14
Nevertheless, some Australian journalists were quick to criticise him 
over the trip. Journalists’ scepticism was reflected in the main ABC 
radio report, entitled ‘Alexander Downer Gains Little from Burmese 
Meeting’.15 It was stated more explicitly in Mark Baker’s later report 
in The Age:
Mr Downer also remains unapologetic about the maverick diplomacy 
that brought him to Rangoon — the most senior Western official to 
sit down with the regime in several years — while other Western 
governments continue to hold the junta at arm’s length. 
He argues that a line should be drawn over Burma’s brutal past and the 
role of those still in power. ‘Going around blaming who’s responsible 
for what’s happened in the past, I can only say to you what’s happened 
has happened, it can’t be undone. 
‘Setting a commission of inquiry and pointing a finger at who’s 
responsible for this isn’t going to make any difference to history. 
We have to look to the future and hope that the future will be more 
productive than the past. 
Small comfort for the Burmese, still stuck in the tyranny that is their 
past and present.’16
14  Mark Baker, ‘Suu Kyi Talks on the Way, Downer Told’, The Age, 3 October 2002. Available 
at www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/10/02/1033538672884.html.
15  See the transcript of Eleanor Hall’s interview on The World Today at www.abc.net.au/
worldtoday/stories/s692508.htm.
16  See the full text of Baker’s article, ‘Downer Faces Burma’s Tyrants’, The Age, 5 October 2002. 
Available at www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/10/04/1033538774051.html.
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Alexander Downer was the first Australian Foreign Minister to meet 
Aung San Suu Kyi. (His predecessor, Gareth Evans, had wanted to 
visit Myanmar and meet her, but this had not proved possible.) The 
Downer–Suu Kyi meeting occurred at her University Avenue residence, 
with no other NLD representative present. As  might be expected, 
they took different positions in a ‘vigorous’ discussion of Australia’s 
limited engagement, neither yielding to the other. Recalling their 
meeting much later, Downer was to describe Suu Kyi as ‘downright 
aggressive’.17 
From Australia’s point of view — and especially from Alexander 
Downer’s point of view — ensuring that Australian journalists could 
cover his visit was important. But the regime was unbending on this: 
they declined to give any Australian journalists a press visa, although 
one Australian journalist Mark Baker, who wrote for The Age and 
The Sydney Morning Herald, applied for a tourist visa and timed his 
travel so that he stayed for a period that overlapped with Downer. 
The Australian Embassy organised a press conference in the embassy 
at the end of the Downer visit, and although only certain Yangon-based 
journalists were permitted (by the regime) to attend, it was a relatively 
routine affair. Alexander Downer might have been concerned that a 
press conference held under the military regime’s censorship would 
not be satisfactory, so he also gave a press conference about his visit to 
Myanmar when he arrived in Bangkok later the same day. 
Overall, Downer’s visit was publicly ‘successful’ — he was able to 
have substantive meetings with all those he wished to meet, and was 
able to get a good understanding of the main issues of the day — but 
it was not spectacularly so. In his own media release at the end of the 
visit, Downer said:
At each of the meetings with Burmese leaders, I reinforced the need 
for early progress with the political reconciliation process and raised 
the consequences of delays in beginning substantive dialogue with 
Aung San Suu Kyi. Australia has welcomed the confidence-building 
process between the two parties which began in October 2000, but we 
believe that now is the time to begin the dialogue on issues such as 
constitutional reform.18
17  Article on ‘Aung San Suu Kyi’ in The Advertiser (Adelaide), May 2012.
18  Media Release, ‘Burma Visit’, 3 October 2002. See foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002/
fa144_02.html.
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A dialogue on constitutional reform was, of course, impossible to 
pursue at that time. The military regime finalised its own draft 
constitution in 2006; it was submitted to a national referendum in 
May 2008, and enacted in March 2011. International lawyers from 
Australia conducted workshops on constitutional reform with their 
Myanmar counterparts in 2013–14 after reforms were begun.
Other Australian engagement programs
Alexander Downer was behind another important assistance initiative 
launched by Australia during this time, which proceeded when a 
satisfactory collaborative program design was arrived at with in 
principle support from the leading opposition party: a collaborative 
agricultural research program with technocratic arms of the Myanmar 
Government, to be conducted by the Australian Centre for International 
Agricultural Research (ACIAR). One unusual aspect of this program is 
that we were able to consult Aung San Suu Kyi as de facto Leader of 
the Opposition, as she happened to be at liberty when the ACIAR 
Program Manager was visiting, prior to finalising the design of the 
program. We informed the Ministry of Agriculture that we were doing 
this and they expressed no objection. Indeed, they might have even 
been pleased to get backing from Suu Kyi. (When Suu Kyi was able 
to travel around the country for the first time in many years in 2002–
03, the first government project she visited was an irrigation project 
sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.) Aung San 
Suu Kyi saw no problem with this ACIAR program, provided that it 
was focused on the benefits it would bring to ordinary farmers, which 
was precisely the intention of the program anyway. However, it also 
involved strengthening the capacity of the Myanmar Government — 
in this case, the Myanmar Agriculture Service — which was something 
that other donors were still cautious about at that time.19 
A second ACIAR project, providing technical assistance for the 
control of Newcastle disease in village chicken production systems, 
was launched in early 2003. The results of this project were very 
encouraging. The project report described the outcomes in the 
following terms: 
19  See the ACIAR Press Release, ‘Australia’s first project in Burma’, 9 April 2003, at aciar.gov.
au/node/10357.
93
7 . AUSTRALIA’S ‘LIMITED ENGAGEMENT’ INITIATIVES
The capacity impacts of this project were remarkable, with training 
provided to local scientists in epidemiology, pathology, vaccine 
production, extension methods, and molecular assays … Poor farmers 
were the direct beneficiaries of this project — by improving the 
survival rate of young birds, more were available for sale at the 
markets and for consumption in the village households.20 
Another project investigated pests in dryland agricultural crops.21
These initial agricultural research capacity building projects 
demonstrated that this could be a fruitful way of working with the 
technocratic arms of the Myanmar Government. Unfortunately, the 
30 May 2003 Depayin incident, involving an attack on Aung San Suu 
Kyi’s motorcade in Central Myanmar, led to the Australian Government 
suspending other ACIAR collaborative research proposals in Myanmar. 
The projects that had already started were allowed to be completed, 
but with slight delays.
There was no ‘funeral service’ for Australia’s limited engagement 
policy with Myanmar. The human rights initiative, whose expansion 
into 2003 had been planned, was eventually suspended in response 
to the further detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from June 2003 
(which  would last another seven years). I do not know whether 
Alexander Downer has any regrets over his Burma initiatives, but I am 
not aware of any public statement by him to this effect. I have not 
heard any objective criticisms of the human rights workshops after 
the event from other quarters. In Myanmar, Australia’s readiness to 
undertake such initiatives is still recalled very positively more than 
a decade later.22
If there is any lasting ‘legacy’ from any of these initiatives, it could 
arguably be in the establishment —  in the first term of the new 
government in 2011 — of a Myanmar National Human Rights 
Commission, including among its members several ‘graduates’ from the 
2000–02 program, as well as the ongoing transnational crime capacity-
20  See the ACIAR project summary at aciar.gov.au/project/AH/2002/042.
21  See Heather Morris and D. F. Waterhouse, The Distribution and Importance of Arthropod 
Pests and Weeds of Agriculture in Myanmar, Canberra: ACIAR. Available at aciar.gov.au/files/
node/2145/the_distribution_and_importance_of_arthropod_pests_48147.pdf.
22  In September/October 2012, the author was a member of an Australian team assessing 
the scope for new human rights capacity building in Myanmar which met many Myanmar 
participants in the original 2000–03 program, which they still praised.
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building programs. (It is no accident that the Myanmar police officer 
most closely involved in international cooperation programs around 
this time, who was intimately associated with the Australian human 
rights workshops, Colonel Sit Aye, became international legal advisor 
to President Thein Sein in 2012.) Agricultural research collaboration 
on selected projects with different Myanmar Government research 
establishments aimed at improving productivity and grass-roots 
outreach continues to this day. 
Some opportunistic actions for increasing 
engagement 
Occasionally, the Australian Embassy had opportunities to encourage 
further international engagement by the military regime, either 
to  ‘fill  gaps’ in Myanmar’s compliance with international norms, 
or to press the regime into ‘normalising’ Myanmar’s international 
policies, including adhering to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. Although we were told by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs in 2001 that a working group had been set up to consider 
the question of Myanmar adhering to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, we did not hear the outcome of this work 
before the suspension of Australian human rights workshops in 2003. 
Myanmar has still not signed and ratified this convention more than 
10 years later.
Compliance with universal international arms control agreements was 
another obvious area to try to seek more conformity with international 
norms. Any improvement in Myanmar’s conformity with such 
instruments would contribute to regional security. By 2000, Myanmar 
was already participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum, which 
undertook a range of regional security confidence-building measures.23 
Thus we encouraged Myanmar to adhere to the International 
Landmines Convention, in view of evidence of the widespread use of 
landmines in Myanmar. The Myanmar Government never agreed to 
take this step, which would have (by design) constrained the Burmese 
23  One area of ASEAN Regional Forum activity where Myanmar was slow to adopt a proactive 
position was the desirability of issuing a regular comprehensive statement of defence policy and 
weapons holdings. 
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army’s use of landmines. But they did allow the ICRC to conduct 
a program to treat civilians with landmine injuries, and allowed the 
Mines Action Group to carry out an Australian Government-funded 
‘landmines awareness’ education program in 2002. 
We also encouraged the regime to allow Amnesty International to 
visit Myanmar and interview prisoners of conscience. Amnesty 
International’s highly effective mobilisation of communities around 
the world to campaign for the release of political prisoners received 
enormous support around Australia. (Even the Amnesty International 
group in my own home town of Kiama, NSW, was lobbying for the 
release of Burmese prisoners of conscience.) At that time, Amnesty 
International’s Bangkok Office was actively monitoring the situation 
of political prisoners, who were already being visited by the ICRC. 
We  were told by Donna Guest from the Amnesty International 
Bangkok Office that they would be prepared to visit Myanmar for the 
first time, if invited and given access to prisoners. Donna Guest visited 
Myanmar in 2002 and 2003.24 
We also urged Myanmar to consider signing the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, to reinforce their commitment under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty not to develop nuclear arms. They never did 
this, although they continued to comply with International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards procedures. Myanmar signed the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty Additional Protocol in 2013, but has yet 
to ratify the instrument. Myanmar has signed, but not ratified, 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
At a time when climate change was at the forefront of international 
agendas, but the environment was not a high priority in Myanmar, 
the Australian Embassy encouraged Myanmar to follow what was 
happening in international climate change developments. We did this 
by taking advantage of a private visit to Myanmar by a senior officer 
from the Australian Department of the Environment, arranging for him 
to brief Myanmar Government officials on international climate change 
developments. It was relatively easy to do this through the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, which coincidentally had formal responsibility for 
24 Amnesty International, ‘Media Report on First Visit to Myanmar’. See www.asiantribune.
com/news/2003/02/10/amnesty-internationalits-first-myanmar-visit.
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climate change issues. The briefing was well attended, but it would be 
another 10 years before Myanmar had a Ministry for the Environment 
(under President Thein Sein).
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also interested to find out about 
the operations of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
organisation. Although there was little prospect then of Myanmar 
becoming a member, we saw no problem with providing them with 
information about this Australian initiative, which we did each time 
APEC met. Myanmar is still not a member of APEC, but it did host the 
East Asian Summit in 2014. 
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Encounters with Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi 
During the early 2000s, there were opportunities to have substantive 
contact with the best-known and most impressive politician in 
Myanmar, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party, the National League 
for Democracy (NLD), had won an overwhelming majority of the 
seats in the only recent elections in 1990, and who had never been 
charged with any offence under the law, but was regularly placed 
under house arrest. Usually, neither she nor the NLD were able to 
carry out normal political activities of any kind, even though the NLD 
was legally registered as a political party and had not been banned 
by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). For its part, the 
military regime (especially its leader from 1994–2011, Senior General 
Than Shwe) pursued policies towards Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD 
that were often contradictory and which swung dramatically from 
tightening restrictions against her in September 2000 to engaging 
in (secret) talks in January 2001, before releasing her completely in 
May 2002. 
Suu Kyi’s party, the NLD, was basically a coalition of left-leaning 
groups and military leaders who had fallen out with the mainstream 
of the army. It was formed to compete in the 1990 elections, and 
was still an officially registered party until 2010, when it split over 
whether to contest the 2010 elections. Even as a legal political party, 
the NLD was under constant pressure from the authorities, who 
constantly monitored NLD members’ movements and activities, 
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subjected members to various forms of low-level harassment, and 
actively sought to pressure them to leave the party. Judging by the 
propaganda in the official media, the authorities seemed to be locked 
into a campaign to reduce membership of and support for the NLD to 
the point where it could not compete with a government-organised 
political party. After 1990, NLD members were systematically harassed 
and persecuted by military authorities, and many were jailed, often on 
spurious or technical grounds. Between 2000 and 2002, the authorities 
consistently mounted public campaigns to pressure NLD members to 
resign from the party. 
During the period 1995–2000, members of the Yangon diplomatic 
community could have considerable access to Aung San Suu Kyi. 
While she was not under house arrest but was restricted to Yangon, 
it was still possible to meet her occasionally, but not frequently, by 
requesting an appointment through the Myanmar Government. 
At other times, when the provisions of her house arrest were tightened, 
no diplomats were able to meet her. Through these years, ambassadors 
from Western countries and Japan never stopped trying to preserve 
the minimal contacts they could have with Suu Kyi and the NLD 
leadership. Other ambassadors — from Asian countries such as China 
and India, and elsewhere — were noticeable for not seeking to meet 
her. It was very difficult, however, to convince some of the ASEAN 
ambassadors that they should make a point of meeting her — the 
Philippines Ambassador being an exception. All conversations with 
Suu Kyi were probably bugged by Myanmar’s intelligence agency, 
but this did not necessarily prevent frank and full discussions. In my 
meetings with Suu Kyi, she did not overtly display any concern about 
being eavesdropped on — it was simply assumed that this happened. 
Writing more than 10 years later, with so many recent changes in 
Myanmar, it is hard to envisage how comprehensively and cruelly 
Aung San Suu Kyi was isolated from her own people and the rest of 
the world by the Myanmar authorities. For most of the time, the only 
communication she had was her short-wave radio, which she used 
to listen to the BBC. For most of the time, she did not have use of a 
telephone; the NLD Headquarters had a phone, but it was often not 
functioning. She did not have access to the internet and satellite TV 
broadcasts until after her release from detention in late 2010. The NLD 
itself was not permitted to have a website until early 2011. As far as 
I know, Aung San Suu Kyi still does not have or use a mobile phone. 
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Her isolation between the late 1980s and 2010 was extremely severe. 
Very few Myanmar people were allowed to visit her, apart from her 
own staff, her doctor Tin Myo Win (Douglas), and her long-standing 
lawyer at that time, U Kyi Win (Neville, who is now deceased). Her two 
sons were living in the UK and were only rarely permitted to visit her 
in Myanmar. Her older brother, Aung San Oo, with whom she is not 
close, is a US citizen and lives in the United States.
While fiercely challenging the restrictions on her whenever she could, 
Aung San Suu Kyi was careful not to step over the line and give the 
military regime any excuse to take more drastic action against her. 
So there was always an element of pragmatism, mixed with principle, 
in her approach. She occasionally met foreign journalists at this time, 
but was always extremely cautious in what she said to them. Visiting 
journalists, somewhat in her thrall, may not have always understood 
the subtlety of her position. However, Suu Kyi’s position on political 
negotiations with the military regime during this period was not 
especially flexible or successful: she always insisted on a ‘dialogue’ 
with the NLD and ethnic groups as a first step in the process of political 
reconciliation, when it was apparent that the military would not 
treat her as an equal, and would not elevate or enhance her political 
standing with the ethnic groups. She always sought to deal directly 
with regime head Senior General Than Shwe, who was not known for 
being flexible, open-minded, or well disposed towards her. She rarely 
raised ‘reconciliation’ as a goal, which the military might have found 
harder to object to than ‘negotiations’. She generally avoided specifying 
any particular topic or issue as being one on which the NLD held an 
incontrovertible position. She gave the impression that she did not 
recognise or accept that she was not in a position to call the shots, and 
she would never settle for anything else. Meanwhile, she confronted 
the regime most vigorously on issues such as her ability to travel, 
and (not unreasonably) her personal access to lawyers and doctors. 
Only rarely did she identify a substantive issue or problem as requiring 
the regime to listen to her views. In other words, the ingredients for a 
perpetual stand-off between the two principal protagonists were fixed 
by both sides, and had scarcely moved since 1990.
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Fortunate good access
Normally, a new ambassador could seek a meeting with Aung San 
Suu Kyi after presenting credentials to the head of state and making 
an introductory call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Military 
intelligence would decide whether or not to permit and facilitate 
a meeting, which normally took place at her University Avenue 
residence. Even this process meant a certain amount of contact 
between Suu Kyi and the military regime. It was never entirely clear 
who was responsible for approving the meeting, and whether or not 
it took place promptly. My first meeting with Suu Kyi in 2000 was 
arranged through this process, and I do not recall any delays or issues. 
She had known several of my predecessors, and through them and 
a few Australians who managed to visit her, seemed to have a high 
regard for Australia, although not for the Australian Government’s 
initiatives seeking limited engagement with the military regime. 
The titular head of the NLD at this time, Chairman U Aung Shwe, was 
a former Ambassador to Australia, so Australian connections with the 
NLD were good, although not nearly as close as those between Suu Kyi 
and the US and UK governments.
It was normal at this time for ambassadors of those countries who gave 
moral support to the NLD to attend occasional important meetings 
organised by them at party headquarters at Shwegonedine Road in 
Yangon. Suu Kyi might attend such meetings, but it was not normally 
possible to talk to NLD leaders on such occasions. On other occasions, 
it was sometimes possible to arrange meetings with other members 
of the NLD Central Executive Committee, such as Chairman U Aung 
Shwe, Deputy Chairman U Tin Oo, and party spokesman U Lwin. 
It was never easy to meet NLD leaders under such circumstances, but 
it was possible if one persevered. Some embassies — mainly those from 
ASEAN and nearby Asian countries — never attempted to meet NLD 
leaders, on the grounds that the military regime did not want such 
contacts to occur. Interestingly, when UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail 
paid his first visit in the middle of 2000, he sought my assistance to 
arrange (and provide a venue for) his first meeting with the leadership 
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of the NLD. With Canberra’s agreement, that meeting with NLD Deputy 
Chair Tin Oo took place at the Australian Ambassador’s residence in 
June 2000.1 
Obviously, under such restrictions, Suu Kyi had very limited 
or no contact with her supporters abroad — whether Burmese 
pro-democracy activists in exile, of whom there were several hundred 
thousand, including a government-in-exile, the National Coalition 
Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB),2 led by Suu Kyi’s cousin, 
Dr Sein Win, or foreign supporters such as the Burma Campaigns in the 
United States, the UK, and Australia. The NCGUB included a number 
of NLD members who had been elected in the 1990 elections, a few 
of whom had permanent residence status in Australia. Suu Kyi rarely 
touched on her interest in or contacts with Australia in conversations 
with me; it is not clear whether or not this was deliberate. A number 
of Australians and Burmese living in Australia purported to be loyal 
supporters, and followed Suu Kyi’s actions and words very closely. 
(Many young Burmese in Australia were strong NLD supporters, but 
many older Burmese-born residents of Australia were disinterested 
in politics.)
When discussing political developments, Suu Kyi always spoke 
carefully and deliberately, and was usually prepared to cover a wide 
range of topics. She seemed fully committed to the domestic and 
international efforts to achieve political reconciliation in Myanmar, 
even though the prospects for success did not seem high and she 
was not necessarily negotiating from a position of obvious strength. 
She never disguised her profound mistrust of the military regime, 
but did not needlessly pursue unrealistic political goals. Despite 
the gloomy situation facing the country and its people, she was 
essentially optimistic about her own role and the future. She did not 
seem unduly concerned that reform in Myanmar would probably not 
be achieved without considerable international support, and indeed 
1  I had known Razali previously when we were both serving as diplomats in Vientiane, and 
while the UN’s Yangon Office could have easily arranged this meeting for Razali, he preferred to 
operate independently to a certain extent. He obviously would not ask the military regime to 
arrange his meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi, nor did the Malaysian Embassy have the necessary 
contacts. After this, Razali met Suu Kyi in her residence in programs arranged for him by the 
Myanmar authorities. 
2  Until February 2000, Amanda Zappia had been the NCGUB’s official representative 
in Australia.
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often explained how she thought this international support should be 
mobilised and channelled. The central tenet of her approach at this 
time was a call for ‘genuine dialogue’ with the military leadership, but 
she tended not to espouse specific, detailed policies. 
Naturally, Suu Kyi herself deeply resented the conditions of the 
unjustifiable restrictions placed on her by the regime, without any 
charges being brought against her, and without any court imposing 
such measures, since she and the NLD had not committed any offences. 
In fact, these were measures imposed under martial law, although 
this was not often stated publicly. One effect of Suu Kyi’s continuous 
objection to these restrictions during the period 1998–May 2002 were 
her endless attempts to assert her basic rights, to defy the authorities, 
and to travel outside Yangon. These sometimes led to rather theatrical 
confrontations in odd circumstances, such as her being held for several 
days on a bridge on the outskirts of Yangon in 1998 and again in 2000, 
and being refused a ticket on the train to Mandalay in 2000 (which was 
the reason she was returned to house arrest in August 2000). These 
were examples of bravery and fierce civil disobedience on the part 
of Suu Kyi, but they were also humiliating, risky, and had somewhat 
unpredictable consequences. They did not seem to achieve any 
concrete outcomes, but did gain considerable international publicity 
(but not domestically, because of the tight censorship imposed over 
domestic media). When these incidents occurred, Australia and other 
pro-democratic countries were mostly concerned about Suu Kyi’s well-
being (although there was not much we could do on her behalf) and 
for the possibility of the situation escalating out of control.
Being put in one’s place by an ‘icon’
After Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest through the 
intervention of UN Special Envoy Razali Ismail in May 2002, it was 
possible to maintain something closer to a normal relationship with 
her. Appointments could be arranged directly and as frequently as 
was mutually convenient, and it was possible to invite her to functions 
at embassies. In 2000, the Australian Embassy arranged for a working 
lunch for Suu Kyi at the Australian Ambassador’s residence with 
representatives of the non-government humanitarian organisations 
that were run from Australia: World Vision, and CARE. Before this, 
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Suu Kyi had not had opportunities to talk to INGOs about their work 
in Myanmar. It seemed important that they have a chance to meet her 
and hear her views, and that she have the same opportunity to find out 
how they operated on the ground. The lunch went smoothly enough 
and achieved its purposes. I recall that Suu Kyi fiercely criticised one 
of the Burmese INGO staff guests (whom she was meeting for the first 
time) for, in effect, collaborating with the military regime, criticism 
that was both inaccurate and unfair. Indeed, Suu Kyi interrogated one 
of the World Vision Burmese female staff so intensely that the woman 
(a doctor) was reduced to tears. 
Under any circumstances, Aung San Suu Kyi would be an impressive 
person to meet, and much has been said and written about meetings 
with her. As with others who met her, Suu Kyi’s presence, poise, and 
personality left a deep impression on me. She knows other Australians, 
and considers Australia to be one of the countries strongly supporting 
her, both through the Burmese diaspora, and through political and 
other connections. So she attached some importance to what Australia 
did in relation to Myanmar, even though she was yet to visit Australia. 
Her unfailing politeness does not disguise her genuine appreciation 
for Australian efforts to help the Burmese people, although she might 
not always agree with every aspect of official Australian policy. 
She  seems to enjoy having unquestioning US and UK support, and 
would notice the difference in the attitudes of Australian Government 
leaders. (The Australian Labor Party is probably more disposed to hold 
up Suu Kyi as a figure of authority, given the close-to-fraternal ties 
it has with the NLD.) Recalling some years later his own encounter 
with Suu Kyi in October 2002, Alexander Downer described her as 
‘feisty and surprisingly aggressive’.3
Suu Kyi let it be known quite bluntly that she did not think such 
INGOs were doing enough to fight against unreasonable or restrictive 
practices imposed on them by the Myanmar authorities at the expense 
of the interests and well-being of ordinary people. She believed that 
most INGOs would do whatever was necessary to stay in Myanmar, 
even if this meant violating their own principles and offending basic 
proprieties. However, at that time, Suu Kyi and the NLD did not fully 
understand the difficult situation faced by INGO staff; they certainly 
3  Alexander Downer, ‘Burma’s Agent of Change’, The Advertiser, 1 April 2012. Available at www.
adelaidenow.com.au/archive/news/downer-burmas-agent-of-change/story-e6freacl-1226315903405.
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did not realise the lengths that INGO staff, such as those at World 
Vision, went to quite frequently in order to rescue young Burmese boys 
who had been recruited against their will as child soldiers. Certainly, 
under the military regime INGOs had not been allowed to carry out 
overt political activities, while the NLD’s contact with foreigners had 
not been encouraged.
If I had a particular need to talk to Aung San Suu Kyi about a work 
matter, the routine was to phone the NLD office to request an 
appointment. Suu Kyi normally agreed to such requests for a meeting, 
and I would inform DFAT in Canberra when a meeting with her was 
scheduled. I do not recall receiving much in the way of guidance 
or instructions from DFAT ahead of meetings with Suu Kyi. On the 
whole, it was not necessary to receive detailed ‘spoon feeding’ before 
meeting her; some elements of conversations with her were taken 
for granted: the state of her relations with the regime, her views on 
the overall political situation, any particular issues or requests she 
might have, and her views on any specific Australia-related matters. 
Suu Kyi would respond directly on any matters raised: she was quite 
comfortable sharing her views on the regime, which were predictably 
critical, and founded on deep mistrust and suspicion; she would 
speak with authority on NLD policy, but rarely, if ever, acknowledged 
any faults on the part of the NLD; she was always full of praise for 
the NLD and her supporters inside the country, but was noticeably 
less enthusiastic about her overseas supporters, Burmese or foreign, 
whom she did not often mention; and she never complained about her 
personal situation, and would not normally touch on her own health 
or well-being. On the other hand, she tended to be quite tight-lipped 
about her dealings with the military regime, and never disclosed 
confidential discussions with UN envoys or other high-level visitors. 
Suu Kyi responded to a request from me for a meeting by saying that 
she would be happy to call on my wife at the ambassador’s residence 
for afternoon tea, and if I wished to drop in, that was up to me. Years 
later, Suu Kyi would always show fondness for my wife, and when Suu 
Kyi visited The Australian National University in November 2013 to 
receive an honorary degree, my wife (a graduate and former employee 
of ANU) attended the meeting between Suu Kyi and ANU academic 
staff, and there is a memorable photograph by an ANU photographer 
of Suu Kyi embracing my wife at one break during the meeting.
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We had one other form of regular contact with Aung San Suu Kyi, 
which was not ‘authorised’ by anyone. My wife kept (at our own 
expense) some 20 chickens in a chicken pen inside the extensive 
grounds of the ambassador’s residence. The chickens produced more 
eggs than we could possibly eat, so we offered some to Aung San Suu 
Kyi on a regular basis, as we knew she was supporting a large number 
of people at her residence. The arrangement was that our private 
driver would deliver eggs to Suu Kyi’s University Avenue residence 
once a week. After a while, our private car would be recognised as it 
approached her gate and allowed to pass through unchecked with its 
valuable consignment. Our driver was delighted to be able to do this, 
and Suu Kyi was always effusive in her thanks for the eggs. Of course, 
I assume other well-wishers were also helping Suu Kyi and the NLD in 
comparable ways, but I never asked about this. 
In conversation, Suu Kyi was usually relaxed and showed her wide 
interests — from domestic affairs to grand policy. But she was always 
conscious that any comment she made would be passed on and could 
take on wider importance, and she gave the impression that everything 
she said was very carefully calculated. She was quick to correct any 
loose wording or generalised comments. She was always contemptuous 
and mistrustful of the military regime, and did not seem to have much 
regard for members of the Myanmar bureaucracy who were prepared 
to work for it. She did not hide her admiration for the US and the 
UK, who gave her unstinting support. She was never disrespectful of 
the United Nations, although it was sometimes clear that she did not 
always place much confidence in them to assist her cause. Her attitude 
to the Burmese diaspora was interesting: she was obviously grateful 
for their great dedication and commitment, but often expressed views 
slightly at variance from what the pro-democracy activists were 
saying. However, she was careful not to criticise or openly disagree 
with them. 
Although she assumed a modest manner, and was not boastful 
or pompous, she was very conscious of her own importance, was 
naturally formal and courteous by nature, and came across as rather 
proper. But she also had a sense of humour, and often joked about some 
of the circumstances she had to face. Suu Kyi was not impressed by 
the Australian-run Myanmar Times, which she would have regarded 
as an apologist for the regime and altogether too close to military 
intelligence. Suu Kyi could, however, be prickly to deal with, and I was 
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certainly not alone in experiencing this. Most written accounts about 
her tend to reflect an obvious hagiographic perspective, but even the 
most detailed biography by British writer Justin Wintle mentions Suu 
Kyi giving insincere people ‘short shrift’.4 Quite a few Australians 
interested in Burma would have met her, and some claimed to be in 
regular communication with her. 
Consulting Aung San Suu Kyi as ‘Leader 
of the Opposition’
When Aung San Suu Kyi was free to travel and meet whomever 
she wished, it was natural to view her as the de facto Leader of 
the Opposition and therefore the person to be consulted about any 
policy matters or initiatives that were being considered by foreign 
governments. The US and the UK (who gained more frequent access 
to her than any other embassies) took this to the ultimate extent, and 
effectively gave Suu Kyi a veto over their policies towards Myanmar. 
This was particularly galling for the military regime (as it was intended 
to be), but it also reduced the flexibility the Americans and British had 
in pursuing their Burma policies. If Suu Kyi could not make up her 
mind over an issue, US and UK policies could be frozen instead of 
adjusting flexibly. Their approach also invested Suu Kyi with a degree 
of infallibility, which most Burmese would not have ascribed to her 
even at the time, and almost certainly not in 2013.
Australian Governments did not go this far, nor did most other 
governments. This meant that while we had good and supportive 
relations with Aung San Suu Kyi, there was sometimes an element of 
tension if Australia was attempting something that Suu Kyi did not 
approve of. Australia’s human rights capacity-building workshops 
were a good example of this. In October 2002, The Age journalist Mark 
Baker was able to interview Aung San Suu Kyi shortly after Alexander 
Downer’s visit to Yangon. Baker’s report — carried in The Age under 
the headline ‘Suu Kyi Attacks Canberra’ — quoted Aung San Suu Kyi 
as saying:
4  Justin Wintle, Perfect Hostage: A Life of Aung San Suu Kyi, London: Hutchinson, 2007.
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Australia should endorse a tough regime of sanctions imposed by the 
United States and the European Union and limit its contacts with the 
regime until it honoured promises to start talks on political reform. She 
described a controversial Australian program of human rights training 
courses for Burmese officials as pointless and a waste of money.5 
Baker — who had been unable to obtain a journalist’s visa for the 
Downer visit in 2002, despite the Australian Embassy’s interventions 
with the Myanmar authorities to allow Australian journalists to 
cover the visit — describes Aung San Suu Kyi’s views as a ‘rebuke’ 
to Alexander Downer. Afterwards, this article was not directly raised 
with Aung San Suu Kyi: it did not help Australia with the Burma 
lobby in Australia, nor did it particularly help Aung San Suu Kyi in 
Myanmar or with international agencies who had publicly supported 
this Australian program. At that time, Baker’s article would not have 
been seen by many Burmese in Myanmar at all.
Aung San Suu Kyi had previously discussed Australia’s human rights 
training program with former Australian Human Rights Commissioner 
Chris Sidoti when he visited Myanmar in 1999.6 Suu Kyi was invited 
to meet with the Australian training team of human rights experts 
(David Kinley, Chris Sidoti, and Kate Eastman) again in 2002 over 
lunch at the Australian Ambassador’s residence.7 On this occasion, 
she made it clear that she did not like this program, as in her view 
it would provide ‘cover’ for the military regime without reducing 
human rights abuses, and because the program would not include the 
main perpetrators of human rights abuses, the army. She was not at 
all convinced Australian experts’ accounts of the free hand they were 
given to tackle any human rights issues head on, or by the indications 
they recounted of officials and law enforcement officers finding value 
in the workshops’ treatment of human rights issues that were directly 
relevant to them, such as interrogation of prisoners, or treatment 
of prison inmates. She was not at all uncomfortable telling the rare 
visiting Australian journalist about her misgivings.
5  Mark Baker, ‘Suu Kyi Attacks Canberra’, The Age, 7 October 2002.
6 Craig Skehan, ‘Suu Kyi Warming to Rights Seminars’, Sydney Morning Herald, 
20 February 2001.
7 The fourth team member, then at Monash University, and alternating as a trainer, was 
Dr Sarah Joseph.
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There was at least one other opportunity where it was possible to 
consult Suu Kyi in a low-key way about a new Australian Government 
initiative. This was the proposal by Australian Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer to provide agricultural research assistance to 
Myanmar through the Australian Centre for International Agricultural 
Research (ACIAR).8 When the head of ACIAR’s International Project 
Branch, Allan Barden, was visiting Yangon in late 2002 for initial 
discussions about this proposal with the Myanmar Government, it 
seemed sensible to consult Suu Kyi about the proposal as well, since 
the visit coincided with her movements being unrestricted. Suu Kyi 
naturally took this in her stride and listened carefully as the proposal 
was outlined. She said she could see the benefits of the project, and, 
fortunately, did not express any objection to the proposal (as we had 
not asked DFAT directly about consulting Suu Kyi on the idea). Her only 
comment was to urge that the project at all times keep the interests of 
the Myanmar villagers uppermost. This was indeed precisely the way 
ACIAR projects were carried out, and this particular project (about 
rodent infestation of rice crops) was exemplary in being embedded in 
grass-roots needs.9
The Australian Embassy briefed Suu Kyi on the Australian Federal 
Police’s engagement in capacity building and law enforcement 
cooperation with the Myanmar Government as part of broader anti-
narcotics cooperation arrangements. This cooperation later expanded 
to other areas of transnational crime, such as money laundering 
and people trafficking. Suu Kyi was generally supportive of such 
programs. If she had misgivings about the Myanmar Police Force as 
one of the arms of Myanmar’s successive authoritarian regimes — 
occasionally bringing them into conflict with her — she did not allow 
these views to colour her reaction to such programs. Such Australian 
Embassy meetings with Aung San Suu Kyi mostly took place at NLD 
Headquarters at Shwegonedine, and a few other NLD leaders might 
also participate. Meetings at her University Avenue residence were 
more unusual, and reserved for high-level visitors such as Alexander 
Downer. But at those brief times when she was free, it was not unusual 
to meet her at other functions and venues. 
8  Alexander Downer had previously tried the same idea on another apparently impenetrable 
regime, the Democratic Republic of Korea, with some success.
9  Media Release, ‘ACIAR’s first project in Burma’, 9 August 2003. 
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The Australian Embassy had always maintained regular friendly 
contacts with the NLD leadership: Suu Kyi herself if and when that 
was possible; U Aung Shwe, Chairman, and former Ambassador 
to Australia; U Tin Oo, Deputy Chair; U Kyi Maung, Central 
Executive Committee member; and U Lwin, Spokesman. Telephone 
communications with the NLD were often interrupted, and the NLD 
had neither fax nor (at that time) email facilities. Visits to the rather 
dilapidated NLD head office in the Shwegonedine area of Yangon under 
full scrutiny of police and intelligence guards were not uncommon. I 
once tried unsuccessfully to visit the large NLD office in Mandalay. 
Regime harassment of the NLD and its members was quite systematic 
and severe throughout 2000–03. I observed NLD offices that had been 
opened in Mawlamyaing and Indaw (Sagaing Division), but I was 
admonished by an official guide for photographing a (closed) NLD 
office in Mogok in early 2003.
During May 2002–May 2003, although Aung San Suu Kyi was 
notionally free to receive visitors, the military regime still tried to 
discourage contact with her. Of course, they could not normally 
prevent UN envoys or ASEAN envoys from meeting her, even when 
her movements were restricted. (They did manage to dampen down 
media briefings being given in Yangon about these meetings.) I recall 
only one situation where Aung San Suu Kyi participated in discussions 
with the Yangon diplomatic community at which she was essentially 
treated as Leader of the Opposition. This was a meeting between 
the international donors and NGOs about HIV/AIDS, which had 
been publicly proposed by UN Special Representative Razali Ismail 
as a potential field for cooperation between the military regime and 
the NLD. The meeting was uneventful. It was more an exchange of 
views than anything else. Suu Kyi did not dominate the discussions 
and was very attentive when experts were providing their views. 
The NLD had been somewhat more ‘progressive’ on the issue of HIV/
AIDS compared to the military regime, and had opened its own HIV/
AIDS ‘Prevention and Treatment Centre’ as early as 2002, but had not 
really sought to make HIV/AIDS a differentiating issue.10 However, the 
idea of some partnership between the military regime and the NLD 
on a ‘national emergency’ issue such as HIV/AIDS did not progress 
10  An International Crisis Group ‘Asia Briefing’ in December 2004 described the NLD attitude 
to the HIV/AIDS crisis at that time. 
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and was eventually dropped. There was never any indication that 
the Than Shwe regime was prepared to pursue even such a limited 
‘power sharing’ experiment at that time. But, more than a decade later, 
this is exactly what has happened under the Thein Sein Government, 
which invited Suu Kyi to participate in parliamentary activities on the 
Rohingya communal violence issue and on rule of law generally.
Dealings with Aung San Suu Kyi about the political situation were 
always interesting, and she was always happy to discuss important 
policy matters, but she could be quite evasive when it suited her. 
For example, she gave away very little about her ongoing talks with 
the military regime, which until the end she maintained did not 
constitute the two-way dialogue among equals that she had in mind. 
One generally hesitated to offer her advice, as she had usually formed 
her views on issues. The strong undertone of nationalism underlying 
her views was sometimes unexpected, but should not have been 
surprising. For example, she was inordinately proud of Burmese 
achievements of any kind, and once said, when acknowledging the 
special role the Burmese military would always play in Myanmar, 
that she would expect the Burmese army to beat the Thai army in any 
contest of military power. This was before the 2002 border clashes 
with Thailand, in which the Tatmadaw performed poorly against 
their Thai counterparts. She made it clear that she has a soft spot for 
younger people, but equally always spoke with genuine respect for 
the elderly ‘uncles’ with whom she shared the leadership of the NLD.
Suu Kyi’s supporters and detractors
Like other ambassadors in Yangon at this time, I occasionally met several 
of Suu Kyi’s advisors, including her doctor, Tin Myo Win (Douglas), 
and her lawyers, all of whom were subjected to severe and entirely 
gratuitous harassment by the authorities. They were all brave, loyal, 
and totally committed supporters, usually very discreet and careful 
in what they said, even to diplomats. All admired and respected Suu 
Kyi enormously and were extremely dedicated to working with her. 
Sometimes, however, they admitted to having some differences of 
opinion with Suu Kyi. Her economic advisor, the former Myanmar 
diplomat and UN economist, U Myint, sometimes mentioned having 
problems convincing her of the rationale for his economic views, and 
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much later (after 2012) would lose influence with her. Some of Suu 
Kyi’s other advisors would remain loyal to her, including after her 
election to parliament in April 2012.
One elected member of the NLD who spoke openly of his personal 
disagreement with Suu Kyi was U Ohn Maung, who was elected as 
an MP for Inle Lake in Shan State in 1990, and who, like most other 
NLD MPs, was subsequently arrested for his political activities. 
After his release from gaol, in the early 2000s Ohn Maung became 
the proprietor of the Inle Princess Hotel, one of the first of the new 
generation of tourist hotels on the shore of Inle Lake. Ohn Maung, 
whose health had been seriously affected by his treatment in prison, 
spoke of disagreeing with Suu Kyi about the attempts by some in the 
West to impose bans on tourism to Myanmar. Ohn Maung of course 
did not agree with this, and said that he failed in his attempts to 
persuade Suu Kyi of the direct and indirect benefits of tourism for the 
local people. He always maintained that human rights abuses in Shan 
State, and around Inle Lake in particular, had decreased noticeably 
after tourists began coming to the area. Suu Kyi was disposed to 
support the tourism ban, although she was sometimes careful how she 
spoke publicly about this. There were never really good arguments for 
banning tourism, which directly and indirectly benefited local people 
and the local economies.
Amongst the general public, as far as one could tell in a country that 
had no opinion polls at that time, Suu Kyi did indeed enjoy remarkable 
popular support and popularity. It was hard to assess the extent of 
support the NLD and Suu Kyi had amongst the bureaucracy, as they 
were not permitted to have anything to do with her, or to mention 
her name (hence the euphemism ‘the Lady’). One would expect that 
a large number of bureaucrats would have supported her. When she 
was released from house arrest in May 2002 and was quickly giving 
interviews at a press conference, I was speaking by phone to a senior 
bureaucrat in his office during working hours and was surprised 
when he made it clear that he was watching the CNN coverage of her 
release by satellite broadcast in his office and described it to me as 
‘great news’. 
On the other hand, the Burmese army was widely said to ‘hate’ Suu Kyi. 
Working in Yangon at this time, one certainly often heard members of 
the military (even the Office of Strategic Studies) speaking critically 
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of Suu Kyi, but this was often a public expression of what they were 
expected to say (or what they had been trained to say). There is no 
reason to think that no members of the military supported or even 
admired Suu Kyi and the NLD, but neither is there any basis to think 
that this would translate into an internal rift in the army. Suu Kyi 
herself sometimes spoke quite favourably of the military intelligence 
liaison officers with whom she dealt regularly. 
More generally, I met several Burmese not connected to the military 
regime but involved in politics who openly claimed that they did not 
agree with Suu Kyi, did not have a high opinion of the NLD, and believed 
that the NLD was not the best political alternative. Indeed, it was rather 
surprising to encounter quite a lot of Burmese who individually believed 
that unswerving Western support for the NLD was not the best option for 
Myanmar. It was also common among ethnic groups to find a considerable 
degree of doubt about Suu Kyi and the NLD — they commonly questioned 
whether she knew and understood ethnic concerns, and doubted that she 
really had ethnic interests at heart. One example I encountered directly 
was the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) leadership at the time, 
who in 2002 had still not met Suu Kyi, and asked whether I thought they 
should do so.11 Naturally, I encouraged them to set up a meeting with 
her, which I understand they subsequently did. However, it was notable 
that in some cases where Burmese had appeared publicly to turn against 
Suu Kyi, they were subject to campaigns of abuse and criticism in the 
pro-democratic media.12 
Journalists, diplomats, and foreigners who had opportunities to meet 
and know Suu Kyi were uniformly impressed by her personality, her 
charisma, her poise, her commitment, and her broad command of 
issues. It was normal to hear more fulsome praise and endorsement of 
Suu Kyi’s views from Americans and Europeans than from Burmese. 
Most Americans and Europeans were not really objective in their 
11  I had met the then KIO leader Saboi Jum both in Yangon and Myitkina, and I assumed he 
was checking with many people before he took a possibly risky step, which could arouse the 
SPDC’s ire.
12  I have in mind the case of the journalist, Ma Thein Gi, who had for a time in the 1990s been 
personal assistant to Aung San Suu Kyi. 
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reactions to her. This contrasts with the views one might hear from 
Australians, who seemed more prepared to mention her inflexibility, 
stubbornness, and occasionally questionable political judgment.13 
Meeting again 10 years later
Almost 10 years later, in late 2010, I received an unexpected telephone 
call from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Myanmar Director asking me for details of my last 
meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi in early 2003. It transpired that Suu 
Kyi was about to be released from house arrest and the Australian 
Chargé d’Affaires was to be among the diplomats she would meet on 
her release (at her request). However, in the intervening years since 
my last meeting with her at a private social function in Yangon in 
April 2003, none of the succeeding Australian ambassadors had met 
Suu Kyi; it had just not been possible for them to do so, as she had 
been under house arrest informally or formally for all of that time. 
I  had not been able to bid her farewell, as she was attacked and 
arrested on 30 May 2003 just before the end of my assignment. I wrote 
her a farewell letter before my departure from Myanmar the following 
month, June 2003, but she almost certainly would not have received it.
I had met Aung San Suu Kyi next when I visited Myanmar in September 
2012, when I was a member of an unofficial Australian human rights 
delegation. That meeting actually took place in the new capital, 
Naypyitaw, as she was by then an elected member of parliament.) 
In November 2013, Aung San Suu Kyi would finally visit Australia 
for the first time, and was awarded an honorary doctorate of letters at 
ANU, when my wife and I met her again. 
During her visit to the east coast of Australia, much larger numbers 
of the Burmese community than expected attended functions in Suu 
Kyi’s honour in Canberra, Sydney, and Melbourne, and it was apparent 
that many Burmese who were not necessarily politically involved 
nevertheless admired her and were keen to see her in the flesh. So, 
whether at home or overseas, she commanded enormous respect and 
affection from ordinary Burmese people.
13  A good example is Hazel Lang’s frank 2006 article, ‘The Courage of Aung San Suu Kyi’, 




Bilateral Sanctions and 
Successful Alternative 
Approaches
Australia was one of a number of ‘like-minded’, largely Western 
(or OECD) countries that imposed political and military (and later 
economic) ‘sanctions’ against ‘Burma’ or Myanmar. But these were 
not mandatory, universally applied sanctions authorised by the UN 
Security Council. This meant that Australia was not aligned with 
the majority of countries with official relations with Myanmar, but 
in a small, but powerful, group of countries with a political or even 
ideological agenda in relation to Myanmar. Australia was acting 
largely in concert with the US, the UK, Western Europe, Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea. But, despite appearances, our sanctions were 
not closely coordinated or orchestrated: there was no coordinating 
mechanism whatsoever, no regular meeting, no ‘secretariat’, and no 
systematic information sharing (although a great deal of informal 
consultation and coordination occurred because diplomats are 
essentially practical people). Nor was there ever any attempt to 
discuss these sanctions with the Myanmar Government with a view 
to identifying changes they should make in order to have sanctions 
lifted. But the (at best) quasi-legal status of international sanctions 
and their indiscriminate effects — on trade, education, and people’s 
welfare — had a divisive effect inside the country, with most people, 
except opposition ‘true believers’, seeming unhappy with sanctions.
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The practical effects of Australia’s sanctions were not necessarily 
well understood by Australians dealing with Myanmar, and were 
not necessarily supported by many of them. The bilateral Australian 
sanctions, imposed since the 1988 uprising, limited Australian 
Government support for trade, tourism, investment, and education 
promotion, and meant that both the quantum and content of Australia’s 
aid program were extremely circumscribed. This meant, for example, 
that there was no trade or economic officer in the Australian Embassy 
(only an Austrade local trade officer), no aid program specialist 
(as  there was officially no government-to-government aid), no 
Australia-based immigration officer (Immigration Department officers 
from the Australian Embassy in Bangkok visited Yangon periodically 
to conduct interviews), no education officer, and no defence attaché; 
it was definitely a second-rank embassy. However, in Australia’s case, 
sanctions were deceptive, because they did not necessarily limit 
Australia’s support for programs carried out by the United Nations, 
international financial institutions, and other international agencies. 
However, Australian activists supporting the Burmese democracy 
movement were strongly in favour of Australia’s bilateral sanctions, 
without necessarily knowing or understanding their full impact — 
positive or ‘negative’. They were, however, prepared to object to 
Australian scholarships for people from Myanmar, when desperate, 
even claiming that such scholarships would enable ‘the sons and 
daughters of generals’ to study in Australia on Australian Government 
scholarships.
In the general course of business, the Australian Embassy in Yangon 
received no instructions or advice or requests from Canberra 
relating to our sanctions ‘regime’ against Myanmar. Other than on 
first encounters — when the absence of Australian aid funding or 
Australian Government scholarships for study in Australia would 
normally arise — sanctions would not normally be raised or discussed 
with senior levels of the military regime. There was really little need 
for any such discussion more than a decade after these sanctions had 
been imposed. The Myanmar Government would have assumed that 
Australian policy would not change in the absence of political change 
in Myanmar and that in debates at the United Nations, Australia 
would, as usual, side with the ‘West’ against Myanmar. 
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There were only a very limited number of mechanisms whereby 
sanctions-applying countries with embassies in Yangon met to concert 
their policies and responses. The main one was the ‘mini-Dublin 
Group’ for coordinating counter-narcotics programs, in conjunction 
with the UNDCP (now the UN Office on Drugs and Crime). Like-minded 
countries occasionally met in other settings, such as the United Nations, 
to try to coordinate their approaches to Myanmar and to exchange 
ideas about how to make more progress, but no such meetings ever 
occurred in Yangon. Indeed, no such meetings occurred elsewhere 
between 2000 and 2003, because UN envoys did have satisfactory 
access to the country at this time, and there were some modest hopes 
that change might not be far away. Some of these meetings resumed 
later, at Wilton Park in the UK, for example, but they never produced 
any significant outcomes, and never had any noticeable influence on 
the military regime. Australia did not always attend.
However, the background presence of sanctions had the expected 
negative effect on many aspects of Australia’s official and unofficial 
contacts and interactions with Myanmar: it effectively discouraged 
Australian tourists, business, and investors, and contributed directly 
to a gradual decline in almost all manifestations of Australian interest 
in Myanmar. A few Australians worked in international agencies in 
Myanmar, but not at senior levels, and from 2000–03 no Australian 
headed an official international agency in Myanmar. Australians 
headed — very creditably — a small number of INGOs, such as World 
Vision, Care International, and World Concern. 
Australia benefited enormously from wide appreciation in Myanmar of 
the well-received work and popular contributions of many individual 
Australians over many years. Although to this day they are not all 
recognised in Australia for their roles, they are still remembered by 
the Myanmar people with whom they worked. Amongst these, for 
example, were a small number of Australian nuns who were assigned 
to parts of the Myanmar Catholic Church to carry out educational or 
community health work. Staff from the Australian Red  Cross were 
occasionally assigned to work with the Myanmar Red Cross Society, 
sometimes in Yangon, sometimes in regional locations. Some academics 
based in Australia maintained personal contacts with academic 
institutions in Myanmar, but some other academics also probably 
avoided contact with Myanmar.
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After about 2000, numerous Australian doctors started coming 
to Myanmar regularly, often as part of programs whose costs were 
covered by Rotary Clubs.1 But the doctors gave their own time pro 
bono, not once but innumerable times, out of their commitment to 
doing something to help those in need in Myanmar. Their medical 
programs and activities had no official standing for Australia, but 
they often were part of official programs of the Myanmar Government. 
So the Australian Embassy needed to be aware of their activities and 
be supportive of them. Occasionally, the embassy helped with any 
administrative problems, but more often they were well organised and 
well prepared for what they wanted to do. How sustainable all this was 
is debatable, but a strong component of all the programs was exposure 
for Myanmar doctors and nurses and additional skills training in 
Australia. The key Myanmar organisation was the Myanmar Medical 
Association (MMA) — a group composed of senior Myanmar medical 
practitioners who were still active in their (essentially government-
controlled) profession. The MMA’s leaders’ understanding of their 
role was impressive, their professional skills substantial, and their 
commitment to high medical principles formidable.
Only a small number of Australians were present in the international 
community in Yangon, but whether working for humanitarian NGOs 
or as small business people, all were highly regarded, and were 
known for their effectiveness, outgoing natures, and their empathy 
with ordinary Burmese. The Australian Red Cross, for example, quite 
often provided expert staff to the Myanmar Red Cross Society and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, one of only four Red Cross 
societies in the world providing such in-country support. At this 
time, no problems emanating from the local Australian community 
ever brought Australia into disrepute. The fact that some INGOs such 
as World Vision, Care Myanmar, and later Marie Stopes International 
were run from Australia, and were usually managed by Australians as 
Country Director, also enhanced Australia’s local standing. 
1  These groups included Interplast (cleft palate surgery); cardiac experts under Dr Alan 
Gale from the Adventist Hospital in Sydney; eye surgery teams under Dr James Muecke from 
Adelaide Hospital; Professor Bruce Conolly from the Sydney Hospital Hand Surgery Unit; 
Professor Bob Bauze from Adelaide University; and Professor Alan Pearson from the Nursing 
School of Adelaide University. 
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Another Australian ‘asset’ was the Myanmar Times, which had 
begun operations in 2000 as a joint venture with military intelligence 
without the benefit of a broader strategic plan. Under the direction 
of a hard drinking, hard-living ‘rogue’ of an Australian journalist, 
Ross Dunkley, the Myanmar Times sought in its own way to 
change Myanmar Government policy, worked diligently to reveal 
aspects of Myanmar and its people that were not normally covered 
in government-controlled media, and eventually endeavoured to 
interpret developments in Myanmar sensitively and objectively to 
the international community. It also went out of its way to publicise 
— very helpfully — Australian policies and initiatives towards 
Myanmar, so that Australia achieved a considerably higher profile 
than it otherwise would have had. At  any time, several Australian 
journalists worked on the staff of the newspaper, as writers, trainers, 
and in senior managerial positions. Not long after it started, the 
Myanmar Times began providing significant training programs for its 
Myanmar journalists.2
The Myanmar Times was a joint business venture (Myanmar 
Consolidated Media) between Western Australian newspapers — and 
Bill Clough in particular — and a Myanmar businessman connected to 
military intelligence. Ross Dunkley was widely criticised in ‘activist’ 
circles for agreeing to work under strict censorship of a regime that 
activists regarded as illegitimate. The life and work of Ross Dunkley 
and the Myanmar Times was later featured in the interesting 2011 
documentary film, Dancing with Dictators: The Story of the Last 
Foreign Publisher in Burma. Dunkley was sometimes accused of acting 
as ‘an apologist’ for the regime, and lacking independence and 
integrity, but the Myanmar Times was always run transparently 
and was prepared to publish articles critical of the military regime 
when it could. Dunkley was personally openly opposed to many 
regime policies and showed courage in challenging regime policies in 
2  According to Wikipedia: ‘Myanmar Consolidated Media is the largest private media 
company in Myanmar and employs more than 300 staff and has bureaus in Mandalay and 
Naypyitaw. The paper has a circulation of around 25,000 copies in Burmese and 3,000 copies 
in English. A January 2008 report said the Burmese edition is the country’s largest circulation 
newspaper, while the English edition is the only privately owned and operated English-language 
newspaper in the country.’ See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Myanmar_Times.
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the early  2000s, although  this happened very rarely. Dunkley later 
achieved international prominence when he had a falling out with the 
regime and was arrested in 2011.3
There was also a handful of smaller Australian businessmen living 
and working in Myanmar on a long-term basis who appeared to be 
respected and recognised in the local community. Larger Australian 
firms such as Broken Hill Propriety Limited, which would normally 
play a leading role in the foreign business community in Southeast 
Asia, had closed their office in 1995 after waiting in vain for more 
open economic policies to deliver suitable commercial opportunities. 
The smaller Australian entrepreneurs often ran small, even one-
person companies in somewhat specialised areas with valuable 
technical skills such as environmental equipment, mining and energy 
services, interior decorating, and legal services. They sourced goods 
and services from Australia, contributing to the very modest bilateral 
trade volume. A few other Australians were working as individuals 
in the hospitality, tourism, and education sectors. Given the small 
size of the international community overall, some of these Australians 
occasionally had a quite a high profile in the local community and 
were sometimes well known to prominent Myanmar leaders. 
As a general impression, Australians residing in Myanmar at this time 
tended not to be taking inappropriate advantage of military rule in 
Myanmar. Indeed, many of them were participating in humanitarian 
and welfare activities, including through Christian organisations. 
If any Australians were involved in any kind of dubious or illicit 
activities, these tended not to come to light. With an Australian Federal 
Police presence in the Australian Embassy after 2000 producing good 
working relationships with the Myanmar law enforcement authorities, 
it could be anticipated that untoward Australian activities would come 
to notice, as happened elsewhere. By and large, during this period 
— due in large part to the very low number of Australian tourists 
travelling to Myanmar — the Australian Embassy experienced very 
few significant consular problems. 
3  Some aspects of Dunkley’s work in Myanmar were described by Chris Maldon after Dunkley 
was imprisoned on apparently trumped-up charges, on which he was found guilty but was 
eventually freed. See ‘Newspaper Boss Ross Dunkley to Renew Push for Free Media in Burma’, 
The Australian, 2 July 2011. Available at www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/newspaper-
boss-ross-dunkley-to-renew-push-for-free-media-in-burma/story-e6frg6so-1226085874701.
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At the same time, there were very few Australian tourists or private 
citizens visiting Myanmar. This was quite an abnormal situation, 
especially when compared with the numbers visiting Thailand next 
door. Although Australian pro-democracy advocates did not formally 
seek to ban tourism, some Australian sympathisers, such as the trade 
union movement and some of the small political parties, did call for 
a ban on tourism, but without success. A few small Australian travel 
companies continued to promote tourism to Myanmar, at least until 
2003; after the 30 May 2003 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi at Depayin, 
companies such as Intrepid stopped dealing with Myanmar, and did 
not resume operations there until after 2010. Australian Government 
policy at this time was not to intervene against normal commercial 
activities. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s support for a tourism boycott 
was sometimes stated vigorously, but her position changed to one 
of tolerating individual tourism, but not mass tourism, for which 
Myanmar Government assistance might be required. To my knowledge, 
Australian tourists and tourism companies were not directly involved 
in supporting Myanmar Government activity. The NLD never drew our 
attention to inappropriate activities by Australian travel companies.
One of the very few high-profile consular ‘cases’ involving Australian 
travellers in this period was that of the human rights activist James 
Mawdsley, a British–Australian dual citizen who was imprisoned 
in Kengtung prison in eastern Shan State in 1999, and who was, by 
agreement, receiving consular assistance from the British Embassy. 
As Wikipedia explains, Mawdsley is 
a Catholic seminarian who is also a human rights activist campaigning 
for democracy in Burma. He is a dual citizen of the United Kingdom 
and Australia. He was born in 1972. He gave up his studying at Bristol 
University to teach English at a Burmese refugee camp. Mawdsley was 
arrested three times for his involvement and deported three times. 
He spent over a year in a prison in Myanmar during 1999 and 2000 
and was also tortured, as part of a seventeen-year jail sentence, after 
taking part in pro-democracy protests in Rangoon. 
Mawdsley had let it be known that he wanted to be arrested again by 
the Myanmar authorities, and it appears that he was writing a diary 
of his imprisonment for later publication. The Australian Embassy 
kept itself informed about Mawdsley’s situation through the British 
Embassy during the year of his imprisonment. I met his (Australian) 
mother when she came to visit him in late 2000, but only met 
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Mawdsley himself at Yangon airport after his release from Kengtung 
prison when he was being deported to the UK. Mawdsley’s book 
detailing his campaign against the military regime’s human rights 
abuses acknowledges the efforts of my predecessor, Lyndall McLean, 
on his behalf.4 
Other Australians who left a distinctive mark inside and outside 
Myanmar at this time were a small number of Australian academic 
experts on Myanmar undertaking research in-country and publishing 
it in high-quality, world-renowned publications. Several of these 
scholars were social scientists connected with The Australian National 
University: Helen James, an expert on education and civil society in 
Myanmar; Andrew Selth, an expert on the Myanmar military who was 
later affiliated with Griffith University near Brisbane; anthropologist 
Monique Skidmore, author of Karaoke Fascism; and the Danish-born, 
Canberra-based PhD scholar and later political scientist, Morten 
Pedersen.5 Other scholars working out of Australia, and undertaking 
notable research in Myanmar at this time included Sean Turnell at 
Macquarie University in Sydney, and anthropologist Nancy Hudson-
Rodd at Edith Cowan University in Perth. All these scholars were 
successful in undertaking significant research on quite sensitive topics 
in Myanmar at this time. 
Another type of Australian visitor — often probably visiting 
without the knowledge of the Australian Government — was the 
occasional academic visiting Myanmar for personal/professional 
research, or as a ‘pro bono’ action helping Burmese universities with 
advanced courses or postgraduate supervision. Sometimes members of 
Australian churches visited in a missionary-like role, although more 
often to perform social work for their Myanmar counterpart church 
than to engage in religious proselytising. These highly dedicated 
people usually had little or no contact with the Australian Embassy, 
although I met a few occasionally at the embassy or social gatherings. 
I discovered that whatever activities these people were engaged in, 
4  James Mawdsley’s book, The Iron Road: A Stand for Truth and Democracy in Burma, 
New York: North Point Press, 2001, was published not long after his release.
5  Andrew Selth published Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory in 2002; Monique 
Skidmore published Karaoke Fascism: Burma and the Politics of Fear in 2004; Helen James 
published Security and Sustainable Development in Myanmar in 2006; and Morten Pedersen 
published Promoting Human Rights in Burma: A Critique of Western Sanctions Policy in 2008. 
They were all carrying out in-country research between 2000–03.
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their contributions were enormously appreciated by the Burmese 
people they were working with. (Australia was far from alone in 
having such ‘humanitarian volunteers’ spending time in Myanmar, 
in contrast to the isolation and sanctions practised under government 
policies. There were many more people from the US and the UK.) 
Some Australians with a strong interest in Burma avoided visiting 
Burma under the military regime; some, especially those with 
connections to the activist movement, preferred to work with the 
large and relatively settled Burmese refugees on the Thai–Burma 
border. There were a few exceptions to this. One individual with 
overt political connections who did visit Burma, despite being on the 
military regime’s visa ‘black list’,6 was the New South Wales Labor 
party politician Janelle Saffin, who had quite extensive connections 
with the National League for Democracy. Janelle Saffin was one of a 
very small number of people at this time who recognised that political 
change in Myanmar might be getting nearer. She was later (in 2007) to 
become a Labor member of the federal parliament, an advisor to Labor 
prime ministers Rudd and Gillard, and — after the transition to the 
Thein Sein Government — a tireless campaigner for rebuilding the 
full range of Australian relations with Myanmar. I recall telling staff in 
the Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Myanmar Embassy 
in Canberra at the time — not acting on any official instructions — 
that it was not in their interests to ban Australian academics from 
visiting Myanmar, no matter what they said or wrote, and mentioning 
Janelle Saffin by name as an example.
The period between 2000–03 saw a number of Australians coming to 
Myanmar as ‘good Samaritans’, trying to help the ordinary people 
of Myanmar in one way or another. My predecessor as ambassador, 
Lyndall McLean, and her husband even came into this category when 
they returned in 2002 to work for a UN agency and a private company 
respectively. Another category of visitors was project managers from 
various Australian Rotary Clubs7 undertaking humanitarian projects 
— their projects ranging from building water supplies to the provision 
of medical equipment and medical services and training — although 
6  Janelle Saffin’s visa applications around this period were mostly unsuccessful because 
of this, but on at least one occasion she managed to obtain a tourist visa in Bangkok and called 
on the Australian Embassy in Yangon. 
7  These included Rotary Clubs from New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, and the 
Australian Capital Territory, but there could have been more.
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they rarely had any direct requirements of the embassy. Their activities 
were all carried out with the knowledge and approval of the Myanmar 
authorities, often through the intermediation of the Myanmar Medical 
Association — and often with the direct approval of the Myanmar 
customs authorities — and never in this period caused problems for 
the Australian Embassy or the Australian Government. Indeed, the 
embassy enjoyed very good relations with the Myanmar Medical 
Association, which in later years also sponsored high-level Myanmar 
medical delegations to Australia.
As a measure of their commitment to assisting Myanmar, a number 
of these Australian individuals subsequently established their own 
charitable NGOs (or non-profit organisations (NPOs)) to cover their 
ongoing operations in Myanmar. These organisations include Sight 
for All, based in Adelaide, and the Conolly Medical Foundation for 
Myanmar, based in Sydney. Possibly the most successful Australian 
NGO to be set up in this period is Graceworks Myanmar, set up by 
retired Australian businessman Peter Simmons in Melbourne, which 
was able to operate effectively with a range of local partners in a variety 
of humanitarian and capacity-building fields in and around Yangon, 
with the approval of the Myanmar authorities, and largely without 
interference from them. Their activities were carried out in the public 
eye, and often attracted publicity — in Myanmar and/or in Australia 
— but this was usually low-key, modest publicity that offended 
nobody, but definitely helped fundraising. Some of these activities 
also received partial funding from the Australian aid program.
The activities of these individuals and groups were uniquely Australian. 
They were not the product of consultation with other countries, they 
were not part of broader programs that were regional or global in their 
character, they were not even ‘blessed’ by elements of the United 
Nations, and they were not the result of any ingenious Australian 
Government strategy to influence and change Myanmar. But they 
were all conducted openly and transparently and in accordance with 
accepted ‘best practice’. They all achieved identifiable results, were 
‘sustainable’, and mostly continued for several years and gradually 
expanded the range of their activities. The individuals involved 
brought credit to Australia through their undertakings. They also 
brought many more Australians into some form of contact with 
Myanmar, including as visitors.
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Australian media visitors, however, were few and far between. 
They were usually based in Bangkok, as were the ABC correspondents, 
and visited Yangon only from time to time to report, mostly when 
significant events were happening. Often they could not obtain a 
journalist visa, which was a problem; occasionally, I was asked to 
intercede with the Myanmar authorities to assist their visa applications, 
which I normally did. A few other Australian journalists visited, but 
not many. As Australian Ambassador, I often received requests for 
interviews with visiting Western journalists such as the Financial 
Times (and sometimes Japanese journalists), which at that time I could 
agree to do without consultation with Canberra. Some of these media 
visitors had also been in contact with my predecessors. I felt it was 
worth responding to such requests, as Western media access was 
on the whole so limited, and anything to expand the information 
available was beneficial. I don’t recall any embarrassing consequences 
from this at all, and did not feel pressured to promote any particular 
political ‘line’ as long as I was providing factual information about 
developments or Australian policy.
Very few Australian politicians visited Myanmar during these years, 
largely because visiting under a military regime might have implied 
some kind of endorsement of the status quo, or because it might have 
required some overt criticism of the regime, which might or might 
not have been appropriate. It was unusual for an Australian embassy 
not to have to look after a stream of Australian political visitors, but 
the absence of a parliament in Myanmar actually meant this lack 
of visitors was logical and unsurprising. There were few political 
visitors from other countries (with perhaps the exception of Japan), 
so Australia did not stand out. In other words, it was highly unlikely 
that political visitors to Myanmar at such an uncertain and polarised 
time would have achieved anything. Alexander Downer’s visit to 
Yangon in early October 2002 occurred just before the Bali bombing 
on 12 October 2002, an event which significantly distracted political 
attention from issues other than terrorism for some time. Over the next 
year or so, no questions were asked about Burma in the Australian 
Parliament, in contrast with earlier periods. Nor did many Australian 
officials visit Myanmar during this period: with a wide range of 
activities sanctioned, there was little practical work for Australian 
officials to pursue. In the early 2000s, when some smaller Australian 
universities began to look further afield for international students — 
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or even possible sites for off-shore campuses — and started making 
exploratory visits to Myanmar, we saw a few Australian academic 
entrepreneurs coming through, but they faced many practical 
obstacles and considerable competition from other countries, so it 
took some time before their plans materialised.8
One international institution which had taken root in Yangon some 
years before my arrival was the Hash House Harriers, the running and 
walking club, mainly for foreigners, which had its origins in British 
colonial times in Kuala Lumpur.9 Participating regularly in the weekly 
Yangon ‘Hash’ was, for me, an invaluable way of seeing parts of the 
city the authorities did not normally want foreigners to enter — as a 
result, the Hash House Harriers event often attracted the attention of 
the security authorities. Participating also brought a great range of 
people from different countries and different jobs into contact, but 
in an informal and friendly ambience. I occasionally invited other 
ambassadorial colleagues to participate, which they found most 
interesting, but perhaps not commensurate with their status. It was 
also a place where many locally based or visiting Australians would 
gather. Overall, the Hash House Harriers provided opportunities for 
anyone participating in the run/walk to ascertain how the Myanmar 
interests of residents and visitors in very different occupations were 
faring, and what unannounced initiatives were under way. But there 
were also a few Burmese men and women who participated very 
wholeheartedly in the activities, and were always interesting to talk 
with. Many short-term visitors, including quite a few from Australia, 
would find their way to the Yangon Hash House Harriers each week.
The Hash House Harriers was where I learnt more about how the 
Myanmar authorities were ‘managing’ their 2002–03 bank crisis than 
would ever come out through the media or scholarly writings.10 I was 
fortunate enough to befriend a fellow walker who was a consultant for 
the Yoma Bank, one of the private Myanmar banks caught up in the 
run on the banks that occurred. (Unrelated to the crisis, Yoma Bank 
8  Educators from Australia at this time included some from Curtin University in Western 
Australia and the University of Central Queensland in Rockhampton.
9  See the Wikipedia entry at en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash_House_Harriers.
10  The Australian economist who specialises in Myanmar, Professor Sean Turnell from 
Macquarie University in Sydney, wrote the most detailed account in his Fiery Dragons: Banks, 
Moneylenders and Microfinance in Burma, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2009. However, Turnell was 
not in Myanmar during the crisis.
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was trying to install modern electronic banking systems for the first 
time across its branches in Myanmar.) What was known in banking 
circles was that when the bank crisis was at its most serious point 
— probably during February and March 2003 —  the Myanmar 
Government was convening a daily meeting of the main banks and the 
government representatives, led by the Ministry of Finance and the 
Central Bank of Myanmar, but also including military intelligence. 
The  purpose was to monitor closely the demands on the private 
banks, and to manage and direct their responses, to avoid the situation 
worsening and getting out of control. While my walking ‘friend’ 
was fairly careful in what he disclosed, he indicated that questions 
about how to manage deposits at the customer level and the banks’ 
capitalisation were on the table. 
Unsurprisingly, some of the decisions taken by the Myanmar 
authorities left the banks uncomfortable, and the regulators were 
fairly authoritarian in their approach, but the overall process was 
more inclusive than might have been expected, and was certainly very 
‘hands-on’. Reassuring Myanmar consumers — no easy task, given 
that they had always been notoriously sceptical about banks — was a 
high priority. Thus, on 21 February 2003, the head of the government, 
Secretary One General Khin Nyunt, issued a statement announcing a 
Central Bank loan to the private banks in question (including Yoma 
Bank) and seeking to reassure people that private banks were safe.11 
Details of what was going on behind the scenes were not secret, but 
for obvious reasons were not being advertised. Subsequently, private 
depositors and local businesses lost quite substantial amounts, but the 
banking system — such as it was — survived. (Yoma Bank, never very 
close to the government, was criticised for unspecified breaches of its 
obligations, but continues operating and today remains the second 
largest private bank in Myanmar.) 
The weekly Hash House Harriers event often meant going to parts of 
Yangon where the authorities might prefer foreigners not to go: areas 
where there was extreme poverty; areas where local residents were 
openly less supportive of the authorities; and areas where the Myanmar 
authorities’ presence was, for one reason or another, problematical — 
there might be an ‘off-limits’ military establishment, military activities 
11  This was reported on page one of the Myanmar Times of 24 February in an article entitled 
‘S1 reassures public that private banks are safe’.
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that were not for public acknowledgement, or questionable police 
behaviour. So the Hash House Harriers group occasionally found 
itself at odds with the security authorities, but since it was officially 
acceptable to move around anywhere in Yangon, there was little the 
local police could do about this. (In practice, the Hash group went out 
of its way to respect local practices — removing footwear if we passed 
through a monastery, for example.) On one occasion, as the local 
security agent tried surreptitiously to photograph Hash participants, 
we turned the tables by asking him to take a group photograph of 
the Hash with his own camera. On another occasion, the Australian 
Federal Police representative from the Australian Embassy was acting 
as the ‘hare’, setting the trail for the Hash running event, but was 
arrested for trespassing near a military camp. He was released by the 
police when they discovered his identity, but the Hash proceeded to 
have an illustrated t-shirt printed to commemorate that occasion. 
Eventually, I was given the ‘Hash name’ of ‘Ambolator’, appropriate 
since I always walked rather than ran, and much more respectable 
than some of the names other participants were given. After my return 
to Australian and my retirement, while working on Myanmar at 
The Australian National University, I would endeavour to join up with 
the Yangon Hash House Harriers whenever I visited Myanmar. It was 
still an enjoyable and relaxing institution where one could understand 
a different side of Myanmar. 
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Early Australian Public 
Diplomacy Possible in Myanmar 
Engaging in public diplomacy in another country necessarily 
involves judgments about mutual benefits arising from exposing 
the people of another country to the intellectual achievements or 
artistic accomplishments of the ‘giving’ country, weighed against the 
possibility of undertaking an activity that might be  inappropriate, 
sensitive, or even offensive in terms of the culture of the ‘receiving’ 
country. Occasionally, it can mean promoting the values of systems 
that are opposed to those of the recipient country (as in the Soviet 
Union, for example). In post-2000 Yangon, several foreign governments 
sought to engage in ‘traditional’ public diplomacy: the highly 
organised and well-funded operations of the former US Information 
Agency and the British Council were the leading exponents of such 
programs, pursuing both sides of the template. But even less well-
funded programs, from countries such as Japan, France, and others, 
increased their activity in this area post-2000 as it seemed that full-
scale political transformation was still some time away, while a modest 
but encouraging degree of ‘opening up’ was under way under the 
otherwise authoritarian military regime. The nature of other countries’ 
public diplomacy varied: Japan tended to prefer film festivals, which 
could be conducted as a commercial activity but targeted a wide 
community, and presumably went through normal censorship; some 
countries chose to organise ‘in house’ activities such as music recitals, 
which were not aimed at the wider Burmese community, and therefore 
would not attract interference from the authorities; the British and 
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the Americans gradually increased their English teaching activities, 
which covertly targeted political opposition members, but did not 
have an overt political purpose.  
By its very nature, public diplomacy was an area where the embassy 
would run up against the regime’s controls on freedom of expression. 
Any material that was published for public consumption, whether 
printed word or images, had to pass censorship controls; any public 
event not held within the confines of the embassy required permission 
from the authorities. These were not untried waters: other embassies 
and organisations had undertaken similar activities, or had to obtain 
official permission to carry out their public activities. But they 
obviously presented policy and organisational challenges, and there 
was a degree of unpredictability about the outcome. Potentially, the 
possibility of adverse media or negative public impact was greater 
than in a non-authoritarian environment.
When I arrived in Yangon in May 2000, the Australian Government 
was not really prepared for a shift away from its hitherto extremely 
low-profile range of activities. As a low-rated embassy in terms of its 
size and the cool political relationship with Myanmar, the Australian 
Embassy in Yangon generally did not figure in Canberra’s plans or 
budgeting for public diplomacy activity. Indeed, before 2000 the 
embassy was not allocated any public diplomacy funds by DFAT. 
Realistically, there was not a lot of global or generic public diplomacy 
activity that would have been suitable for Myanmar. The embassy was 
mostly left to its own devices about what it wished to do, subject to 
informing DFAT in Canberra in advance (usually by simply including 
any proposed activity in the embassy’s annual public diplomacy plan). 
Sometimes embassy ‘support’ might be no more than the ambassador 
offering to host an event at the embassy, using official entertainment 
allowance funds. Yet, some other countries that imposed sanctions 
had begun modest public diplomacy programs. So it was apparent 
that, even in a highly controlled environment such as Myanmar 
in the early 2000s, it would be possible to project a distinct, but 
genuine, Australian profile and to work with various stakeholders or 
proponents, while conforming with broader Australian Government 
directions and standards to maintain the integrity of the events or 
activities. 
131
10 . EARLy AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACy POSSIBLE IN MyANMAR
The Australian Embassy’s limited experience with only a small number 
of lesser public diplomacy activities in the challenging but changing 
political environment of 2000–03 confirmed that the military regime’s 
tentative signs of opening up could be translated into embassies 
carrying out more ‘normal’ diplomatic activities in Yangon, including 
public diplomacy events, despite the restrictions that applied on 
political activity, freedom of expression, and ‘fraternisation’ with 
ordinary Burmese people. This was contrary to many preconceptions 
that existed in Australia and the West, but was consistent with the 
experience of many other embassies in Yangon at that time.
Given the extremely modest resources available, it was very much a 
matter of ‘making the best out of very little’. An effective way to promote 
Australian food and wine was at the annual Australia Day reception, 
where we were able to take advantage of the existing efficient ‘supply 
chain’ links from Australian suppliers to supermarkets, restaurants, 
and hotels in Myanmar, enabling us to organise impressive Australia-
sourced catering for the reception at the Australian Club. 
In addition, a few significant Australian occasions or events were 
marked by the Australian Embassy in Yangon between 2000 and 2003. 
In a variety of ways, these events inevitably involved some interaction 
with the military regime and its policies and practices, beyond what 
would be the case in countries without an authoritarian government. 
The main objective was to carry out these events in the way the 
Australian parties preferred; the main challenge was to judge how to 
go forward if the Myanmar authorities decided to amend or adjust 
the character of the event. The ultimate test was to assess whether or 
not it had been possible to preserve the ‘integrity’ of the event, and 
whether or not holding it had been worthwhile and meant achieving 
some progress for the Burmese people affected.
These events included the Sydney Olympic Games, the 50th 
anniversary of the Qantas Kangaroo Route, the 50th anniversary 
of  Australia–Burma diplomatic relations and the 60th anniversary 
of the Burma–Thailand Railway.
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Australia Day
Events to mark Australia’s national day are a high point in Australia’s 
public diplomacy around the world, and it was little different in 
Yangon from 2000 to 2003, although local circumstances influenced 
the style and nature of the event. As in other countries, the Australian 
Embassy in Yangon sought to bring members of the Australian 
community together with local people, who were cooperating with 
Australia to celebrate Australian connections with Myanmar, with 
special Australian food and wine, and sometimes musical performances. 
The end of January is the coolest time of the year in Myanmar, with 
minimum temperatures around 19 degrees Celsius and maximums 
around 30 degrees Celsius, with almost no possibility of rain, so a 
wet weather plan was never needed. The setting for the Australia Day 
reception was the outdoor area of Australian Club within the grounds 
of the ambassador’s residence, with special lighting for the occasion. 
In Yangon by this time, the advent of Australian professionals in the 
hospitality sector and the arrival of quality Australia food products in 
the up-market City Mart supermarket chain in Yangon made it possible 
to stage quite an impressive Australia Day function at the ambassador’s 
residence. Each year we sought to showcase something different and 
exotic in the way of Australian food, sharing the day with the Indian 
Embassy, whose national day falls on the same day. (Alcohol was not 
normally served at the Indian national day reception, so local practice 
was for invitees to attend the Indian receptions first and then proceed 
to the Australian reception.) In the early 2000s, Australian embassies 
across the world received a special budget allocation for the Australia 
Day reception, based on a plan submitted by each embassy in advance. 
This enabled the Yangon Embassy to put the catering arrangements for 
the reception out to competitive tender from a few of Yangon’s better 
hotels. We had a small organising committee within the embassy, 
which included myself and my wife, who had considerable experience 
of such events from our times in Tokyo.
In Yangon in the early 2000s, while aiming to welcome a suitably high-
level government representative — usually the foreign minister — 
senior representatives of the NLD also normally attended, although 
the two would not necessarily speak to one another. At this time, 
there were not many events at which both government representatives 
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and NLD representatives were present. The NLD was generally 
represented at Australia Day by Deputy Chairman Tin Oo, although 
the Chairman, U Aung Shwe, as a former Ambassador to Australia, 
would also attend, health permitting. (Aung San Suu Kyi did not 
attend, as this was not permitted by the Myanmar authorities until 
much later.) Another former Myanmar Ambassador to Australia who 
regularly attended our reception was Brigadier Maung Maung,1 who 
was the long retired architect of the modern Burmese Army and who 
had been a key figure in the ‘Caretaker Government’ of 1958–60 under 
General Ne Win. While the military regime did not interfere overtly 
with the event, some government officials inevitably felt that they 
should not attend. But a reasonable cross-section of Yangon society 
mostly did attend. We  never felt constrained in who we invited, 
or  what we did at the event. Since we had no formal military-to-
military relationship, we did not invite members of the Myanmar 
military, and so did not have numbers of Burmese in military uniform 
present. (A representative of the Australian Defence Attaché’s Office 
from Bangkok who was accredited to Myanmar usually attended, 
but the senior defence attaché was normally required to attend the 
equivalent event in Bangkok.)
The social columns of the Australian-run Myanmar Times provided 
coverage of the embassy’s Australia Day event for their own purposes. 
Sydney Olympic Games 2000
Myanmar is a member of the Olympic movement and sent a small team 
of seven athletes to the Sydney Olympic Games in September 2000. 
As a matter of course, we invited the Myanmar team to a farewell party 
at the ambassador’s residence. The games were also an opportunity 
to celebrate Australia’s achievements. In this case, our embassy 
obviously had the benefit of a wealth of marketing and publicity 
material generated by the Sydney Olympics Committee and the 
federal and NSW state governments. One interesting aspect of this for 
1  Brigadier Maung Maung paid a courtesy call on me at the embassy after my arrival in 
Yangon, which was exactly that — a courtesy call. Brigadier Maung Maung was quite elderly 
by this time, but he remained in reasonable health, while being somewhat eccentric. His two 
daughters had stayed on in Australia and were Australian citizens married to Australians. 
They returned to Yangon from time to time to keep in touch with their family.
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Myanmar was the case of the Sports Minister, Brigadier-General Aye 
Myint, being allowed to attend in spite of Australian travel bans on 
members of the Myanmar military regime. (Aye Myint resigned from 
the army to stand for election for the government Union Social and 
Development Party in November 2010, and was appointed Minister 
of Science and Technology in President Thein Sein’s first cabinet in 
2011, before being appointed Minister of Industry in 2012, and then 
Minister of Labour, Employment and Social Security in 2014.)2 
Fiftieth anniversary of Qantas’s Kangaroo 
Route, 2001
Whose idea was it to celebrate the 50th anniversary of Qantas’s 
Kangaroo Route from London to Sydney by staging an air race of 
small planes in 2002 over the route? An assortment of more than 40 
aircrafts from all over the world left the UK on 11 March 2001 at the 
start of a 22,000 km journey to Australia, stopping at many countries 
that became well-known stopover points on the original ‘Kangaroo 
Route’ between England and Australia. Stopover and transit points 
included France, Greece, Crete, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United 
Arab Emirates, Oman, Pakistan, India, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, 
Indonesia, and Timor, finally making their first Australian landfall at 
Darwin. The ‘Kangaroo Route’ originally included Yangon, but it was 
a very long time since Qantas had stopped over regularly in Yangon.
The Myanmar Government gave all-out support for this event, 
presumably conscious that its handling of the stopover in Yangon 
would be compared with others along the route, and also presumably 
also because it saw the air race as a recognition of Myanmar’s rightful 
place. They would also have calculated that a successful (accident-
free) stopover, even if only 12 hours in duration, could generate 
considerable positive publicity. Most of the arrangements for the 
stopover were handled by the air race organisers directly with the 
Myanmar civil aviation authorities. The Australian Embassy was 
primarily involved in the ‘hospitality’ arrangements for the pilots at the 
Inya Lake Hotel. However, the extent of the Myanmar Government’s 
2 According to ALTSEAN’s Regime Watch. See www.altsean.org/Research/Regime%20Watch/
Executive/Cabinet.php.
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supporting arrangement were unexpected: Deputy Minister for 
Transport Brigadier-General Kyaw Myint was stationed in the air 
traffic control tower overseeing aircraft landing activity for most of 
the time; Foreign Minister U Win Aung and Transport Minister Hla 
Myint Swe, a higher ranking general, greeted the aircraft on arrival; 
and the government newspaper, the New Light of Myanmar, carried 
a prominent factual story on the stopover the following day.3 
The stopover at Yangon was accomplished safely and successfully, and 
without incident. Despite fears that the crossing of the Bay of Bengal 
involved risks for such small planes with minimal navigation systems, 
no casualties occurred during the transit of Myanmar, and no consular 
problems arose from the participants for the Australian Embassy in 
Yangon. The Myanmar Government’s support, neither solicited nor 
anticipated, contributed considerably to this outcome. But embassy 
staff had to invest a great deal of time and effort into the exercise, and 
were gratified by the satisfactory outcome. It was not clear whether 
the larrikin actions of some of the pilots — landing on beaches, roads, 
etc. — were known to the authorities at the time. But if they did 
know about these relatively harmless incidents through their normal 
military intelligence networks, they were politely tight-lipped. 
The air race certainly gained great publicity for Australia, although 
the Myanmar transit, among so many stopovers during the race, was 
probably not a stand-out event. Quite a lot of responsibility was carried 
by the Australian diplomatic posts involved, but whether this was 
fully appreciated by the organisers or by the Australian Government is 
not certain. It was written up enthusiastically by the Myanmar Times 
more than once. 
Fiftieth anniversary of Australia–Burma 
diplomatic relations, 2002 
In May 1952, an Australian diplomatic office was opened in Yangon 
for the first time, just over three years after Burma gained its 
independence, and Australia’s relationships with Burma began. 
3  See ‘Yangon Landing for Air Race’, New Light of Myanmar, 13 November 2000; and ‘Aircraft 
in Sydney Air Race 2001 Stop Over at Yangon International Airport’, New Light of Myanmar, 
27 March 2001.
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The fiftieth anniversary of diplomatic relations was thus marked in 
May 2002. DFAT would normally mark significant anniversaries of 
bilateral relations in some way or other, such as when the fiftieth 
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations was reached, 
but relations with Burma (now Myanmar) in 2002 under a ‘despised’ 
military regime was not an appropriate cause for lavish celebration. 
I do not recall receiving any instructions from Canberra in connection 
with this anniversary.4 
In the embassy, however, we did do the bare minimum, feeling that 
it was inappropriate to ignore the occasion altogether. Vice Minister 
of Foreign Affairs U Khin Maung Win kindly agreed to be guest of 
honour at a small reception in the embassy, which also marked 
the refurbishment of the embassy. Having been in the same fairly 
prestigious location next to the Strand Hotel for most of the period, 
but having just recently been refurbished — even if on a very modest 
scale — the Australian Embassy was a widely recognised presence. 
The Australian-owned and managed Myanmar Times loyally reported 
the event on its front page. My recollection is that the very brief report 
we sent to DFAT on the event drew little or no response from Canberra.
Sixtieth anniversary of the Burma–Thailand 
Railway, 2003
A more moving event was the special service the Australian Embassy 
organised for the World War II prisoners of war who returned to 
Myanmar on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Burma–
Thailand Railway in May 2003. As this trip was not an officially 
supported event, it was entirely organised through private channels, 
with little or no involvement from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.5 
The Burma terminus of the railway, Thanbyuzayat, has been accessible 
for many years, but until recently it had not been possible for visitors 
4  Perhaps reflecting the extent Australia’s diplomatic history is coloured by the Commonwealth 
and the Cold War, Burma also receives only the briefest of mentions in the official departmental 
history of Australian engagement with Asia, Facing North. The only references are in Peter 
Gifford’s chapter ‘The Cold War Across Asia’, in Goldsworthy, David (ed.), Facing North: A Century 
of Australian Engagement with Asia, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001, pp. 172, 175. 
5  In the words of the Minister for Veteran Affairs, in another context, Burma ‘is not a country 
with which the Department has any dealings’. Letter from Minister for Veterans’ Affairs Dana 
Vale to Trevor Wilson, 11 September 2003.
137
10 . EARLy AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACy POSSIBLE IN MyANMAR
to travel even a short distance down the WWII railway track, because 
of clashes that occurred as part of the continuing insurgency in the 
area. As in Thailand, the WWII railway track had been taken up, and 
the only signs of it are the trackbeds, embankments, and some bridges. 
Although only around 200 km by road from the capital Yangon, travel 
to Thanbyuzayat is not easy. Nowadays, foreign visitors to the railway 
usually hire a vehicle (mini-bus or four-wheel drive) in Yangon for the 
trip to Thanbyuzayat, a drive of at least eight hours, quite a tiring 
journey for the elderly former POWs.6 Construction of a new bridge 
across the Salween River (and extension of the railway line from 
Yangon) to Mawlamyaing in 2004 made the trip shorter and slightly 
more comfortable.
Through communication with the Australian organisers of the POWs’ 
pilgrimage many months ahead of the visit, the Australian Embassy 
in Yangon organised a special tribute to the POWs in the form of a 
special service at the Commonwealth War Cemetery at Thanbyuzayat 
on 1 May 2003.7 Several of the POWs were returning to Burma for the 
first time since their imprisonment, including Dr Rowley Richards, 
by then 82 years old and a remarkably dignified and disciplined 
figure.8 Representatives of Myanmar groups showed their respect by 
attending, including the military regime’s ‘mayor’ of Thanbyuzayat, 
the retired professor of history from Mawlamyaing University, and 
representatives from other POW country embassies (US, UK, and 
the Netherlands, but not Japan or Thailand). A representative from 
the opposition New Mon State Party was probably present as well. 
A Burmese Anglican priest from Mawlamyaing, Rev. Sonny Movin, 
conducted the religious aspects of the service. For local Myanmar 
people, it was quite a moving occasion, as their own remembering of 
this history has not been very consistent or open, and it is still not 
known how many Burmese labourers died on the railway. 
6  See Michelle Gorman’s article ‘Travelling a Track of Sad Memories’, Myanmar Times, 
24 December 2001 – 6 January 2002, Vol. 5, No. 95–96.
7  The Australian Embassy did not seek SPDC approval to hold this event, but out of courtesy 
notified the Foreign Ministry of our intentions, not expecting any problems as ANZAC Day and 
Remembrance Day (11 November) were already celebrated annually.
8  His personal account of his wartime experiences was published soon after this anniversary 
as A Doctor’s War, Sydney: Harper-Collins, 2005. 
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In Australia, this particular anniversary was not marked by any 
significant events or initiatives.9 The Department of Veterans’ Affairs 
published a memorial monograph to mark the 60th anniversary, 
Australians on the Burma–Thailand Railway.10 However, in mid-
2002 no official messages from Australia were received — or needed. 
At this time, prisoners of war generally did not get much recognition 
in the Australian Government’s war commemoration activities, so no 
official activity was planned to mark the 60th anniversary of the 
railway. More attention might have been accorded the occasion in 
Thailand, which was much more accessible and had developed good 
facilities to celebrate the famous railway project. The ceremony at the 
Thanbyuzayat cemetery in May 2003 was very positively written up 
in the Australian prisoner of war magazine, Barbed Wire and Bamboo.11 
In subsequent years, in Australia, Myanmar, and Japan, greater 
attention was focused on the Burma–Thailand Railway prisoner of war 
experiences.12 
Generic public diplomacy challenges 
(or opportunities)
Kunwinjku Aboriginal art exhibition
The one notable exception in regular public diplomacy was a relatively 
small but stunning exhibition of Arnhem Land Aboriginal art, Seasons 
of the Kunwinjku, which the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
curated and was taking around Asia and Africa. The Australian 
Embassy in Yangon arranged for the paintings from West Arnhem 
Land to be exhibited in the Sedona Hotel in Yangon in 2002. The SPDC 
9  The Department of Veterans’ Affairs in Canberra did maintain a website on the anniversary. 
See trove.nla.gov.au/work/29881891?selectedversion=NBD44466515.
10  John Moreman, Australians on the Burma–Thailand Railway 1942–43, Canberra: Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs, 2003.
11  An account of their trip, written from the perspective of POWs, and authored by Terry 
Beaton, was published as ‘Burma Remembered: An Incredible Experience’ in the July/August 
2003 issue of Barbed Wire and Bamboo.
12  The Australian War Memorial subsequently created a special website in association with 
a POW exhibition. See www.awm.gov.au/exhibitions/stolenyears/ww2/japan/burmathai/. 
In  2005, Palgrave Macmillan published Railwaymen in the War: Tales by Japanese Railway 
Soldiers in Burma, by Kazuo Tamayama, the first Japanese account in English.
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Deputy Minister for Culture, U Soe Nyunt, a famous poet and writer, 
and one of the few civilians in Myanmar’s Cabinet, kindly opened the 
exhibition for us.
The ‘official’ description of the paintings probably does justice to them.
Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is proud to 
present the art exhibition ‘Seasons of the Kunwinjku’ by artists from 
the Kunwinjku clans of West Arnhem Land, Northern Territory. 
This collection of contemporary Indigenous Australian art reflects the 
stylistic techniques that have been employed by the people for over 
50,000 years.
The collection of 13 paintings and 13 photographs tells the traditional 
stories of the Kunwinjku clans’ ancestors. While many stories relate to 
the Dreamtime, the time of creation, the exhibition also provides an 
insight into Indigenous culture and the collective knowledge about 
the seasonal cycles of West Arnhem Land.
The exhibition was purchased by the department in 1994 from the 
Hogarth Galleries Aboriginal Art Centre, Sydney, and continues to 
enjoy a successful international touring program. Altogether, the 
exhibition travelled to many cities around the world, including 
Bangkok, Shanghai, Singapore, Tokyo, Seoul, Dhaka, Karachi, Mexico 
City, Manila, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Maracaibo, Bogota, Wellington, 
Harare, Nairobi, Port Louis, Pretoria, Lagos, Rome, Ottawa, and 
Port Moresby.13
Some Burmese said this was the first time they had ever seen Aboriginal 
art. It was not possible to verify whether other Aboriginal art 
exhibitions were ever held in Myanmar; they possibly were, but many 
years earlier, and few if any Burmese recalled them. In any event, to 
stage such an exhibition in a country interested in art, and with a very 
diverse culture, was both appropriate and worthwhile. The Myanmar 
Government’s censors said they had to inspect the paintings to confirm 
that they were suitable for public exhibition, as they did for all public 
showings. I doubt that I mentioned this to Canberra, since there had 
been no serious suggestion that the Myanmar authorities would object 
to the exhibition (and, in any event, the Deputy Minister for Culture 
had already agreed to open the exhibition).
13  See the media release on the DFAT website at dfat.gov.au/news/media-releases/Pages/
seasons-of-the-kunwinjku-aboriginal-art-from-west-arnhem-land.aspx.
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Splendours of Arakan book launch, 2001
One of the embassy’s modest public diplomacy initiatives during this 
period was to organise a book launch for Dr Pamela Gutman of Sydney 
University, whose Burma’s Lost Kingdoms: Splendours of Arakan was 
published by Orchid Press, Bangkok, in 2001.14 Pamela had been my 
contemporary at ANU in the mid-1960s, and gone on to become one of 
the world’s foremost experts on the middle period of Burmese history. 
A frequent visitor to Burma during the previous 20 years, Dr Gutman 
was present at the launch at the ambassador’s residence, and was 
grateful for a chance to acknowledge the superb publication in the 
company of her many Burmese friends and colleagues who had assisted 
her in what was her life’s work. Not least of these was her photographer 
friend Zaw Min Yu, a Yangon resident whose unique images grace the 
book. We were able to assemble a number of Dr Gutman’s Burmese 
academic friends and collaborators at the launch. Being held at the 
ambassador’s residence, the launch was a private event for which 
regime approval was neither needed nor sought.
Burma–Thailand Railway photographic 
exhibition, 2003
Another locally inspired event was the exhibition of photos of the 
Burma–Thailand Railway from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. 
The  photographs  were merely exhibition-size copies of black-and-
white photographs in the Australian War Memorial’s collection, 
reproduced in larger format and framed simply after their arrival 
in Yangon. The photographs were later donated to the small ‘Death 
Railway Museum’ in Thanbyuzayat, which until then had photographs 
mainly from Japanese sources. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs 
had also published a memorial monograph to mark the 60th 
anniversary, Australians on the Burma–Thailand Railway 1942–43.15 
The embassy arranged to obtain bulk copies of this publication from 
14  Pamela Gutman, Burma’s Lost Kingdoms: Splendours of Arakan, Bangkok: Orchid Press, 
2001. For tributes about the book, see books.google.com.au/books/about/Burma_s_lost_
kingdoms.html?id=YXJuAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y. Pamela Gutman died in Sydney in early 
2015. The author’s obituary for her was carried by the ANU blog site, New Mandala: asiapacific.
anu.edu.au/newmandala/?s=Gutman.
15  John Moreman, Australians on the Burma-Thailand Railway 1942–43, Canberra: Department 
of Veterans’ Affairs, 2003.
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the Department of Veterans’ Affairs to have on hand at the exhibition, 
and the Myanmar Government had no objections to these being 
distributed. The exhibition was staged at the Yangon Inya Lake Hotel, 
whose manager at the time was personally interested in the story of 
the railway. It was significant that the Australian Embassy was able 
to sell copies of the Australian official account of the railway at this 
exhibition, since few Burmese knew much about Burma’s involvement 
in World War II, which has long been suppressed by post-independence 
nationalistic and anti-colonial Burmese governments. There was 
no attempt whatsoever by the censorship authorities to censor the 
publication, or to obstruct its dissemination, since it obviously had no 
political relevance for contemporary Myanmar. 
To stage any public event in Myanmar at this time, it was necessary to 
obtain the permission of the censorship authorities in the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. There was no evidence of any previous public exhibition 
of material about the foreign prisoners of war on the Burma–Thailand 
Railway being held in Myanmar since World War II. So it was by 
no means certain that permission would be forthcoming, especially 
given the distorted anti-British view of World War II promoted in the 
Defence Ministry’s own museum. But, thankfully — and perhaps as 
a sign of things to come much later — in the end, in granting its 
permission, the ministry merely asked for all references to ‘Burma’ in 
captions for photographs to be changed to ‘Myanmar/Burma’, which 
in the circumstances was quite a reasonable request. So while this 
exhibition was very modest in scale and content, it was nevertheless 
the first public showing in Myanmar of any material about the role 
that foreign prisoners of war had played in the construction of this 
railway inside Burma, which tended to be one part of World War II 
history that the military regime normally preferred not to acknowledge 
publicly. In  other words, this was another sign of opening up and 
‘normalisation’.
Under the Thein Sein reforms after 2011, permission to open the old 
railway route to visitors was granted, and Professor Joan Beaumont, 
an ANU scholar who had worked on museums on the Thai side of the 
railway, was given permission to visit Three Pagodas Pass in January 
2013. I learnt subsequently that plans are under discussion to reopen 
a new museum about the railway in Thanbyuzayat, possibly as a Mon 
State project. Arguably, there is a consistent pattern of official interest 
in the history of the railway, although it has certainly not always 
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enjoyed high priority in Yangon. Some aspects of the way tourism has 
developed around the railway in Thailand may not be so appealing to 
more conservative Myanmar taste, but it would not be surprising if 
this whole area became much more a destination for local as well as 
overseas visitors. Australian (and British) travel companies specialising 
in war commemorations had for many years been organising small 
groups to visit Thanbyuzayat without problems, but they were never 
allowed to revisit the railway track beyond Wegale, which is only 
a few kilometres from Thanbuyzayat. 
Opera in the Strand Hotel, 2001
A more traditional event organised entirely by the embassy was a recital 
by Australian soprano Joanna Cole, who approached the embassy in 
2001 about the possibility of giving a concert in Yangon. Ms Cole was 
planning to be travelling in Southeast Asia, and she was interested 
in visiting Myanmar. As she was paying for her own travel, the costs 
for the embassy of arranging a recital for her were minimal, so we 
readily agreed, even though at that stage we had never heard of her.16 
Other  Western embassies in Yangon occasionally staged concerts as 
part of their public diplomacy efforts, so a recital of operatic arias was 
not impossible to imagine; it had just never been done before, or at least 
in recent times. The Australian Embassy had never attempted such 
an ambitious public event in Yangon, and there were no counterpart 
Burmese classical music organisations — no orchestra, no opera troupe 
— as Burmese performing arts focused entirely on Burmese classical 
genres. Neither the Australian nor Myanmar governments had any 
objections to the idea of the concert.
The recital was staged on 8 October 2001 as a free concert in the 
prestigious Strand Hotel, located, as it happens, next door to the 
embassy, and which was at that point celebrating its centenary. 
Joanna Cole chose her own program, which included arias sung in 
other settings by none other than Joan Sutherland. The embassy 
did not presume to pass judgment on the suitability of items for the 
recital, nor did the Myanmar Government. We tried to invite as many 
local artists as we could find, but they were not numerous, as Western 
16  See her CV at wp.morethanopera.com/artists/. 
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classical music, and opera in particular, had not been much encouraged 
under the cultural chauvinism of Ne Win’s time. The Myanmar Times 
generously provided prominent coverage of the occasion.17 





Reflections on Coming to Terms 
with Myanmar: Personally and as 
Convener, ANU Burma/Myanmar 
Update 2004–13
Yangon is a cosmopolitan and multicultural city that was to affect me 
greatly, both personally at the time and ‘professionally’ for the next 
decade after my retirement as an Australian civil servant/diplomat. 
None of this was predicted by me at the time, nor was it planned. I had 
greatly enjoyed my unexpected assignment as Australian Ambassador 
to Myanmar, and indeed had been disappointed when my request 
for an additional year in the position was not accepted. When I left 
Myanmar, this could have easily been the end of any interaction I had 
with Myanmar. That would have ultimately been a great let down, and 
I would have missed out on ongoing and new experiences in engaging 
with Myanmar, its people, and occasionally its leaders. Some of my 
Australian associates on Myanmar may not have even perceived much 
change in my role after my ‘retirement’ as a diplomat, but it could 
have easily been the case of a one-off assignment for me ending after 
just three years. Although I had no retirement plan on leaving Yangon, 
I am very glad Myanmar was not a one-off assignment for me. 
After I took early retirement from the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade in August 2003, I was invited to take up a (unpaid) 
position as Visiting Fellow on Myanmar/Burma in the Department 
of Political and Social Change, without any specific obligations or 
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work project in mind. So the challenge of ‘coming to terms’ with 
Myanmar remained, and for me a number of areas of ‘unmet demand’ 
proved to exist in relation to Myanmar, including the need to explain 
public developments on the basis of some direct experience and 
knowledge of dealing with leading figures in Myanmar; the need to 
assess the ongoing discourse about the encouragement or denial of 
democracy in Myanmar as objectively as possible and to balance the 
views and counter-views of those involved in the debate; and the 
need to articulate how and why any particular policy response by 
the Australian Government would be appropriate or inappropriate. 
Of course, a number of Australians were quite well qualified to do 
this, but I was the only former serving Australian diplomat who was 
absolutely free to comment.1 Some Australian scholars of Myanmar — 
such as Monique Skidmore in Canberra and Sean Turnell in Sydney 
— were frequent commentators for the international media and 
parliaments, but being in the middle of their careers, they occasionally 
felt constrained from saying too much. Nicholas Farrelly later joined 
this ‘group’ after his return to ANU from Oxford University.2
Interestingly, none of us working on Myanmar at ANU ever felt the need 
to coordinate or consult with each other about what we were saying 
publicly about Myanmar; we always felt we could do no more than 
offer our best impartial analysis and assessment. I never experienced 
any discomfort from comments about Myanmar expressed by these 
true experts, who became my friends, and I only hope they felt the 
same. Our views were certainly not identical, and that was never 
what we sought to achieve, but we all made quite a contribution to 
understanding Myanmar, not only within Australia but well beyond 
our shores as well. This was mostly on the basis of being asked to 
respond instantly about developments that might (or might not) have 
already been reported with a particular interpretation by members 
of the Burmese democracy movement. In my case, it certainly helped 
greatly to have the status of Visiting Fellow at ANU.3 ANU encouraged 
its affiliated personnel to speak to the media, without any thought 
1  For example, my predecessor as ambassador, Lyndall MacLean, was still working as 
a member of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
2  He also kindly gave me strong support for this memoir project.
3  In early 2004, I was asked to act as co-convener for ANU Burma Update, and was convener 
for the six update conferences between 2004 and 2013. The name of the conference was changed: 
initially to ‘Burma/Myanmar Update’, and then to ‘Myanmar/Burma Update’, which was soon 
shortened to ‘Myanmar Update’. 
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to restricting or controlling what they said, seeing value in their 
publicising their ANU status. (This eventually became the butt of 
local comedians’ jokes about the ABC and the SBS — the media outlets 
most frequently using university academics as a free source of ‘expert’ 
opinion for their current affairs programs.)
The Australian National University as 
a Myanmar ‘think tank’
In parallel with this, along with the rest of the outside world, the 
Australian Government had found one way it could try to come to 
terms with what was happening, and what was not happening, in 
Myanmar. This was the initiative from around 2000 to financially 
support The Australian National University’s efforts to better 
understand the various developments and underlying forces at play in 
Myanmar, and the scope these offered for opening up and encouraging 
social, political, and economic change: the  regular Burma/Myanmar 
Update Conference. In the decade after 2003, I was to become closely 
associated with this conference as a co-convener, and edited or co-
edited six collections of conference papers. 
The conferences, and the publications they spawned, point to the 
many  concerns and problems they uncovered and assessed. I had 
been invited to give a presentation at the March 2002 conference 
(while  I  was  still Australian Ambassador and was therefore 
constrained  in what I could say) just 14 months before the 30 May 
2003 attack on Aung San Suu Kyi at Depayin. A driving force 
behind the conferences was Dr Ron May, Associate Professor in the 
Department of Political and Social Change, who was not a Burma 
expert but rather a conflict resolution specialist.4 The format and 
focus of the update conferences was fairly consistent through this 
period: it sought to bring  the world’s leading Burma scholars to 
Canberra and have them present their interpretations of current 
events in Myanmar, alongside Burmese scholars and experts. In all 
cases, the objective was to hear from scholars who had recently been 
in Myanmar, and were not just examining theoretical or historical 
4  Under his tutelage, ANU was at the time sponsoring a project on ‘Regime Change and 
Regime Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific’, which published a series of research papers. 
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perspectives. Essentially, the conferences were not political and were 
not politicised; they endeavoured to consider policy options. The early 
conferences naturally focused on the debate between ‘sanctions versus 
engagement’.
The themes of the update conferences, and thus the titles and dates 
of the publications with which I was associated, were:
• The Illusion of Progress: The Political Economy of Reform in 
Burma/Myanmar (2004)
• Burma’s Long Road to National Reconciliation (2006)
• The State, Community and the Environment in Myanmar (2007)
• Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar (2008) 
• Ruling Myanmar From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections (2010)
• Myanmar’s Transition: Openings, Obstacles and Opportunities (2012)
• Debating Democratisation in Myanmar (2014)
An update conference was held in 2003, devoted solely to economic 
issues and convened by a former ANU colleague, Professor Peter 
Warr, who has a long-standing and deep interest in and knowledge 
of Myanmar. No publication was produced from this conference. 
Some comments from conveners and editors might be noteworthy. 
Launching the conference series in 1999/2000, Morten Pedersen, 
Emily Rudland, and Ron May argued that the military regime was 
in a strong position rather than a weak one, that ‘there are obstacles 
to the  achievement of peace and prosperity in Burma which go 
beyond the  formed structures of government’, and that ‘the future 
development of a well-functioning democracy in Burma critically 
depends on the emergence of a new synergy between a vibrant civil 
society and a strong, but responsive state’.5 The argument was not 
that democracy would be doomed, but ‘that it is not inevitable for the 
armed forces to fall out of power’, which ‘does not mean giving up 
hope for a positive political change’.6
5  See ‘Introduction’ to Morten B., Pedersen, Emily Rudland and R. J. May (eds), Burma 
Myanmar: Strong Regime Weak State, Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000, pp. 2–3.
6  Ibid., p. 21.
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Papers from the second update conference were not published until 
after the shock of the 30 May 2003 Depayin incident. Co-conveners 
David Mathieson and Ron May concluded that ‘as promising as many 
of the events of 2002 were in Burma, progress was largely illusory’, 
and that ‘the possible gains [for the regime] from destroying the 
domestic opposition outweighed any threat from international 
sanctions’.7 Many of the conferences’ forecasts were nevertheless very 
prescient. Editing the 2006 publication, I commented that ‘national 
reconciliation is likely to be a drawn-out gradual process rather than 
a single event or agreement’.8
As late as the 2006 and 2008 update conferences, most speakers 
from Myanmar were anxious about publishing anything abroad 
that could be viewed by the Myanmar authorities as hostile to the 
military regime. Even if we treated such speakers as ‘commentators’ 
without formal papers, they would not necessarily be exempt from 
close scrutiny and possible official reprisals. By the time of the 2010 
conference, this was no longer a concern, and Myanmar contributors 
began providing quite frank and revealing chapters. On the whole, 
Myanmar presenters were chosen for their independence, rather than 
their political affiliation. Some of our conference presenters from 
Myanmar — selected also for their ability to influence policy — went 
on to become advisors to President Thein Sein. It was always hoped 
that the conference publications would achieve some circulation and 
sales inside Myanmar, and, largely thanks to the Myanmar Book 
Company, this happened. By 2013, after reforms were becoming more 
embedded, copies of Myanmar’s Transition (2012) were observed in 
up-country bookshops. Copies of all update conference publications 
were presented to Aung San Suu Kyi and to the Myanmar Government 
(even Dictatorship, Disorder and Decline in Myanmar, with its cover 
photo of the ‘Saffron Revolution’ street protests). 
The Myanmar Embassy in Canberra was not formally invited to attend 
the conferences, although as a courtesy they were always informed 
beforehand of the program and the speakers. In the early days, their 
presence at the conference would not have been welcomed by some 
7  See ‘Introduction’ and ‘A Black Day in Burma/Myanmar’ in David S. Mathieson and 
R. J. May (eds), The Illusion of Progress: The Political Economy of Reform in Burma/Myanmar, 
Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2004, pp. 14, 303.
8  See ‘Introduction’ to Trevor Wilson (ed.), Myanmar’s Long Road to National Reconciliation, 
Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2006, p. xxxiii.
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members of the Burmese expatriate community, regardless of any 
political associations. In those days, the Myanmar Embassy received 
reports of the conference from their own supporters who had attended. 
The embassy did not attend until the 2010 conference, which included 
a former senior Myanmar diplomat among the speakers. Accordingly, 
at the 2010 conference, the Myanmar Ambassador (who was known 
as a supporter of reforms) attended unobtrusively, without notice, 
and without fuss. No Myanmar Government speaker was invited to 
the conference until the 2013 conference, when the Deputy Minister 
for National Planning and Economic Development (a former academic 
economist) attended. Maintaining a careful distance from politics 
and from both governments undoubtedly helped the conference. 
It goes without saying that neither DFAT nor AusAID ever attempted 
to interfere with the content or character of the conference. In its 
format, the conference resembled most of the other country update 
conferences sponsored by ANU.
The Australian National University Myanmar/Burma Update 
Conference has been unique: nowhere else was there a conference 
that looked at contemporary Myanmar in a dispassionate way. To a 
considerable extent, this goal was greatly assisted by the many 
prominent and respected Burmese who came from Myanmar to speak 
about how things really were inside Myanmar. Some of them did 
this at some personal risk. Some prominent international observers 
of Burma regarded it as a very valuable and significant institution. 
It achieved considerable profile around the world, among scholars 
and governments alike. Burma scholars from around the world were 
prepared to participate in the conferences. Generating specific policy 
or other outcomes was not the objective of these conferences, but they 
certainly encouraged networking across borders, and they certainly 
enhanced Australian understanding of Myanmar. One notable feature 
was the enduring support and loyalty to the conference shown by 
Australian NGOs and individuals working with Myanmar, as well as 
the Australian Government’s former aid agency, AusAID.9
9  On 18 September 2013, the new Australian Prime Minister, Mr Tony Abbott, announced that 
the Australian Agency for International Development would be integrated into to Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Mr Abbott said: ‘I intend to recommend to the Governor-General 
that the Australian Agency for International Development be integrated into the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, enabling the aid and diplomatic arms of Australia’s international 
policy agenda to be more closely aligned.’ The new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ms Julie Bishop, 
was also appointed Minister for International Development.
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Epilogue
The glimmers of hope that prompted many to anticipate that change 
might be coming in Myanmar in 2000 were extinguished in 2003–04 
by the actions of the military regime. However, the desire for change 
and a better life did not disappear. It took a few years for the tide to 
turn in favour of change, but turn it did: further triggers for significant 
change could be observed in 2007 (the ‘Saffron Revolution’), in 2008 
(Cyclone Nargis), and in 2010 (general elections). Myanmar now seems 
to be one of the few countries undergoing a political transition that 
is largely, but not entirely, peaceful and which has been sustained for 
more than a short time. The origins of the changes are largely home-
grown and can be traced back to the period around 2000, if not before 
then. But, unlike some countries, change in Myanmar has been greatly 
influenced by international factors — much more than the Myanmar 
military leadership would like to acknowledge, and perhaps somewhat 
less than many in the international community would recognise or 
believe should occur. 
Yet, realistically and objectively — despite the various stratagems 
deployed by interested parties from time to time, and despite many 
outspoken statements and allegations by different parties along 
the way — Myanmar’s problems have been quite steadily set on 
a ‘long  road to reconciliation’ which will hopefully incorporate 
reforms more along the lines of what all stakeholders would prefer, 
or at least could live with, in a more or less ongoing trajectory — one 
satisfactorily ‘owned’ by the Myanmar people themselves. Some found 
it distasteful that, in the case of Myanmar, this ‘road’ was determined 
by the military regime; but, pragmatically, without military backing 
of some kind, the only way to move forward would have probably 
been through outright conflict. It seemed contrarian in the least, and 
to some people quite unprincipled, to try to argue that the cause of 
the democracy movement should not be accepted uncritically or in 
toto as the appropriate way forward, which explains why debates 
about ‘sanctions versus engagement’ were conducted so vehemently. 
Yet surely, if the authoritarian regime is even slightly open to outside 
ideas and to outside influence, and if it  can be demonstrated that 
communication with — and pressure on — the authoritarian regime 
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has provided concrete examples of compromise and reconciliation, it 
would be not only foolish but dangerous to ignore what might be 
called a ‘managed approach’ to change and transformation. 
My overwhelming reaction on observing conditions on the ground 
was that things were not nearly as bad in Myanmar as they were 
being presented internationally by the activist movement and the 
media. Although my opinion was never sought on whether or not 
‘extra-judicial killings’ were widespread and whether or not massive 
repression of free speech was endemic, I knew that while many people 
in Myanmar were quite unhappy, many were also managing well 
enough, and the Myanmar situation did not seem nearly as bad as that 
in many other countries. Obviously, the wider lessons for effective 
resolution of deeply intransigent conflict are plainly present in the 
case of Myanmar — and are probably applicable for other situations. 
They include the overriding importance of the maximum possible 
transparency, as a means of reassuring all concerned about the process 
of change; and, conversely, the risks of unnecessary secrecy, especially 
because it subverts the benefits of openness; the value of occasional 
self-restraint in terms of not insisting on one’s own interests all the 
time, when differing interests have to be accommodated at some 
point; the essentiality of maintaining lines of communication, even 
when worst-case scenarios ensure; and, ultimately, the folly of a non-
inclusive approach that does not involve all possible stakeholders at 
all times, even those not initially fully committed to a shared outcome. 
While The Australian National University awarding an Honorary 
Doctorate of Letters to Aung San Suu Kyi in 2013 was obviously a 
high point in any terms, it has been especially gratifying to see and 
work with some of the students who have won Australian Government 
scholarships to study for postgraduate degrees after 2010. Their 
personal and intellectual qualities, as well as their determination to 
enhance their capabilities to contribute more effectively to Myanmar’s 
development, have been truly exceptional. 
The Australian National University decision in 2015 to establish 
a  Myanmar Research Centre in the College of Asia and the Pacific 
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